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Abstract 
 
This thesis addresses the issue of compliance requirements under international law. 
Compliance with international norms is a contested issue. On the one hand the meaning 
of compliance is contingent on the theory of international law one holds. But on the other 
hand, the requirements for compliance are not clearly set out in the norm itself. This is 
problematic as the increased normative impact of international law brings more non-state 
actors under the regulation of regimes devised to regulate state activities. Compliance is 
expected of non-state actors with international norms, the compliance requirements of 
which are not clear even for states, the intended regulatees. Also, as the reach of 
international law expands, international law is under threat of fragmentation This means 
actors must contend with competing compliance requirements further prompting a need 
to identify those requirements more clearly and systematically. A general scheme for 
identifying such compliance requirements could help improve understanding of the 
meaning of compliance and improve levels of compliance. I propose such a scheme by 
critically examining key aspects of the concept of compliance and reviewing compliance 
theories. The thesis then sets out a Compliance Strategy and Framework (CSF) to 
systematically identify compliance requirements under international law. I then provide a 
Compliance Framework (CF), which sets out those requirements. This scheme will of 
necessity be of a general nature to be adapted in application to particular issue areas of 
international law. I illustrate the Compliance Strategy and Framework (CSF) by adapting 
it to the area of human rights. Specifically I show how the CSF may be applied to identify 
compliance requirements with the human rights associated with participation and 
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accountability and I extend that example with a simple illustration aimed at using the 
CSF to identify the World Bank’s compliance requirements in relation to those human 
rights in the context of a Bank project. Finally, my thesis contends that the CSF is a valid 
scheme, according to international law, for identifying compliance requirements with 
norms of international law. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1. Outlining the problem 
This thesis examines the issue of systematically identifying requirements for an actor’s 
compliance with norms of international law. Obviously, the issue of compliance is 
important for international law, as for all legal and regulatory systems, and so various 
commentators have examined it, producing theories for why actors comply with 
international law1. But while such theories have provided insights into the motivations for 
an actor’s complying with international law, the issue of how an actor might achieve 
compliance has not been systematically addressed. This thesis sets out to do so. In 
particular, this thesis examines the issue of systematically identifying compliance 
requirements for actors in relation to norms of international law. The aim is to identify, 
describe and examine requirements for such compliance, and in so doing to suggest a 
strategy and framework as a solution for the identification of such requirements for use in 
specific cases. 
 
There is no universally authoritative definition of the concept of compliance. The 
literature provides various definitions of the concept such as: 
                                                 
1
 Andrew Guzman, How International Law Works, Oxford University Press, 2007, Markus Burgstaller, 
Theories Of Compliance With International Law, Brill Academic Publishers, 2004, Beth A. Simmons, 
‘Compliance with International Agreements’, 1 Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. (1998), pp. 75-93, Daniel E. Ho, 
‘Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do Countries Implement the Basle Accord?’, 5 J. Int’l Econ. 
L., 647 (2002). 
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a. ‘a state of conformity or identity between an actor’s behaviour and a specified 
rule’2 
b. a ‘factual matching of state behaviour and international norms.’3 
c. ‘whether countries in fact adhere to the provisions of the accord and to the 
implementing measures that have been instituted.’4 
d. ‘[conformity] between the conduct required of the state by [an international] 
obligation and the conduct actually adopted by the state – i.e. between the 
requirements of international law and the facts of the matter.5 
e. ‘the fulfilment by the contracting parties of their obligations under a 
multilateral … agreement’.6 
While there may be no universal authoritative definition of ‘compliance’7 , common 
features of a definition of the concept can be discerned and would arguably comprise at 
                                                 
2
 Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law, International Relations and Compliance’, in 
Walter Carlnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, Handbook of International Relations, Sage 
Publications, 2002, pp.538-558 at p. 539. 
3
 Dinah Shelton, ‘Introduction’, in Dinah Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: the role of non-
binding norms in the international legal system, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 5. 
4
 Harold K. Jacobson and Edith Brown Weiss, Engaging Countries: Strengthening compliance with 
international environmental accords, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998, p. 4. 
5
 James Crawford, International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, text, and 
commentaries, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 125. The definition is an adaptation of the ILC’s 
description of non-compliance: ‘the breach of an international obligation consists in the disconformity 
between the conduct required of the state by that obligation and the conduct actually adopted by the state – 
i.e. between the requirements of international law and the facts of the matter.’ 
6
 United Nations Environment Programme, Manual on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements, June 2006, p. 59. The definition adapts the UNEP’s definition of compliance 
with international environmental agreements: ‘ “Compliance” means the fulfilment by the contracting 
parties of their obligations under a multilateral environmental agreement and any amendments to the 
multilateral environmental agreement’. 
7One reason for the lack of an authoritative definition of ‘compliance’ as noted by the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), in the context of negotiating multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs), is that in practice ‘definitions often are vague so as to reach consensus in negotiating an MEA and 
to maintain flexibility in evolution of an MEA’. The UNEP further noted that its definition of compliance 
was ‘designed to be consistent with international definitions (to the extent they exist) and usages’, and that 
it derived the definition through consultations with various MEA Secretariats State Parties. United Nations 
Environment Programme, Manual on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements, June 2006, p. 60. 
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least these three elements: (1) the conformation of (2) the actor’s conduct to (3) an 
applicable norm or rule. 
 
The conduct of each actor will be governed by its ‘operative normative environment’, 
which comprises both legally and non-legally binding norms applicable to that actor and 
its conduct8. The situation where an actor is motivated or expected to comply with a norm 
of international law is referred to here as a compliance situation. Compliance theories 
explain the motivations for an actor’s compliance with its applicable norms, that is, the 
motivations for the actor to produce conduct conforming to such norms. But, as noted 
above, the issue of how to systematically think through the actor’s requirements for 
producing the conforming conduct in  a particular compliance situation has not been 
addressed. 
 
So while the definitions say what compliance is, i.e. conforming or matching conduct, 
they do not specify what the actor is to do in order to comply. This can give rise to 
uncertainty as to what to do in order to comply and to the risk of non-compliance. 
International treaty norms for example are not always clear as to what conduct they 
require of states. So state officials have to assess what to do to comply. A systematic 
approach to identifying the state’s compliance requirements could help reduce the 
uncertainty in determining what to do to comply. 
 
                                                 
8
 Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of 
International Law’, 19 Michigan Journal of International Law, 345 (1998), p. 363. 
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The need to know what to do to comply is not restricted to state actors. International 
law’s reach has expanded to cover the conduct of non-state actors. But there is an added 
dimension to non-state actors determining what to do to comply with a norm of 
international law norm. Those norms are designed for states. So there is the issue of 
transposing and adapting those norms to the characteristics of the non-state actor. 
 
The interpretation of the content of norms by international administrative bodies and 
tribunals can help states define what they must do to comply with an international norm. 
But the idea of compliance requirements, as discussed in the next section, extends beyond 
the content of the norm. As will be shown, compliance requirements help orchestrate the 
course of conduct an actor adopts in order to achieve compliance with an applicable norm 
of international law.  
 
But interpretation of the norm can be of limited assistance where the norm is not 
legally binding. Because such norms are usually not subject to rules of treaty 
interpretation as with the case of states, without clear, authoritative interpretation, the 
uncertainty involved in determining what to do to comply with an international norm can 
be heightened. The norm’s perceived lack of legitimacy because of its lack of clarity may 
also undermine compliance with such norms. 
 
The expanded reach of international law has also given rise to the problem of 
overlapping and parallel regulations governing a compliance situation. For an actor, 
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working out its compliance requirements in such situations may be particularly 
problematic and uncertain, and carry a higher risk of non-compliance. 
 
The following examples highlight some of the issues that can arise in relation to 
identifying an actor’s compliance requirements with norms of international law. 
 
The first example concerns the findings that a mining company in India did not 
respect the rights of a resident tribal community. The findings were made by the United 
Kingdom’s National Contact Point under the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (the Guidelines). Under the Guidelines, companies registered in the territory 
of member state are expect to comply with certain norms while undertaking operations 
overseas. One of those norms is that the company would ‘respect human rights’ where it 
operates. And under the Guidelines, a process exists where complaints of the company’s 
non-compliance with the applicable guideline can be made to the OECD’s National 
Contact Point (NCP) in the company’s home state. An NGO brought such a complaint 
against the company, Vedanta Plc, and the UK’s NCP found that 
Vedanta, through its Indian subsidiary, did not respect the rights and freedoms of the 
Dongria Kondh consistent with India’s commitments under various international human 
rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
People.9 
 
                                                 
9
 NCP Final Statement, ‘Summary of the Conclusions’. 
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The issues raised by this example are the following: 
1. How were norms designed for states transposed onto a non-state actor? 
2. How would Vedanta plc have been able to validly identify its compliance 
requirements with the norms concerned? 
3. How would it be possible to delineate what Vedanta was supposed to do and what the 
state was supposed to do? 
4. How to coordinate findings such as the NCPs with the findings of the state where the 
state also investigates the issue? In this case, India’s investigation showed Vedanta’s 
subsidiary had violated environmental laws but not apparently any human rights laws 
in India. 
 
The second example concerns the World Bank and its engagement with human rights 
issues in connection with its projects. The World Bank has consistently maintained it 
does not have obligations under international law in relation to the human rights of the 
people affected by its programmes and projects10. However, the Bank recognises that the 
realisation of human rights in the countries and communities where it operates is a 
relevant factor in achieving its mandate. For instance, the Bank has acknowledged that 
political rights such as the right to participation are relevant to the success and 
sustainability of its projects. Thus, in a 1995 legal opinion, the Bank’s General Counsel 
posited the following scenario in which the Bank may legitimately promote individual 
                                                 
10
 Ibrahim Shihata, ‘The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal Issues and the Record 
of Achievements’, 17(1) Den. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 39. 
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political rights in the interest of a project’s needs and withhold funding if such rights 
were not protected11: 
The Bank, benefiting from its experience in development finance, seeks participation of affected 
people in the design and implementation of many types of projects it finances, and requires 
consultation with local communities and local NGOs in the preparation of the ‘environment 
assessment’ of projects with significant impact on the environment. Such participation and 
consultation, to be useful at all, require a reasonable measure of free expression and assembly. The 
Bank would, in my view, be acting within proper limits if it asked that this freedom be insured 
when needed for the above purposes. Its denial of lending for a given project in the absence of this 
requirement where it applies cannot be reasonably described as an illegitimate interference in the 
political affairs of the country concerned, just because the rights to free expression and assembly 
in general are normally listed among political rights. 
 
The issues raised in the World Bank example are: 
1. How are the World Bank’s own compliance requirements relating to human rights 
norms to be identified, if the Bank finds that the enjoyment of such rights is relevant 
to its mandate? 
2. How to delineate what the Bank is supposed to do compared with what the state is to 
do. 
 
As the examples above illustrates, actors can face conflicting normative regimes with 
their respective compliance pressures and requirements. Questions arising include: 
a. Which human rights are in issue? 
b. Are the requirements of the corporation or of the World Bank the same as those of the 
states concerned? 
                                                 
11
 World Bank, Prohibition of Political Activities in the Bank’s Work, Legal opinion of the General 
Counsel, 11 July 1995 (SecM95-707, July 12, 1995), in Ibrahim Shihata, World Bank Legal Papers, 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2000, p. 235. 
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c. How do the requirements of the corporation or of the World Bank relate to those of 
the states concerned? 
 
The above examples indicate the importance of being able to systematically identify 
an actor’s compliance requirements in relation to norms of international law. Yet to do 
involves facing certain issues arising from the concept of compliance itself. For example, 
compliance and non-compliance are not always necessarily binary conditions. They can 
be binary in nature when the norm concerned prescribes some limit that the actor’s 
conduct must not transgress such as maximum allowed levels of pollution. But even with 
this example, there is an issue of sustaining compliance, assuming the actor currently 
complies with the pollution limit. Sustaining that compliance will involve certain 
behavioural undertakings or patterns on the part of the actor. Compliance is thus an 
ongoing phenomenon, suggesting that it is critical to focus on the various elements of 
behaviour or conduct that go towards achieving compliance and would in themselves be 
evidence of the actor’s compliance. 
 
 Further, the circumstances of the actors of whom compliance with a norm is 
expected also vary meaning their capacities to comply with a norm will vary12. In such 
cases, the problem of compliance is less likely to be conceived of in binary terms but 
rather viewed in terms of degrees of compliance13. Here the determination of compliance 
will be a more subjective exercise with perhaps greater emphasis being laid on 
                                                 
12
 Dinah Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: the role of non-binding norms in the international 
legal system, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
13
 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The new sovereignty: compliance with international 
regulatory agreements, Harvard University Press, 1998. 
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progressively moving the situation to one of better or improved compliance. That 
emphasis then must necessarily involve a focus on the actor’s efforts to comply with the 
norm, including elements of the actor’s behaviour or conduct that go towards achieving 
such compliance. 
 
Attempts at achieving or sustaining compliance may prove unsuccessful but may 
not be rectified because neither the actor nor an external observer is able to determine 
that certain compliance requirements were not undertaken. However, even where non-
compliance may be relatively easily detected, the issue remains of what the actor must do 
or refrain from doing in order to return to a state of compliance. It is suggested that if the 
actor’s compliance requirements were systematically thought through before the 
compliance effort is undertaken, there is a greater likelihood of compliance with the 
international norm in question. There would probably also be more efficient learning 
across actors in terms of what works in order to comply with a particular norm. 
 
And bearing in mind international law norms can regulate the conduct of actors 
even when not legally binding, and can conflict in specific cases, an approach based on 
systematically identifying compliance requirements can help improve the coherence of 
international law by emphasising the compliance pressure and resulting compliance-
seeking behaviour relating to a specific international law norm. This is because this 
approach can apply to all actors irrespective whether the norm is legally binding, as the 
key issue is whether a compliance-seeking effect arises, and facilitates the resolution of 
20 
 
any conflict between issue areas by promoting the self-conscious and transparent 
balancing of potentially competing values and visions. 
 
For the reasons above and the situations or cases identified above, the need to 
identify an actor’s compliance requirements in relation to norms of international law can 
arise. Accordingly, a systematic review and approach to identifying such compliance 
requirements can be useful. This thesis attempts to do that. The next section examines the 
concept of compliance requirements relating to norms of international law. 
 
1.2. Compliance requirements 
This section explains the concept of compliance requirements more fully. As the idea of 
compliance with norms of international law includes the idea of compliance with 
international obligations, examples from the law on state responsibility, which concerns 
the consequences of non-compliance with international obligations, are pertinent and can 
help in explaining the concept of compliance requirements. It can do so by analogy with 
the idea of conduct or actions required of states for compliance with obligations under 
international law. 
 
The law on state responsibility sets out the conditions in international law under 
which states are considered responsible for internationally wrongful acts, as well as the 
consequences that flow from such acts.14 An act of a state that is internationally wrongful 
                                                 
14
 James Crawford, International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, text, 
and commentaries, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 74. 
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can be an act or an omission, attributable to the state, that constitutes a breach of the 
state’s international obligation. 15  And as recalled from the previous section, the 
International Law Commission’s (ILC) concept of a breach of an international obligation 
provided a definition of compliance in terms of conduct conforming to an actor’s 
international obligation. 
 
But the conforming conduct itself is the subject-matter of the obligation, whereas the 
concept of compliance requirement is concerned with the requirements on the part of the 
actor, that go to producing the conforming conduct. In its final draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, the ILC does not provide any focus or guidance on the requirements that 
go to producing the conduct on the part of the state actor that conforms with the state’s 
international obligations. This is because the ILC’s focus was on when an international 
wrong arises or when a breach of an international obligation occurs.16 And so the ILC 
notes that:  
“Whether there has been an internationally wrongful act depends, first, on the 
requirements of the obligation which is said to have been breached”.17 
And elsewhere: 
“But in the final analysis, whether and when there has been a breach of an obligation 
depends on the precise terms of the obligation, its interpretation and application, taking 
into account its object and purpose and the facts of the case.”18 
 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., page 81. 
16
 And the consequences in terms of international responsibility that would follow. 
17
 James Crawford, International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, text, 
and commentaries, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 77. 
18
 James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, 
Text and Commentaries, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 125. 
22 
 
As such the focus is on the end-state situation, specifically when there may be said to 
have been non-compliance with an international obligation, and not, as mentioned, on 
what the state actor is required to do to produce that situation.  
 
However, the ILC’s earlier work on state responsibility addressed concepts that can 
help explain the idea of ‘compliance requirements’ and in so doing situate it within the 
body of international law. In that earlier work, the ILC drew a distinction between 
international obligations that are characterised as obligations of conduct and obligations 
of results19. Obligations of conduct refer to obligations to perform or to refrain from 
performing a specified action20. The failure to undertake that conduct would prima facie 
constitute an internationally wrongful act attracting international responsibility 21 . 
Obligations of result refer to obligations to achieve a specified result, outcome or state of 
affairs. The means by which the state is to achieve that result are not specified by the 
obligation. So the state has discretion over what means to adopt to achieve the result 
required by an international obligation of result22. 
 
                                                 
19
 The idea of an obligation of result and that of an obligation of conduct was considered by the 
International Law Commission at an earlier stage in its work on state responsibility. While noting these 
concepts have become an “accepted part of the language of international law”, the International Law 
Commission deleted them from its final draft articles on state responsibility. The ILC concluded the 
concepts were not determinative of when an international wrong occurred triggering a State’s international 
responsibility. James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: 
Introduction, Text and Commentaries, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 20 - 22. 
20
 Report of the International Law Commission (1977) 2 Yrbk. ILC 12, para. 1. 
21
 Report of the International Law Commission (1977) 2 Yrbk. ILC 18, para. 23. 
22
 Report of the International Law Commission (1977) 2 Yrbk. ILC 12, para. 1, “There are other cases in 
which the international obligation only requires the State to bring about a certain situation or result, leaving 
it free to do so by whatever means it chooses.” 
23 
 
The ILC went on to note that “every international obligation has an object or, one 
might say, a result [that] requires of the obligated State a certain course of conduct.”23. So 
under an obligation of result, the state actor is obligated to achieve a specified result by 
undertaking a particular course of conduct. The same can logically be said of obligations 
of conduct where the action specifically determined in the obligation must result from a 
certain course of conduct undertaken by the state. For instance, Article 6(2) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 24  consists of an 
obligation of conduct because its requires of states parties a specifically determined 
action, namely that: 
The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include technical and vocational guidance and training 
programmes.25 (emphasis added) 
 
Clearly the state party complying with Article 6(2) will have to undertake ‘a certain 
course of conduct’ to provide the ‘technical and vocational guidance and training 
programmes’ stipulated in the provision. In this sense the distinction between ‘obligations 
of conduct’ and ‘obligations of result’ is a distinction without a difference, at least for the 
purposes of determining when an international wrong had occurred, which was one of the 
reasons why that distinction was deleted from the final draft Articles on State 
Responsibility.26 
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But the fate of the ILC’s distinction between obligations of conduct and result is not 
relevant to the purpose here of explaining the concept of compliance requirements in 
relation to norms of international law by analogy with the idea of conduct or actions 
required of states for compliance with obligations under international law. Instead what is 
relevant to note is that ‘the course of conduct’ required to comply with an international 
norm is the object of interest and is by definition never specified, being left to the actor to 
determine in any particular case. Nevertheless, what is evident from the ILC’s 1977 
report on its work on state responsibility is that what it had in mind when it discussed 
these concepts was that ‘course of conduct’ was synonymous with the measures the state 
actor may take to attain the result specified in an obligation of result.27 And an example 
of such a measure that the ILC referred to was the enactment of relevant legislation.28 
 
But identifying the measures an actor ought to take to comply with an international 
norm, while necessary, is insufficient to fully identify its compliance requirements in 
relation to that norm. Take the example of a state faced with the obligation in Article 6(2) 
of the ICESCR of having to provide the ‘technical and vocational guidance and training 
programmes’. There may be legislative, administrative, financial and technical measures 
the state would have to take to comply with this obligation. But there is also a need to 
systematically and validly think through how these measures would have to be 
orchestrated to produce the result required of the obligation, or in other words, for the 
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state’s conduct to conform to that required by the obligation. For instance, how to 
account for the possibility that the legislation adopted has unintended negative effects? 
Or how to think through the monitoring of the measures adopted by the actor when they 
are applied in practice? These considerations need to be accounted for in addition to the 
measures comprising an actor’s ‘course of conduct’ when seeking what the actor is to do 
to comply with an applicable international norm. 
 
So some other requirements for compliance are needed in addition to the elements of 
a course of conduct the actor may adopt. The other requirements can be identified from 
theories of compliance with international norms and from considerations arising from the 
concept of compliance itself. Together with the acts or omissions comprising an actor’s 
adopted course of conduct for complying with an international norm, these other 
requirements make up the set of compliance requirements relating to a particular actor in 
a particular situation. Thus the compliance requirements relating to an international norm 
can be defined as the set of acts and omissions, plus the considerations for orchestrating 
them, that are required for an actor to achieve or maintain compliance in a particular 
case or compliance situation. 
 
In sum, compliance requirements comprise behaviours dictated by the content of a norm 
as well as the procedural or organisational aspects of achieving compliance with the norm. 
In other words, where the approach to an issue is norm compliance, the range of 
prescriptions that may be validly considered can be broader that those comprising the 
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content of a norm as decision-makers have to make an ex ante determination of what they 
need to do in order to comply with a norm. 
 
So in any compliance situation there will be the following three basis for the actor’s 
compliance requirements, namely (1) the theories of compliance, (2) considerations 
arising from the concept of compliance and (3) the applicable international norms. Basis 
(1) and (2) are addressed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, while basis (3) is addressed in 
Chapters 3 and 5. 
 
One feature worth noting about the idea of ‘compliance requirements’ is that it is 
broad in scope. Firstly, it applies to non-binding as well as binding international norms. 
Second, it applies to compliance situations involving states as well as non-state actors 
like corporations and international organisations. The idea of ‘course of conduct’ is not 
limited to cases involving states’ compliance with international obligations and so a way 
to systematically think through what is to be done to comply with an international law, or 
‘the course of conduct’ that can apply to both states and non-state actors can be useful. 
 
It needs to be explained how the idea of ‘compliance requirements’ relates to the 
content of a international norm. Whether  it is prescribed by the norm or not, the content 
of the norm must still be worked out for a particular compliance situation. This is because 
the compliance requirements must work to that content. That content can be identified by 
interpretation according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties29 if it is a treaty 
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norm. Or that content can be identified by some other mode of authoritative interpretation, 
for example by an international tribunal. So in undertaking that review the international 
tribunal or body would have to interpret and apply the obligation to the case before it. In 
doing so it would employ concepts like reasonableness, the margin of appreciation and 
proportionality. As such those concepts would operate to define the obligations 
requirements of the actor and allow the international tribunal or body to see if the actor 
has acted in a manner that is “not in conformity with what is required of it by that 
obligation”30. Those concepts will also define part of the compliance requirements of the 
actor concerned and can be transposed to the case of an actor not legally bound by the 
international norm that imposed that obligation but is nevertheless seeking or expected to 
comply with that norm. 
 
And such a transposition would be valid because: 
(1) Implicitly, the underlying rationale of those concepts would probably 
apply where the norm was not binding. 
(2) Explicitly, the non-binding norm could be based on the binding norm ‘as 
interpreted and applied’. 
(3) The non-binding norm itself could be ‘interpreted and applied’. For 
instance, non-binding guidelines can be given an authoritative 
interpretation.  
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In conclusion, this section explained and defined the concept of compliance 
requirements with norms of international law. The next section addresses some other 
relevant conceptual considerations. 
 
1.3. Conceptual considerations 
The subject addressed in this thesis is the identification of an actor’s compliance 
requirements in relation to norms of international law. Two concepts relating to that 
subject need to be examined further. One is the concept of actor under international law. 
The other is the concept of norm of international law. These concepts and particular 
considerations relating to them from the perspective of compliance with international law 
norms will be discussed in this section. 
 
1.3.1. Actors 
The concept of actor under international law has traditionally referred to states. The fact 
of states as the makers of international law and international law as the law governing the 
relations between states clearly meant that states were subjects of international law and as 
such possessed international legal personality, that is the ability to possess duties and 
exercise rights under international law. The more prominent role played by international 
organisations after World War Two led to their also being recognised as possessing 
international legal personality.31 Whereas states enjoy full legal personality, international 
organisations have limited legal personality, shaped to the extent needed to carry out their 
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functions and tasks. But whether their personality was full or limited, these actors could 
acquire duties and obligations under international, giving rise to issues as to whether they 
were or were not in compliance with the international norms that applied to them. 
 
But international law has widened in scope over the years and now instruments 
and norms of international law may be directed not only at states and international 
organisations but also at other non-state actors like individuals and corporations.32 So 
now the category of ‘actor under international law’, or more accurately, ‘actor whose 
conduct is governed by a norm or norms of international law’ is a very broad one. For 
instance, as noted in relation to the Vedanta plc example given in the previous section, 
corporations, which otherwise do not have legal obligations under international law 
concerning human rights, can be expected to comply with the norm ‘respect human 
rights’, and be held accountable for not respecting international recognised human rights 
in their operations in a particular country. 
 
The actor’s normative characteristics 
Thus an actor can be expected to comply with a norm of international law even if 
such a norm is not legally binding on the actor under international law. Instead, from a 
compliance perspective, the key characteristic of an actor to consider it its operative 
normative environment.33 An actor’s operative normative environment refers to all the 
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norms applicable to the actor, or governing its conduct, at any one time34. The norms may 
be applicable due to the operation of law, the actor’s voluntary acceptance of them, or 
because of societal expectations that the actor comply with them. Whatever is the basis 
for the norm’s application will depend on the characteristics of the particular actor. 
Accordingly, the actor’s characteristics, specifically their normative aspects, will be one 
key determinant for identifying its compliance requirements relating to the relevant 
international law norms in a particular case. 
 
While the idea of ‘norms of international law’ and the nature of norms will be 
further developed in the next section, a particular implication of the fact that actors can 
face expectations of compliance with norms of international law even if they lack 
international legal personality bears noting. This decoupling of compliance from an 
actor’s international legal personality means that analysing an actor’s conduct from a 
compliance perspective can give a more complete picture of the regulatory effect of 
international law as that regulatory effect is not limited to cases where actors have duties 
under international law. This implication is relevant for instance in cases where some 
states may not have signed and ratified certain treaties but yet are not free to act contrary 
to the particular treaty provisions. And it has resonance in cases where gaps in 
international law may be noted as in the example of corporations that lack obligations 
concerning human rights under international law but whose conduct can substantially 
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affect the enjoyment of those rights or the ability of states to meet their obligations 
regarding human rights. 
 
As already noted, companies can face expectations of compliance with 
internationally recognised human rights norms even where such norms are not legally 
binding or where the companies may not have voluntarily adhered to them. So perceived 
gaps in international law may not appear to be so in terms of an actor’s actual conduct, 
suggesting, as indicated, that the regulatory effect of international law may be more 
coherent and whole in practice. It is thus submitted that such a characterisation of 
international law’s regulatory effect can be better analysed from a compliance 
perspective. 
 
But the application of international law norms to a variety of actors irrespective of 
their international legal personality can give rise to the problem of systematically 
identifying their compliance requirements, especially where such norms are usually 
designed to regulate state conduct. In such cases, the issue arises as to how those norms 
may be translated or transposed to the case of non-state actors. As noted in the Section 
1.1, even the requirements for compliance with international law norms that are legally 
binding on state actors may not be precisely known because the content of such norms 
have not been precisely defined.  
 
Although there is no systematic approach to the issue of validly and appropriately 
transposing the compliance requirements in relation to an international norm from one 
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category of actor to another, ad hoc examples of doing so exist. So for instance, the 
codified customary law of treaties has been transposed to the case of international 
organisations.35 And elements of the international law of responsibility for states and of 
criminal responsibility for individuals have been transposed to the case of identifying the 
human rights duties of corporations. 36  In the latter case it was suggested that in 
transposing the norms concerned it was necessary to explicitly recognise where the norms 
relating to one category of actor could apply to another category of actor and where they 
would not. In the specific case, this involved determining ‘the similarity or differences 
between corporate behaviour in the area of human rights and individual or state 
behaviour’, the norms being transposable, at least prima facie arguably so, where the 
behaviour was similar as to how it affected the enjoyment of human rights37. 
 
It is submitted that recognising such similarities or differences in behaviour 
involves a focus on the actor’s operational characteristics. Such a focus should go 
together with a consideration of an actor’s normative characteristics, such as that 
discussed above in relation to the actor’s normative environment, to determine 
comprehensively the norms applicable to the actor, whatever the issue area and whether 
the norms are legally or non-legally binding. The focus on the actor’s operational 
characteristics, from the perspective of compliance, is discussed next. 
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The actor’s operational characteristics 
As mentioned the operational characteristics of the actor are a key factor to consider and 
will influence the compliance requirements identified for an actor in relation to the 
international norms applying to it. This is because the manner of the actor’s operations 
will determine to a large extent the manner in which its conduct affects the rights and 
interests protected by such norms. In this regard the compliance requirements for a state 
actor and for a non-state actor will differ because they operate differently from one 
another, including in the manner which affects the subject-matter of international norms. 
But, it may be the case that at a general level there is similarity in operation and this 
allows the transposition of the norms regulating states to the regulation of like conduct by 
non-state actors. Nevertheless, the specific compliance requirements will likely still be 
influenced by the particulars of the actor’s operations. 
 
 Another reason why the actor’s operational characteristics matter for the 
identification of its compliance requirements is that those requirements will depend on 
the actor’s capacity to comply. 38  And that capacity is a function of the actor’s 
characteristics. For instance, a state’s administrative capacity is a key determinant of its 
compliance with international norms.39 A number of factors are found to be relevant in 
this regard; the education and training levels of administrative staff, the financial support 
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given to administrative agencies, and whether administrative bodies or officers are 
cloaked with adequate authority to carry out the tasks assigned to them. 
 
 Capacity builds up over time so different actors will be situated differently in 
terms of their ability to comply with international norms depending on how they have 
performed in relation to the subject-matter of the norms in the past. Actors that already 
have a good track record of performance in a subject area are likely to be better able to 
comply with international norms regulating that area.40 And while economic factors can 
be important determinants of the ability to comply, in many cases the issue may not be 
how many resources are available but how well or appropriately the available resources 
are employed. Thus it have been found that in the area of newborn and maternal health, 
variations in health outcomes sometimes had less to do with a country’s economic 
position than with whether its health personnel were applying appropriate techniques and 
interventions. The level of training, as mentioned above, can thus be a stronger 
determinant in such instances.41 
 
 Governance factors are another facet of an actor’s capacity to comply. In large 
countries and large organisations, especially multinational corporations with operations in 
different countries, it may be more difficult to control local units and ensure they all 
operate to the same level. 42  Also the extent to which political systems operate 
                                                 
40
 Harold K. Jacobson and Edith Brown Weiss, ‘Strengthening Compliance’, p. 140. 
41
 Shyama Kuruvilla, Flavia Bustreo, Paul Hunt, Amarjit Singh, et al., ‘The Millennium Development 
Goals and Human Rights: Realizing Shared Commitments’, Human Rights Quarterly 34 (2012), 141-177. 
42
 Harold K. Jacobson and Edith Brown Weiss, ‘Strengthening Compliance’, p. 142. 
35 
 
transparently and allow watchdog groups like relevant civic groups and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) to operate effectively, affects the level of 
compliance with international norms. With transparency and effective watchdogs groups 
there can be better performance of an actor’s efforts at compliance and less chance for the 
actor to deviate from compliance or for efforts at compliance to stall or take a wrong turn 
so that time and resources are wasted.43 
 
 But it is not only collective actors that can make a difference to levels of 
compliance. The attitudes and capabilities of individuals matters as well. For instance, 
national leaders or leaders of corporations can make a difference to how well states or 
corporations comply with international norms. For instance an international oil company 
operating in an Asian country would choose to comply with its own stricter 
environmental codes than the country’s environmental laws because the company’s chief 
executive office (CEO) had made it a priority to ensure the company’s operations would 
not adversely affect the environment. And because the company’s managers in the Asia 
country knew that if there were to be an environmental problem it would definitely be 
brought to the CEO’s attention, they ensured that operations in that country complied 
with the company’s environmental codes.44 
 
 In addition to an organisation’s leaders, the attitudes of individuals affected by the 
organisation’s activities matters as well. With greater access to information, individuals 
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are better able to demand their rights and entitlements. Having information and access to 
information can be empowering and has a heritage reaching back to the first printing 
presses that made books and phamplets more cheaply and readily available helped spread 
the ideas of representative government and individuals rights and liberties that scholars 
and individuals like Jonh Locke and Thomas Paine wrote about to fuel the American 
Revolution and provide the constitutional foundations of the newly formed United States 
of America. And such ideas have resonated through the years, probably because they 
manifest a fundamental truth about the trajectory of human societies, that as they become 
more developed and settled and secure, the individual comes to the fore, so that with the 
Internet and e-commerce and information technology, the voices of individuals are heard 
more and more, whether in the blogs they self-publish or the individualised ring-tones 
they carefully download onto to their phones. There is a demand for individuality that the 
vendors of ring-tones are ready and willing to supply and so the idea of the empowered 
self becomes more and more of a reality.45 Thus the role of the individual must also be 
considered in relation to the actor’s operational characteristics, both from the perspective 
of the actor’s leadership and the people affected by the actor’s operations. 
 
1.3.2. Norms 
The concept of ‘norms’ must be clarified both as a matter of providing a definition that 
informs the use of the term in this thesis and because in the literature on international law 
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and compliance with international norms, the term ‘norms’ is sometimes interchangeably 
used with the terms standards.46 Additionally, researchers in the area of international 
regulation have noted that actors in that area refer to concepts like ‘principles, standards, 
rules or guidelines’ 47 . So this section begins with a clarification of the concept of 
‘norms’. It then discusses two considerations arising from the idea of identifying 
compliance requirements with norms of international law. 
 
 Norms can be regarded as ‘prescriptions for actions in situations of choice’48 and 
as including ‘all rules of conduct’49. For the purposes of this thesis, the concept can also 
be usefully regarded as including ‘rules, principles, standards and guidelines.’ 50  So 
principles, standards, rules and guidelines are all types of norms in that they all prescribe 
some conduct or behaviour that the actor to whom they are directed must or is expected 
to comply with. The concepts ‘principles’ and ‘rules’ are related in a specific manner in 
that ‘[r]ules prescribe relatively specific acts; principles prescribe highly unspecific 
actions’51. So once the general agreement as to the actor’s conduct has been settled in the 
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form of an applicable principle, then rules, or the more detailed prescriptions for the 
actor’s conduct may be produced or designed.52 
 
 Standards, as prescriptions for an actor’s conduct operate differently from 
principles and rules in that they set some measure against which to assess the actor’s 
conduct for compliance.53 The literature identifies two types of standards. On the one 
hand they can be highly specific like standards against which to measure a bank’s capital 
adequacy levels or a corporations accounting practices 54 . The other conception of 
‘standards’ calls for the determination of what conduct is permissible according to the 
facts of the particular case55. Thus standards may be established by reference to concepts 
like ‘due care’, ‘due diligence’, ‘best interests’ or ‘reasonableness’.56 In relation to this 
second type of standard, the enquiry as to whether the actor has complied will necessarily 
be a subjective one, undertaken on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all the 
circumstances of the case or the compliance situation. 
 
Finally, guidelines are directions for conduct where more settled norms of 
conduct like principles, rules or standards are yet to be achieved. While actors may 
appreciate that their conduct in a particular may need regulation, the precise form and 
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nature of such regulation has yet to be agreed upon.57 For instance, the area in which the 
actors are operating may be undergoing rapid development necessitating the need for the 
adoption of guidelines as a provisional regulatory measure. 58  The relationship of 
principles, rules, standards and guidelines just described is represented in Diagram 1 
below. In considering this relationship it bears noting that norms are not static. They can 
evolve in the direction of wider acceptance and greater concreteness and specificity. Thus 
a guideline can over time become a principle that generates rules.59 
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Diagram 1. Illustrating the relationship between norms, principles, rules, standards 
and guidelines (from Braithwaite and Drahos60). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 1 emphasises the general nature of the category ‘norms’ and while in 
this thesis the general term ‘norm’ is used, in any particular case such usage may refer to 
a principle, rule, standard or guideline. And in any particular area of international law 
being considered, two or more of these concepts may be in operation. For example, in the 
area of human rights, the applicable prescription may be to ‘respect human rights’. In 
relation to the scheme represented in Diagram 1, ‘respect human rights’ would be termed 
a principle as it is a general indication or agreement as to the conduct expected of the 
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actor. That general conduct could be specified further, as for instance where a human 
rights treaty body issues general comments to indicate more specific measures for a state 
party to the human rights treaty to adopt. In terms of Diagram 1, the provisions setting 
out the more specific conduct would be regarded as rules. 
 
Internationally recognised human rights may also be defined by standards. For 
instance, many of those rights are subject to permissible limitations or derogations. Thus 
the human right to take part in the conduct of public affairs may be subject to restrictions 
provided such restrictions are not unreasonable.61 The prescription of conduct here is a 
standard as it calls for the determination of whether the conduct at issue is reasonable or 
not according to the facts of the particular case. So in one area, norms of the type 
‘principles’, ‘rules’ and ‘standards’ may be in operation at any one time in relation to a 
particular case. As norms they all prescribe conduct in relation to the actor concerned. 
And in analysing an actor’s compliance requirements in relation to a particular case, the 
clarification of the type of norm that is being applied can be useful for clearly defining 
the set of applicable norms in relation to which those compliance requirements are to be 
identified. Section 4.1.1. examines how the analysis of international human rights norms 
in terms of principles and standards is relevant to identifying compliance requirements in 
relation to such norms. 
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 As noted in the previous section, norms can either be legally binding under 
international law or non-legally binding. This fact is recognised in Diagram 1 in the 
reference to principles and standards being non-legal. And as norms evolve, a non-legal 
norm can evolve into a legal norm over time. From a compliance perspective the key 
feature of the norm is whether it induces the actor to comply and in this sense the concept 
of compliance can be said to be agnostic about causality.62 The prevalence of non-legally 
binding codes that are not based on agreements between states highlights the expanded 
scope and reach of international law.63 So when identifying its compliance requirements, 
the actor’s operative normative environment must be considered fully to cover all 
applicable norms. 
 
But the expansion of international law, including through non-legally binding 
norms, increases the risks that norms within an actor’s operative environment will 
conflict with one another, exerting mutually pressures for compliance on the actor.64 This 
feature of norms is discussed next, including how an approach based on identifying an 
actor’s compliance requirements can help resolve such norm conflicts. 
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1.3.3. Fragmentation 
The previous section touched on the possibility of there being conflicting norms 
governing a particular compliance situation. This problem has been analysed in the 
international law context under the rubric ‘the fragmentation of international law’.65 The 
International Law Commission (ILC) studied this problem from 2002 to 2006 after the 
topic ‘Risks ensuing from the fragmentation of international law’ was included in its 
programme of work in 2000.66 The risks alluded to by the ILC were those of  
generating frictions and contradictions between the various legal regulations [such] ... 
that States even have to comply with mutually exclusive obligations.67 
 
 
That international law comprises various legal regimes is not a recent 
phenomenon and can be traced to the lack of a centralised legislative body at the 
international level to develop a harmonised body of international norms.68 But in recent 
years the reach of international law has expanded and deepened. The growth of the 
influence of international organisations on international law-making, particularly after 
World War Two has likely contributed to development of parallel regimes and 
regulations. This in turn has been added to by the growth in international cooperation 
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because of newly significant problems like international terrorism and because traditional 
alliances broke down with the end of the Cold War, allowing the space for new alliances 
and regulatory frameworks to arise. 
 
Alongside these developments and as part of them, autonomous legal regimes 
have developed, each with their own normative or ideological biases and self-contained 
systems for norm-creation, adjudication and enforcement.69 These include those relating 
to trade, human rights, the environment, diplomacy, crime prevention and security. And 
such regimes are supported by the relevant United Nations specialised agencies or other 
relevant international organisations and international non-governmental organisations, 
resulting in the 
emergence of regimes of international law that have their basis in multilateral treaties and 
acts of international organisations, specialized treaties and customary patterns that are 
tailored to the needs and interests of each network but rarely take account of the outside 
world.70 
 
The fragmentation problem the ILC analysed concerned situations where states 
face conflicting obligations under international law or where disputes under international 
law may conceivably be addressed under separate regimes and therefore come under the 
jurisdictions of different tribunals or courts depending on how such disputes are 
characterised.71  Accordingly, the solution produced by the ILC was a mode of legal 
reasoning that involves working through the conflicting legal norms governing a 
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particular case by recourse primarily to the articles of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties.72 
 
The problem of systematically identifying compliance requirements with norms 
of international law overlaps with the problem of the fragmentation of international law 
in that there also the issue of conflicting norms of international law can arise. For 
example, an area that has raised issues of fragmentation of international law is the 
potential for conflict of norms between the regimes for the protection of international 
investment and for the protection of internationally recognised human rights73. It has 
been suggested that arbitral tribunals facing such issues in the course of investment treaty 
arbitrations may adopt an approach that takes account of the applicable human rights 
norms relating to the investor’s host state. And that this could be done as part of the 
interpretation of the investment treaty, where international law is the applicable law, and 
as part of determining what the investor’s legitimate expectations might have been in 
relation to the investment.74 It is suggested that the substance of both these types of 
inquiries could also be approached by inquiring into the investor’s compliance 
requirements in the particular case. This is because the substance of such enquiries 
involve establishing a balance between the investor’s rights and the state’s right to 
regulate conduct in its own territory in order to meet its international commitments, 
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including those relating to human rights. As indicated above, the approach to identifying 
an actor’s compliance requirements involves assessing all normative frameworks 
applicable to an actor and resolving any norm conflicts through a principled balancing of 
the interests involved. Doing so in a transparent manner can result in a valid and 
legitimate resolution of any competing interests. Such an approach as is proposed in this 
thesis therefore could help resolve the conflict of norm problem just described that can be 
faced by investment arbitration tribunals. 
 
The perspective taken here in addressing the issue of systematically identifying 
compliance requirements in relation to international law norms is different from the 
approach of the ILC in its work. So is the scope of the perspective in this thesis. 
Accordingly, the proposed solution will be of a different nature from the ILC’s as well. 
 
In addressing the issue of identifying compliance requirements with norms of 
international law, the perspective is one of bringing the actor seeking to comply or 
expected to comply with an international law norm into compliance and to maintain that 
compliance. As such the compliance requirements perspective is concerned with 
addressing issues before a dispute arises and so before the problem of being at risk due to 
the operation of mutually exclusive obligations or commitments comes about. The scope 
of the compliance requirements approach is also different in that it also applies to the 
case of non-state actors and to the case of non-legally binding international law norms, 
whereas the ILC, in addressing the problem of fragmentation in international law, was 
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concerned with the situation of states facing conflicting international legal obligations 
and issues. 
 
Accordingly the solution from the perspective of identifying an actor’s 
compliance requirements in relation to international law norms is different. It involves 
thinking through and identifying the actor’s compliance requirements so that its conduct 
can proceed in a valid and legitimate way according to the applicable international norms. 
This in turn involves thinking through an actor’s operative normative environment, the 
set of legally binding and non-legally binding international norms governing the actor’s 
conduct. Such a comprehensive consideration matters so as to ensure the compliance 
requirements may be legitimate, which may not be the case if the requirements are 
worked through and identified in the context of the issue area concerned alone. And 
because it is perceived to be more legitimate, and takes account of the requirements of 
other applicable areas of international law, such an approach is also able to address 
concerns emanating from those areas. Ultimately, it can build on complementarities 
between the issue areas. The result can lead to the strengthening of the first issue area 
itself, in terms of its acceptance by and coherence with other regimes, and of the 
international legal system as a whole. So for example, in the area of human rights, it has 
been noted: 
Thus the capability of the international legal system to be relevant to human rights 
requires dislodging legal and conceptual boundaries between, for example, human rights 
law and international economic law, between state sovereignty and transnational law, 
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between international humanitarian law and military necessity, between law and non-law 
and between states and non-state actors.75 
 
Recalling the discussion on the concept of ‘norm’ in Section 1.2.2., it is noted that 
the actor’s operative normative environment takes account of all applicable principles, 
rules, standards and guidelines. In dealing with cases involving different and sometimes 
conflicting international law issue areas, the role of applicable standards can be 
particularly important. The standards referred to here include such standards as 
‘reasonableness’, due diligence and the standard of necessity.76 The application of such 
standards, which take account the actor’s circumstances and the facts of the compliance 
situation allow for the principled balancing of interests that should be undertaken in 
situations covered by conflicting norms. The compliance requirements identified through 
such a principled balancing approach are likely to be seen as more legitimate and valid 
than if they were determined in a manner perceived as less fair. 
 
This section considered three conceptual issues pertinent to the issue of 
identifying an actor’s compliance requirements with norms of international law. First, the 
relevance of the actor’s characteristics to making such an inquiry was considered. The 
actor’s capacity for compliance with an applicable norm is a key factor in determining its 
compliance requirements in relation to that norm because those requirements must suit 
the actor’s capacity to be workable and sustainable. Second the concept of ‘norms’ was 
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discussed in terms of its relation to other concepts like principles, rules, standards and 
guidelines as well as the relationship between those concepts. Finally, the problem of 
norm conflict in relation to international law or the fragmentation of international law 
was considered. The approach to identifying compliance requirements in relation to 
norms of international law that is examined in this thesis can provide a solution for 
resolving such conflicts in certain cases. It was noted that this approach is more 
comprehensive in scope than other approaches that might apply only to traditional 
subjects of international law such as states and only to cases on conflicting international 
legal norms. The approach to identifying compliance requirements reflects the full 
regulatory effect of international law in its application to the case of non-state actors and 
to both legally binding and non-legally binding norms. The next section outlines this 
approach in more detail in terms of the solution this thesis proposes to the problem of 
identifying compliance requirements in relation to norms of international law. 
 
1.4. The proposed solution and its application 
The proposed solution to the problem of identifying compliance requirements in relation 
to international law norms is a systematic approach to thinking through and identifying 
such requirements for a particular actor faced with the task of, or seeking to comply with, 
such norms. It comprises and synthesises elements derived from: (1) aspects of the 
concept of compliance, (2) theories of compliance with international law and (3) 
applicable concepts and norms of international law. The proposed solution has two parts. 
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First, the proposed solution involves systematically thinking through some key 
elements of an actor’s compliance situation. There are three main elements of that 
situation: 
1. The compliance topic, which is the issue concerning which the actor’s compliance is 
sought by the actor itself or expected of the actor by external interested parties. Any 
compliance topic will lead to the adoption of a ‘course of conduct’ whether the topic 
has to do with international trade law, environmental law, investment law, and so on. 
2. The actor’s characteristics made up of its normative environment77 and its operational 
aspects. The actor’s normative environment includes all norms governing the actor at 
the time the compliance issue arises, not just the norms concerning the compliance 
issue. This means that all norms affecting the actor’s conduct are taken into 
consideration irrespective whether they are legally binding or not, whether they 
conflict or are from the same international law issue area or not. All such norms are 
part of an actor’s operative normative environment and need to be considered in 
thinking through the actor’s compliance requirements relating to the compliance 
issue. 
3. The applicable international law norms. These refer to the norms relating to the 
compliance topic as they are defined or contextualised given the actor’s 
characteristics, that is its operative normative environment and operational details. 
Altogether, these three elements provide the basis for working through that actor’s 
compliance requirements given its particular compliance situation. The actor’s 
compliance requirements themselves are identified in terms of three categories: 
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implementation of measures for compliance (‘implementation’), application of those 
measures (‘application’) and determining the effectiveness of those measures 
(‘effectiveness’). These three categories make up the Compliance Framework (CF) for 
identifying the actor’s compliance requirements as represented in the last box of Diagram 
1. Altogether, the four components of Diagram 2 are referred to as the Compliance 
Strategy and Framework (CSF) where the Compliance Strategy (CS) is a road map to 
systematically identify compliance requirements under international law that incorporates 
the Compliance Framework (CF), which sets out those requirements. 
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Diagram 2: Elements of a systematic approach to identifying an actor’s compliance 
requirements in relation to norms of international law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The compliance topic 
The actor’s characteristics 
The applicable norms 
The framework identifying 
the actor’s compliance 
requirements: 
• Implementation 
• Application 
• Effectiveness 
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To help explain it further the CSF can also be described in reverse order, starting with the 
last box in Diagram 2 above. So to identify the compliance requirements in a particular 
case or compliance situation, it is necessary to know precisely which norms control that 
situation. These specifically applicable norms are ascertained by first considering the 
normative aspects of the compliance topic and then applying them to the case of the actor 
concerned. Doing so involves taking into account the actor’s normative and operational 
characteristics. Applying the compliance topic to these aspects of the actor concerned 
yields the generally applicable norms for the compliance situation under consideration 
and for which the compliance requirements need to be identified. 
 
As already mentioned, the elements of the CSF will be developed and explained 
in the following chapters with part of the explanation undertaken by illustrating the use of 
the CSF in systematically identifying and specifying the actor’s compliance requirements 
in relation to international human rights norms. Accordingly, the uses of the CSF in terms 
of specific international law issues area concerning human rights will also be discussed. 
In this section, the use of the CSF will be discussed in more general terms. 
 
Of course if may not be possible to identify all compliance requirements for 
norms of international law. The components or behaviour may be so numerous, varied 
and constantly changing as to defy attempts at identifying them. There may be a virtually 
limitless number of compliance requirements because the numbers of cases that can arise 
is also virtually limitless and each will have its particular set of requirements. But it is 
submitted that a basic set of compliance requirements can be discerned that can be 
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applied to all cases as they arise. This basic set of compliance requirements can be 
discerned from compliance theories, the characteristics of compliance, and applicable 
international law norms, general and specific. 
 
It is submitted therefore that it can be useful to isolate and consolidate the basic 
set of compliance requirements, and in so doing showing how the elements of that set 
interrelate. Not all the elements may be operative in each and every case. Depending on 
the circumstances of the case, some elements may be emphasised more than others. But 
the basic set of compliance requirements serves as a framework that can be tailored to the 
specifics of individual cases and then that can serve as the basis for working out more 
complex requirements if needed. For instance, difficult balancing or justice issues may 
need to be worked out, so it can be useful to have a basic framework as the basis for 
working them out. Formulating the means of identifying compliance requirements for a 
specific actor in a specific situation may also have other theoretical and practical benefits. 
 
First, as a practical matter, by facilitating thinking through an actor’s compliance 
requirements, the CSF addresses the problem outlined in Section 1.1, namely the lack of 
a systematic and valid way to identify such requirements. In doing so, it may reduce 
uncertainty actors may face in determining what it is they ought to do to be in compliance 
with a particular norm. If there is ambiguity as to the required behaviour, the actor may 
be at risk of non-compliance and so exposed to a sanction, most likely either economic or 
reputational in nature.  
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As noted above, international law has increased in its scope and complexity. The 
actors governed by its norms are no longer only states. Non-state actors like international 
organisations and companies are also expected to shape their conduct according to norms 
of international law. As international law has grown more complex, it has fragmented 
into numerous issue areas that increasingly overlap creating circumstances in which 
norms conflict. This too raises uncertainty as to how actors ought to behave when 
seemingly governed by conflicting norms. A systematic approach to think through its 
compliance requirements may help reduce such uncertainty and with it the risk of non-
compliance.  
 
Perhaps a more important practical benefit of thinking through compliance 
requirements relates to the very likely possibility that, in most cases, since compliance 
can be a complex phenomenon, the state of absolute compliance is a fiction. In reality, in 
most situations, actors are only more or less compliant with applicable norms. In other 
words, thinking or theorising in terms of compliance may be like economists thinking in 
terms of models that simplify reality. Seen in this light, a systematic approach to thinking 
through compliance requirements, in effect models the behaviour that would have to 
obtain in order for the actor to be in compliance with an applicable norm of international 
law.  
 
Two observations can be made of such a way of thinking about systematically 
mapping out compliance requirements. First, it could be the basis for improved institution 
building in order to increase compliance levels. Second, it can be used practically to 
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identify gaps or weaknesses in an actor’s compliance requirements in order than remedial 
action may be taken. If compliance is not absolute, it must mean such gaps exist and it 
may be worth systematically thinking about identifying compliance requirements so that 
such gaps can be filled. Ultimately, assuming the actor is interested in compliance, the 
idea is to act pre-emptively and proactively so that one’s actions are more in compliance 
rather than not. Systematically thinking through one’s compliance requirements may help 
in a practical way to achieve this aim. 
 
So as a universal template for thinking through compliance requirements that is 
valid according to theories of compliance and of international law, the CSF can provide 
the framework on which to model an actor’s behaviour or activities with the aim of 
complying with a norm of international law. Identifying international law compliance 
requirements systematically can also help other actors assess compliance levels for a 
particular actor. 
 
Part of the task or exercise of identifying an actor’s compliance requirements will 
involve the appraisal and resolution of conflicting claims on its conduct.78 For instance, 
as noted earlier, even for a particular state actor, obligations under various international 
law subject areas, have presented a problem due to the so-called ‘fragmentation of 
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international law’, leading commentators to call for approaches to compliance aimed at 
evaluating all normative influences on an actor.79 
 
The CSF, by systematically accounting for an actor’s normative environment, can 
also highlight and clarify where conflicts of norms may arise. Doing so may provide the 
actor with options for resolving that conflict. By providing a focus on the actor’s 
operational environment, the CSF also highlights situations where the conduct of 
multiple actors can be relevant to a compliance situation. For example, human rights 
issues concerning corporations can also involve questions about the conduct or 
responsibility of the state. It can be useful to think through the issues with the CSF, 
which can account for the conduct of various actors in relation to a particular issue. 
 
Further, another practical issue is that with different actors effectively self-
regulating and working out their own compliance requirements, a systematic approach 
that is valid because it accords with international law and compliance theory could help 
avoid inconsistent approaches to compliance with the same norms. 
 
Finally, there may be a theoretical benefit in seeking to think through compliance 
requirements for international law norms in a systematic manner. Doing so could provide 
insight into the phenomenon of compliance itself, either generally or in relation to the 
particular issue area in which the CSF is applied.  
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For one thing, examining the issue of compliance can illustrate and provide the 
basis for further examining the role of soft law norms in regulating an actor’s conduct. As 
mentioned earlier, from the compliance perspective, soft law norms can have an effect 
equal to that of hard law norms in regulating an actor’s conduct. For instance, viewing a 
situation from a compliance perspective can be very helpful where legally binding norms 
are not directly applicable to certain actors. The issue of business and human rights is an 
example of such a situation. The international law on human rights is not directly 
applicable to companies80 yet there is a demand for such regulation81. Soft law norms, 
propelled by such demand, exhibit some effectiveness in regulating some corporate 
conduct from the human rights perspective. A framework that takes account of 
compliance with such norms can form the basis for determining how effective that kind 
of regulation might be. 
 
In addition, by extending compliance requirements under international law to 
non-state actors, the issue of compliance can provide a common platform for interaction 
between all actors subject to international law in a way that the ideas of international 
responsibility and obligations under international law are unable to. And since ultimately, 
the aim of any legal system is the regulation of the conduct of the actors that are subject 
to its norms, it can be useful to have a framework that accounts equally for all actors in 
relation to the norms having such regulatory effect. By systematically taking account of 
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various regulatory frameworks and working out an actor’s compliance requirements 
accordingly, arguably the compliance strategy and framework suggested here goes some 
way to bolstering the coherence of international law. 
 
In fact sometimes compliance pressure exists because societal expectations of 
compliance have outpaced the law. And when actors accede to that pressure by seeking to 
comply with a hitherto non-applicable norm, their efforts at compliance may serve to 
influence and direct the development of the law. Thus, a systematic approach to 
examining the nature of such requirements and to their identification could assist with 
theorising about and identifying patterns or trends in the development of international 
law. 
 
It is suggested that a focus on systematically identifying requirements for 
compliance with international law is necessary and that a systematic identification of 
such requirements can help those actors motivated to comply with applicable 
international law norms to achieve and sustain such compliance. 
 
1.5. Outline and method of the thesis 
Chapters 1 and 2 lay out the theoretical and conceptual groundwork for the identification 
of the requirements for compliance with norms of international law. The claim made in 
these two chapters is that the requirements for compliance with international law norms 
outlined in the general Compliance Strategy and Framework (CSF) are valid for 
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compliance situations in every issue area of international law. Chapter 1 explains the 
concept of compliance requirements and the implications of the nature of the actors 
involved and of conflicting compliance expectations that may arise in compliance 
situations for the identification of compliance requirements. 
 
Chapter 2 examines the various theories that have been developed to explain 
actors’ compliance with norms of international law. It examines related issues and 
concepts concerning such compliance. These are, the causality linking an actor’s conduct 
and a specific norm, the concepts of implementation and effectiveness and the idea of 
international regulation. Based on the discussion in Chapters 1 and 2, the general CSF is 
set out in full and explained at the end of Chapter 2. 
 
The CSF that is proposed as a solution to the problem of thinking through an 
actor’s compliance requirements is general in nature and it is next adapted to the area of 
international human rights law in Chapters 3 and 4. This offers a full explanation of the 
CSF that completes its exposition. 
 
In Chapter 5, the human rights-specific CSF developed in Chapter 4 is used in a 
simple illustration in thinking through the compliance requirements for a specific set of 
human rights, namely those associated with the human rights principles of participation 
and accountability as identified by the United Nations’ Office of the High Commissioner 
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for Human Rights82. As explained earlier, the aim of the thesis is to work out a systematic 
approach to identifying compliance requirements with norms of international law, and 
this illustration suggests an approach for doing so. 
 
The method employed for the illustration is to take certain extant material for the 
illustration as given and as being true. So for instance it is taken as true what the OHCHR 
says about participation and accountability being key principles of the international law 
concerning human rights and the human rights associated with those principles. 
Consequently, the validity of the OHCHR’s position under international law is not 
examined.  
 
The principle of participation relates to the right of individuals to participate in 
decision-making processes that affect their lives and interests83. The application of this 
principle was seen in the examples involving Vedanta Resources and the World Bank 
above. The principle of accountability refers to the right of individuals to hold those 
whose conduct affects their lives and interests to account84. 
 
The principles of participation and accountability encapsulate multiple human 
rights, facilitating the illustration of the CSF in compliance situations involving more 
than one norm, which is likely to be the situation faced by users of the CSF in real-world 
cases. Further, participation and accountability are related concepts in that the degree of 
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accountability in any one case may be connected to issues of participation in the sense 
that greater participation may mean improved accountability85. Likewise, more effective 
accountability mechanisms could engender greater participation. Thus, selecting these 
principles permits the demonstration of the CSF in situations involving related 
compliance issues. 
 
The illustration of the CSF in Chapter 5 is useful in its own right as an illustration 
of the CSF in thinking through and identifying compliance requirements for a set of 
norms without reference to the conduct and characteristics of a particular actor. But to 
show how the CSF and CF could be used with reference to a particular actor, Chapter 6 
presents a simple illustration in which the CSF and CF are used to identify compliance 
requirements of the World Bank in relation to the human rights relating to participation 
and accountability that were addressed in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 2 International regulation, compliance theories and 
compliance considerations 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, this thesis aims to propose a systematic approach to working out 
an actor’s compliance requirements relating to international law norms in a specific 
situation. This chapter takes a step towards that goal by examining various aspects of the 
concept of compliance with international norms to extract and show the compliance 
requirements that derive from those aspects of compliance. The first section discusses 
aspects of international regulation that are pertinent to the issue of compliance 
requirements. Then the theories explaining compliance or the existence of compliance-
seeking behaviour are described and examined. Finally, some key aspects of compliance 
are examined, namely the issue of causality, and the related concepts of implementation 
and effectiveness, as well as the fact that compliance can take time and be a matter of 
degree. Together, these sections uncover and describe key compliance requirements 
relating to norms of international law. At the chapter’s close, these requirements are 
systematically organised and represented as the Compliance Strategy and Framework.  
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2.1. International regulation and compliance 
International regulation refers collectively to activities like setting norms, monitoring an 
actor’s compliance with those norms and the enforcement of those norms at the 
international level.86 Traditionally the subjects of international regulation were states and 
later international organisations. But now corporations and individuals are also governed 
by international law norms, while non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are involved 
in setting international norms and monitoring and reporting on their compliance.87 This 
expanded reach of international law is also seen in terms of the subject-matter it 
regulates, which covers many areas where cooperation is needed to secure common 
interests such as the environment, trade, investment, financial regulation, counter-
terrorism, human rights, and maritime passage and pollution.88 
 
 International law has always been concerned with the regulation of activities 
within the territory of states. The international law on the treatment of aliens was and is 
concerned with the treatment accorded by a state to foreign nationals within its borders. 
Injury to a foreign national could be raised to the international, state-to-state level, by the 
device of treating the injury as one done to the national’s home state itself, which could 
lead to diplomatic entanglements and in extreme cases, the exercise of gunboat 
diplomacy, where the offended home state might blockade the host state’s ports until 
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reparations were made for the injury inflicted. The international law on state 
responsibility developed in part to regulate the relations between states where such injury 
was alleged or had occurred. 
 
Today the same concern that what is done within the territory could seriously 
affect the national interests of other states means that now more than ever before, 
international regulations are designed to be implemented and enforced domestically. And 
so many international norms can pierce a state’s sovereignty shield and regulate domestic 
activities. The difference now is that, as indicated, the subject-matter regulated by 
international norms is more vast in scope than in the past and also that implementation 
and enforcement at the domestic level is not the domain of the state alone but 
increasingly has come to be mediated by international organisations like the United 
Nations’ specialised agencies and by NGOs,89 in certain cases because state services are 
now delivered in partnerships with NGOs and private sector companies.90 
 
But international norms have come to be applied not only to non-state actors at 
the domestic level, over increasing subject areas. They also apply to such actors in 
relation to their conduct across borders. So for instance, human rights norms, as seen in 
the example in Chapter 1, attach to global companies based in one country but having 
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operations in another. These developments in international law can be summed up in 
comments like these: 
If global rules regulate individuals, corporations, foundations, nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs), and other social actors, as well as states, … [p]erhaps we are 
moving toward intergovernmental law (regulating relations between governments) and 
global law (regulating all nongovernmental actors acting across borders91. 
 
 Still, global norms will, in operation, have their content defined, to a greater or 
lesser extent, by local circumstances, depending on the case. This is because a norm that 
is not rooted in the circumstances of its application may lack the flexibility of 
interpretation and application to account for actors’ differing circumstances and 
capacities to comply. As a result, such norms can lack the perception of legitimacy that 
compels compliance and underlies a valid and effective international regulatory 
framework.92 Thus because an actor’s capacity to comply with a norm depends on its 
characteristics and context, these features of an actor’s compliance situation will shape 
expectations of its compliance with the norm. So for instance, in international investment 
law, while the international law norm that an investor is entitled to fair and equitable 
treatment by the host state may be regarded as having ‘an objective core’, its application 
will depend on the expectations nurtured and fostered by the local laws as the stand 
specifically at the time of the investment.’93 
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 The reference to local circumstances and contexts obviously undermines the 
uniformity of international regulation. But arguably this cost has to be evaluated against 
the gains that international regulation can make in terms of its perceived legitimacy and 
fairness.94  However, while allowance for local context can be made, there will be a 
problem where the flexibility and discretion reserved to the local level for interpreting 
and applying an international norm, is not undertaken in good faith and goes so far as to 
hollow out the norm’s object and purpose. Cases where this problem arises do not consist 
of the reasonable balancing of factors to allow for local circumstances, but more likely of 
stretching the norm or its exceptions to cover non-compliance.95 
 
 Yet, where actors are applying international norms to local contexts in good faith, 
there presents itself the opportunity for discourse and persuasion between the actor and 
those external parties that may have an interest in the actor’s compliance.96 The meaning 
of the local application of the norm would be contested between these parties. But the 
norm as applied will likely be perceived as being legitimate, having been justified to the 
interested community, and so become more likely be complied with. 97  Thus, in the 
process of complying with a norm that is part of an international regulatory framework, 
the meaning of the norm is likely to be constructed, as in fact, may the identities of the 
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actor’s engaged in dialogue and justification comprising such a process.98  The next 
section considers some of these issues in examining theories of compliance to see what 
compliance requirements elements or criteria they might suggest. 
 
2.2. Compliance theories 
In this section six theories of compliance are described to identify from them elements 
relevant to the identification of compliance requirements in relation to international law 
norms. 
 
2.2.1. Realism 
Realism predicts compliance with international norms where it is in the actor’s self-
interest to comply with those norms. For powerful states that interest is defined in terms 
of the compliance of other states with the relevant international norms99. The powerful 
state itself need not be in compliance with those norms but where such compliance makes 
it easier to ensure or obtain the compliance of other states, the powerful state constrains 
itself to comply and sustain that compliance. For weaker states, compliance is brought 
about and sustained on pain of sanctions for non-compliance. The international norms are 
incidental. They do not on their own motivate their compliance. Instead compliance is 
determined on a calculation of costs and benefits involved in complying with a norm. 
Where compliance brings the actor more benefits than costs, it is in the actor’s interests to 
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comply with the norm. If the costs of compliance outweigh the benefits, the actor will 
likely choose not to comply. 
  
As an example, direct sanctions are also applied to propel states to end human 
rights violations. This is a controversial issue with differing views as to its efficacy100 and 
also concerns over the negative human rights impacts of sanctions 101 . Thus direct 
sanctions in the name of human rights have been or are being applied as in the case of 
apartheid South Africa or the present regimes in Myanmar and Zimbabwe. The 
sanctioned states of course are meant to face an economic cost but also face a 
reputational cost102. Which costs will cause the sanctioned state to finally comply with 
the international norm in issue, if at all, will depend on the circumstances of the case. 
However, even if a change in conduct is brought about, it will likely have involved an 
interplay of the fact of the sanctions, domestic political factors and the activities of 
international institutions and non-governmental actors. 
 
In realist theory, the actor is the state as a unitary entity103. The corollary of this is 
that realism is only concerned with explanations of compliance on the basis of activities 
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at the international level as that is the arena for inter-state interaction104. This idea of the 
state has its limitations as non-state actors play an increasingly influential role in 
domestic and international regulation105. Realism therefore has limited predictive power 
where compliance is brought about by activities of interest groups at the international or 
domestic level, including within the actor’s apparatus. Still, as discussed below, there are 
commonplace examples of the response of actors to expectations based on international 
norms that appear to be explainable in realist terms. 
 
For instance, while realism is limited as a compliance theory for not accounting 
for the activities of non-state actors in motivating compliance, the realist lens can 
nevertheless be applied to explain apparent human rights compliance by non-state actors, 
specifically multinational corporations. Like states, these actors can also face economic 
and reputational costs for non-compliance with human rights norms. Faced with domestic 
and international pressure, as well possibly from pressure within their organisation, either 
among employees or in some cases senior officials, such companies may undertake 
human rights commitments either of their own or as part of an international initiative like 
the UN’s Global Compact. It is in the interests of these companies not only to undertake 
such commitments but also to ensure and sustain their compliance with the human rights 
norms such commitments embody. Again, compliance is only ensured as long as the 
costs of non-compliance exceed the benefits of compliance106. 
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The realist theory of compliance says that individual preference does not 
matter107. But that is not necessarily so. There is an internal aspect in that it is also 
concerned with the self-interest of the actor. This is both in relation to the powerful actor 
dictating or requiring compliance and the weaker actor that is responding to the pressure 
to comply. The interest of the organisation is defined and renewed by the individuals 
making up the organisation, especially those at the top of the organisation’s hierarchy. 
For instance, the interests of the countries may change when a new leader takes office. 
Thus the powerful actor’s self-interest must be constructed, which implies a role for 
external normative influence, but the realist theory does not address this aspect of the 
factors motivating compliance. So factors internal to an organisation can influence its 
external strategic interest. The weaker states self-interest lies in asserting its sovereignty 
in the face of power and it is able to do so to some extent by positive rules allowing for 
contextual compliance, for instance the doctrine of margin of appreciation 108  or 
differentiated responsibilities109. These rules suggest that compliance requirements arise 
only in relation to conduct within the control of the actor concerned. In defining its 
discretion, the weaker states self-interest will also be constructed and will involve 
justification to the stronger state. This implies some element of interaction and 
interpretation. The realist theory does not account for these factors but other theories, as 
discussed below, do. 
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Finally, if an actor’s interest is set in terms of compliance with an international 
norm, key decision-maker’s in that actor will have to transmit the decision to comply to 
individuals throughout the actor’s hierarchy. So the attitude of individuals within the 
organisation becomes an important requirement for its compliance with the relevant 
international norm once the decision to comply with that norm is made. 
 
In summing up the discussion on realism as an explanation for compliance with 
international norms, the implications of this theory for identifying compliance 
requirements should be highlighted. First, the actor complies when it is in the interest of 
the actor to comply. That interest must be defined by the context of the actor. Context is 
also important as it constructs the identity of the actor and so constructs its interest. So 
context defines and constructs the actor’s interest and therefore whether it will comply 
with a particular international norm. Finally, by not dealing with the issue, realist theory 
emphasises the role and attitude of individuals as a requirement for compliance. 
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2.2.2. Institutionalism 
Institutionalism theory grew out of regime theory which showed that international 
regimes, by which was meant international ‘rules, norms, principles and decision-making 
procedures’110, could promote and sustain states’ compliance with norms of international 
law. International regimes facilitate state interaction and enhance international 
cooperation by reducing uncertainty among states that are members or part of an 
international regime.111 And so institutions help counter the anarchy that may otherwise 
prevail between states by providing a means for the provision and exchange of 
information, thus lending some transparency to a state’s conduct.112 
 
Like realism, institutionalism is concerned with international interactions among 
states as unitary actors pursuing their self-interests113. Their interests include interests in 
addressing common problems at the international level through international cooperation. 
As mentioned, international institutions facilitate that cooperation. But they do so only to 
the extent that the institutions members do not deviate from the institution’s norms.114 
The key issue then is what features of institutions operate to reduce deviation or non-
compliance. 
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These features include the facilitation of information sharing to reduce 
uncertainty, the promotion of learning and the provision of conditions for orderly 
negotiations and the monitoring of state behaviour.115 All of these can involve repeated 
interaction and such interaction can also lead to the internalisation of norms by the actors 
concerned and thereby to the construction of their identities.116 
 
2.2.3. Liberalism 
Liberalism departs from realism and institutionalism by discarding the notion of the state 
as a unitary actor. Its concern is still with explaining the compliance of states with 
international norms. However it seeks that explanation by looking to domestic factors or 
elements internal to the state. For liberal theorists, domestic politics matter117. Domestic 
factors like ‘societal ideas, interests and institutions’ shape the preferences or interests of 
states thus influencing their behaviour 118 . As with realism and institutionalism, the 
concern is still with the interests of the states. The difference is that liberalism penetrates 
below the state level to find the factors defining those interests. 
 
For liberalism, international norms matter but only as seeds crystallising domestic 
interests that subsequently engage in political contests so as to direct the state’s behaviour 
on the international plane119. Similarly international politics matter in shaping domestic 
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perceptions of the state’s interests. This is because international politics influence 
domestic political contests that shape the state’s international behaviour. An example of 
such dynamics is provided when domestic political considerations determine the 
decisions of states to ratify and comply with international climate change agreements or 
not. In this example, liberalism provides tools to predict a state’s behaviour. 
 
 Liberalism’s fundamental reliance on domestic politics as the explanatory 
variable for state behaviour has led to the theory being largely directed at the behaviour 
of liberal states. For, after all, it is in such states that domestic politics is most vigorous. 
Thus liberal theorists assert that liberal democratic states are more likely to comply with 
international legal obligations because such obligations mobilise domestic pressure on the 
state to comply with such obligations 120 . Such an assertion is tautologous, causally 
problematic and thus undermines the power of liberalism to explain compliance with 
international norms.  
 
If liberal states are by definition predisposed to the idea of the rule of law as a 
constitutive value, this fact would be a conflating variable and could be the primary 
causal factor explaining their compliance with international law. It also does not follow 
why polities of liberal states are predisposed to the idea of compliance with international 
law. Surely, if one were to maintain fidelity with the fundamental elements of liberalism, 
the locus of explanation must lie with the perceived self-interests of the politically 
strongest domestic groups. If those interests are not best served by compliance with 
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international law, the response may well be to interpret that law favourably and thereby 
bring the law into compliance with domestic interests. In this all states are alike, whatever 
their political hue. This apologist subtext to liberalism does not appear to be 
acknowledged by the theory’s proponents. 
 
Despite the confusion one finds in thinking associated with liberalism, the theory 
does advance compliance theory by adverting to the role of domestic factors in 
explaining the compliance of state actors with international norms. This insight is of 
course transposable to non-state actors such as international organisations, international 
NGOs and multinational corporations. These actors too have internal constituencies that 
are either predisposed or otherwise to compliance with applicable international norms. 
Their compliance with such norms may also be explained by which constituency is 
politically dominant within the organisation. 
 
Liberalism points to the characteristics of the actor, whether state or non-state, as 
a key consideration or predictor if the actor will comply with an international norm. In 
this sense, it is similar to realism in highlighting the importance of the actor’s context to 
predicting compliance. However, as liberalism is internally focused, this means that the 
compliance requirement it suggests is the presence of a domestic constituency that is 
motivated to comply with an international norm. For states, these would be political 
constituencies and key decision-makers. For non-state actors, these would be the 
organisation’s employees and its senior management. 
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While adverting to internal factors that motivate compliance, liberalism does not 
focus on external factors that do so other than the obvious one of the fact that the focus is 
on the state’s compliance with international norms. The question or the fact of such 
compliance brings into play the role of international pressure groups seeking or resisting 
compliance as the case may be. As mentioned earlier, liberalism alludes to these external 
factors but only on the basis of their indirect effect on shaping domestic pressure. The set 
of theories that are examined next place greater emphasis on both external and internal 
factors motivating compliance with international norms. 
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2.2.4. Managerialism 
The Managerial theory of compliance seeks to explain compliance with multilateral 
regulatory agreements dealing with issues requiring international cooperation among 
states. These issues concern matters like monetary affairs, security, trade, the 
environment, and human rights. 121  The theory is suggested as an alternative to the 
‘enforcement model’ of compliance emphasises by Realism, which highlights the use of 
sanctions, military or economic, to produce compliance. Mangerialism by contrast relies 
mainly on a cooperative, problem-solving approach to compliance.122 
 
It is submitted that as with the discussion of the previous compliance theories, 
aspects of the Managerial theory of compliance can be applied to cases of compliance 
with other international law norms, besides treaty norms, and to non-state actors like 
international organisations and corporations. The theory in fact acknowledges this, 
especially where the norms in question, even if non-binding, are based on or derived from 
treaty norms.123 
 
 Managerialism explains states’ treaty compliance on the basis of their propensity 
to comply with their treaty obligations124. It rejects, as not keeping with experience, the 
idea of the state as a rational actor complying with its international obligations only when 
it is in the state’s interests to do so. As such, Managerialism conceives the problem of 
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compliance as one where certain factors compel the state actor’s non-compliance, 
meaning that achieving compliance is about managing those factors propelling non-
compliance in the face of the state’s propensity to comply. 
 
The assumption that states tend to comply with their international treaty 
obligations is based on three factors, namely efficiency, interests and norms. The 
efficiency argument is that states expend effort and limited resources, entering into 
international agreements, and unless circumstances change, are motivated to comply with 
their treaty commitments. The alternative of non-compliance would be wasteful and 
inefficient. The theory notes that because government agencies tend to adopt standard 
operating procedures in response to authoritative rule systems such as those manifested in 
treaties the result is that compliance, and not deviation, is the normal presumption.125 
  
The ‘interests’ factor acknowledges that a state’s treaty ratification often reflects 
the interests of various government agencies, and possibly the legislature and civil 
society groups, sometimes honed and developed over the many years of treaty-making.126 
As such the state’s interests underlying its treaty commitments are unlikely to change 
substantially once the treaty comes into force. Finally the ‘norms’ factor refers to the role 
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of norms in decision-making process and how norms can be the independent basis for an 
actor’s conforming behaviour.127 
 
So Managerialism, through the three factors mentioned above, suggests some 
basic requirements for compliance. For example, a framework to guide the decision-
making of a government agency, international organisation or corporation could enhance 
its  compliance with a particular norm. Engagement with stakeholders concerned with the 
subject-matter of the norm could create the interests within the agency, organisation or 
corporation in seeking and maintaining compliance with a norm, while the norm itself, if 
legitimately applied to the state, international organisation or corporation, could produce 
conforming behaviour. 
 
Of course the validity of Managerialism’s assumption of states’ propensity to 
comply with their treaty obligations can be challenged. States may narrowly tailor their 
treaty commitments through the use of reservations that negate the costs of ratifying the 
treaty to such a degree as to call into question the state’s commitment to the spirit and 
purpose underlying the treaty. In some cases states may ratify treaties only to seek to 
evade their commitments afterwards through favourable interpretations or by seeming to 
exercise permitted discretion in applying the treaty in less than good faith 128 . 
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Managerialism’s proponents acknowledge this129. But for the purpose of examining the 
nature of compliance requirements such objections are not critical. The overall validity of 
the compliance theory, and the factors it highlights, provide the basis for such 
requirements. And the validity of the compliance requirements identified this way is not 
undermined if the compliance theory they are derived from fails to account for some 
instances of non-compliance. 
 
 Managerialism suggests three reasons why there is non-compliance or incomplete 
compliance despite the reasons it says make states ordinarily want to comply with their 
treaty commitments.130 These are:131 
(1) ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language, 
 (2) limitations on the capacity of parties to carry out their undertakings, and 
 (3) the temporal dimension of the social, economic, and political changes contemplated 
by regulatory treaties. 
 
The first reason indicated above relates to the imprecision of language and the 
virtual impossibility to capture at the outset all the circumstances in which a treaty 
provision will come to be applied. This results in a ‘zone of ambiguity within which it is 
difficult to say with precision what is permitted and what forbidden.’132  This is the 
problem of defining the content of a norm that was discussed in Chapter 1 in relation to 
the idea of compliance requirements.133 It was also noted in the earlier discussion on 
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Legitimacy Theory, which regards a norm’s the lack of clarity as undermining its 
‘compliance pull’.134 
 
By the second reason for non-compliance, Managerialists mean the state’s 
inability to regulate not only the conduct of government officials but also ‘the activities 
of individuals and private entities’135 engaged, or otherwise able to control, the activities 
international treaties seek to regulate. Examples of such activities are unfair labour 
practices, the release of environmental pollutants, and the proliferation of nuclear 
material. A state’s promulgation of legislation implementing the treaty is often not 
enough. Appropriate administrative regulations and effective enforcement are also 
necessary. In addition adequate financial, and scientific and technical resources will 
likely be required.136 
 
The third reason is the fact that the internal changes treaties are designed to bring 
about usually take substantial time.137  So there can be a considerable lag between a 
state’s undertaking an international obligation and conditions within its territory 
approximating the state of affairs the obligation entailed. Lack of capacity by some states 
can be provided for by employing transition periods in treaties. But the variation in 
capacities among all the countries in the world can also result in treaties with global 
coverage having rather low obligations requirements because these have to match the 
capacities of the poorest countries. For these reasons, Managerialists accept it may take a 
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long time for some states to come into compliance with for example, treaties concerning 
the environment and human rights. Nevertheless they regard such treaties as initiating a 
process to bring about the changes sought even though that may take time.138 
 
In the face of factors like lack of norm clarity, lack of capacity and the time it 
takes to be fully compliant, Managerialism Theory notes that international treaty regimes 
are designed so as persuade states to comply. In this regard, the theory notes three 
features of those regimes in particular: transparency, dispute settlement, capacity 
building. 139  Transparency refers to ‘the generation and dissemination of information 
about the requirements of the regime and the parties’ performance under it’. 140  By 
facilitating the provision and sharing of information, transparency helps to ensure that all 
treaty members have a common understanding of what they are required to under the 
treaty141. In this way it can help minimise the divergence of views among state members 
as to what they are required to do to comply with the norm concerned that may arise 
because the treaty provision lacks that clarity. 
 
Through the information provided, members of a treaty gain knowledge as to how 
other treaty members are performing. This allows for mutual reassurance that all 
members are playing by the rules and so may generate more compliance because 
everyone knows there is no free riding or moves afoot to undermine the effectiveness of 
the treaty. Conversely a transparent treaty regime deters non-compliance because any 
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behaviour that deviates from the requirements of the norm can be detected, causing the 
treaty member concerned to answer to the other members for that non-compliance.142 
 
Managerialism suggests a valid compliance strategy is one that emphasises the 
clarification and specification of applicable norms, and one that takes account of the 
actor’s capacity to undertake a course of conduct needed to comply. Such a strategy 
would emphasise ‘justification, discourse and persuasion’143, indicating transparency and 
capacity-building as compliance requirements and context as a compliance consideration.  
 
2.2.5. Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy Theory posits that the legitimacy of international norms secures a state’s 
compliance with them144. According to the theory, legitimacy is a quality a norm that 
leads ‘to the belief that it is fair because it was made and is applied in accordance with 
‘right process’145 In other words a norm that has come into being or that has been applied 
according to right process is legitimate, and so is likely to be complied with.146 The 
making of a norm refers to its promulgation and interpretation as both acts ‘make’ a norm 
while the application of a norm refers to its use in guiding a decision. That decision could 
be what the actor should do to comply with the norm or it could a decision of an external 
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party, for instance a judge, as to whether or not, given a certain set of facts, the actor was 
in compliance with the norm or not. 
 
The concept of legitimacy described above has been twinned with the idea of justice 
as being two components of the concept of fairness. The two components are independent 
of one another and operate as part of fairness discourse to explain the working of 
international and international institutions in specific instances. The legitimacy 
component reflects societal desires for order and the justice component, for 
change.147Together they help explain how international law and institutions provide a 
stable framework for international cooperation and interaction while maintaining the 
flexibility to adapt to varying circumstances that is necessary to usefully serve the needs 
of the international community. In the discussion below, the focus will be on legitimacy 
as the factor explaining an actor’s compliance with international norms. 
 
According to Legitimacy Theory, four indicators or properties of a norm determine its 
legitimacy. The extent to which a norm exhibits these properties, it will be perceived to 
be more of less legitimate and so more or less fair consequently having more of less 
compliance pull. The four indicators or properties of a norm’s legitimacy are148: 
1. Determinacy 
2. Symbolic validation 
3. Coherence 
4. Adherence. 
                                                 
147
 Thomas Franck, Fairness, New York, Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 25. 
148
 Thomas Franck, Fairness, New York, Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 30; Thomas M. Franck, ‘Legitimacy’, 
82(4) AJIL (Oct., 1988), pp. 705-759, p. 712. 
86 
 
 
Determinacy 
Determinacy refers to whether a norm has a clear message and meaning to those it 
addresses such that they can understand what the norm expects of them. A norm with 
these features is more likely to be complied with. When faced with a determinate norm, 
an actor is less able to justify noncompliance because the determinacy of the norm does 
not admit of other meanings or other modes of compliance other than the one set out in 
its text.149 
 
 In reality the situation is not so straightforward. Those making norms, either 
through the creation of a treaty or the authoritative interpretation of an existing norm, 
usually cannot foresee and account for all situations in which the norm will be applied. 
Accordingly, international norms refer to standards like reasonableness, due diligence or 
proportionality that render them more flexible in application but at the same time less 
determinate. By the lights of Legitimacy Theory, the norm’s determinacy is low, which 
threatens its compliance pull. But the theory make an allowance for such cases by 
acknowledging the standard introduces a justice component that permits a fairness 
calculus to be applied, which can actually help enhance compliance with the norm or 
standard because it allows for the actor’s circumstances to be taken into account in 
making an assessment whether the actor has complied with the norm or not.150  The 
application of the margin of appreciation doctrine which takes account of the 
circumstances of the case when international bodies or tribunals review the conduct of 
                                                 
149
 Thomas Franck, Fairness, New York, Clarendon Press, 1995, pp. 30-31. 
150
 Thomas Franck, Fairness, New York, Clarendon Press, 1995, pp. 33. 
87 
 
national authorities, is an example of the application of such a fairness calculus that 
conduces to compliance because the it allows the actor concerned to perceive the 
applicable norm as being both legitimate and fair.151 
 
Symbolic validation 
The second indicator or property of a norm’s legitimacy speaks to its authority in the 
international social order.152  The provenance of a norm’s authority has a number of 
dimensions to it. It can have to do with its pedigree as a source of normative 
obligation.153 For instance, is the norm contained in a treaty or in custom, is an emanation 
from an international tribunal or an international organisation?154 In another sense a norm 
is symbolically valid where it is produced by an authority exercised according to right 
process, which means the authority is exercised in a manner that is institutionally 
recognised and valid. 155  The emphasis in connection with the symbolic validity of 
legitimacy according to Legitimacy Theory is the preservation of a stable social order. 
And so values like the predictability and stability of expectations within a normative 
system are emphasised. 
 
Coherence 
The third indicator of a norm’s legitimacy is its coherence, which refers to the degree to 
which it is applied in a principled fashion. According to Legitimacy Theory, there are two 
dimensions to the principled application of a norm. One is that ‘its application … treats 
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like cases alike’. The second is that it ‘relates in a principled fashion to other rules of the 
same system.’156 Taking them together, it means a norm exhibits coherence when its 
application in an issue area coheres with the principles and purposes of that issue area 
and that the rule relates to other like rules also in a principled manner. 
 
 The idea of coherence in terms of like cases being treated alike is straightforward 
but carries with it a particular implication for dealing with cases that are similar in nearly 
all respects but are distinct in some particular and importantly determinative respect. 
These cases represent the existence of some exception to the norm in question. In such 
cases the idea of treating all cases uniformly is abandoned and the distinct case is treated 
differently. But for the basis for the different treatment to be valid, it must derive from 
principles representing the rationale for the normative system in question and those 
principles must cohere with principles underpinning the system of law as a whole. So for 
instance in the area of trade law the most favoured nation treatment (MFN) norm operates 
to eliminate favouritism among a country’s trading partners. But poor countries that 
would be outcompeted from the global trading system are treated differently under a 
system of preferences that entitles their export to reduced duties or no duties at all. 
 
According to Legitimacy Theory, the deviation from the MFN norm can be justified. 
For although granting the preferences deviates from the MFN norm, doing so enables 
coherence with a more fundamental principle or goal of the global trading system, 
namely to increase trade by all countries, which means not having some countries 
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sidelined and frozen out of the system. By allowing preferential treatment and thus 
carving out an exception to the application of the MFN norm, the more fundamental 
purpose of the global trading system is upheld. In this way encapsulating the exception to 
the MFN norm coheres within the international trading system issue area. 
 
Of course, since there are always bound to be differences among those subject to any 
system of law, it might be observed that the different cases can simply be treated 
differently without the need for a principled justification but simply on their own terms 
and that way allowing like cases to always end up being treated alike. However, such an 
observation misses the point that carving out exceptions in a careful, considered and 
principled manner helps maintain the overall normative structure of the particular issue 
area of international law. If every difference was entitled to an exception simply on its 
own terms, there would be so many loopholes to that aspect of the issue area as to call 
into question its legitimacy to compel compliance. In fact it might be possible to design a 
loophole on demand and so turn a situation of non-compliance into one of compliance. 
 
Thus the legitimacy of a differentiated system of law, where equal subjects of that 
system are entitled to be treated differently under certain circumstances, is preserved 
provided the differentiation is made with reference to some principle, goal or purpose of 
the system. And as indicated above, not only must the basis of differentiation cohere with 
the overall purpose or goal of that particular system of law or issue area. To ensure 
legitimacy of the norm permitting the exception, it must cohere with like norms in other 
issue areas of international law where differentiated treatment obtains. So to ensure the 
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legitimacy of the norm or norms concerned, a principle for differentiated treatment in the 
global trading system must cohere with general principles for differentiated treatment 
within the body of international law.  
 
Such principles can be found in the area of international environmental law157 and in 
the area of international human rights law in respect of provisions recognising the rights 
of individuals belonging to groups previously discriminated against to preferential 
treatment or affirmative action. In this fashion the norms in one issue area in international 
law are reflected in norms in other issue areas signifying the second dimension of 
coherence noted above, namely that to ensure the legitimacy of a norm it must not only 
cohere in a principled fashion within the issue area of international law it inhabits, but 
also with like norms in other international law issue areas thus connecting it with the 
body of international law generally. 
 
In connection with the discussion on coherence as a basis for the legitimacy of a norm 
and hence its power to compel compliance, or its compliance pull, the discussion on the 
fragmentation of international law in Chapter 1 is relevant.158  In thinking through a 
norm’s compliance requirement using the CSF, it should be the case that the norm that 
the actor is concerned with is one that is identified in as determinative a manner as 
possible, as indicated in the discussion on the determinacy indicia of legitimacy above, 
and also that it coheres within the issue area of the Compliance Topic as well as with 
respect to the body of international law generally. According to Legitimacy Theory, a 
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norm without these properties is not likely to be generating much compliance pull and so 
is not likely to engender strong efforts at compliance. So the CSF, as explained later in 
this chapter is designed to identify the applicable norm with precision taking account of 
the actor’s operative normative environment, that is the body of binding and non-binding 
norms governing the actor’s conduct, so that the identified norm is also one exhibiting the 
strongest coherence property. 
 
Adherence 
The fourth and last indicia of the legitimacy of a norm is adherence which is the vertical 
connection between norm governing an actor’s conduct, designated a primary norm, and 
a body of higher-order secondary norms ‘governing the creation, interpretation and 
application’ of the primary norms.159 The secondary norms represent the ‘procedural and 
institutional framework’ according to which a community is organised160 as well as the 
fundamental normative values it subscribes to. Thus the legitimacy of a primary norm is 
based on the degree to which it conforms with the secondary norms.161 
 
Ultimately the secondary norms apply to actors as a function of their status as 
members of a community, such as the international community in the case of 
international law. In other words the secondary norms are not created by the actor’s 
consent. They exist and apply to the actors by virtue of their existing in a community. So 
for international law, the secondary norms include the jus cogens or peremptory norms, 
and the norm pacta sund servanda, by which a treaty’s terms bind states parties. The 
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adherence of the primary norms to these secondary norms signals the legitimacy of the 
primary norm because it could not validly exist in contravention of the secondary norm. 
 
 In conclusion, Legitimacy Theory can be said to identify the following as 
requirements for compliance with international norms: 
1. Clarity as to what the norms requires as conforming behaviour 
2. Coherence of the requirements for conforming behaviour with other norms applicable 
to the actor  
3. Validity of the interpretation placed on the norm in terms of consistency (and maybe 
transparency) of that interpretation and the process of interpretation 
Underlying these three elements and indeed Legitimacy Theory itself is the idea of 
rightness of process, akin to the ideas of procedural fairness and procedural justice. These 
concepts relate to the ‘how’ of things. How to design a process that is fair and therefore 
legitimate in the eyes of those subject to that process and therefore liable to enjoin their 
compliance with that process. In this sense Legitimacy Theory offers an overall rationale 
for the idea of the Compliance Strategy and Framework (CSF) that has been alluded to in 
Chapter 1162 and that will be developed later in this Chapter. The CSF, as will be seen, 
offers a way to systematically think through an actor’s compliance requirements for 
international norms that builds on aspects of Legitimacy Theory like the clarity and 
determinacy of norms, and their coherence, but also the idea of a right process in the 
sense of one that is transparent and fair in that it takes account of the actor’s 
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characteristics, both normative and operational, and one that seeks to move the actor 
towards compliance through an iterative, discursive process.163 
 
2.2.6. Transnational Legal Process 
Transnational Legal Process (TLP) agrees with Managerialism and Legitimacy Theory 
that actors comply with norms because they have internalised the norms and that that is 
what drives compliance in the main as opposed to external enforcement of norms164. TLP 
seeks however to examine further the process of norm-internalisation and suggests that 
the process consists of three phases: interaction, interpretation and internalisation. 
 
 First, other actors initiate an interaction, or series of interactions, with the actor 
concerned. These other actors are referred to in TLP as transnational actors and consist of 
those actors interested in the actor’s compliance with a particular norm. They include the 
actor’s peers, such as other states, international organisations or corporations, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), individuals of particular eminence, experts, officials 
or staff of the actor concerned, and ordinary citizens. Some of the actors in these 
categories can be described as belonging to an ‘epistemic community’, a network of 
professionals with particular expertise such that they have ‘an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge’. 165  Thus TLP looks to such actors’ expectations of 
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compliance by the actor with a particular norm, leading to interactions with the actor 
concerned such that its behaviour is turned to complying with the norm. 
 
This interaction leads to an interpretation or enunciation of the applicable 
international norm, which is the second stage. Finally, the third stage involves the 
internalisation of the interpreted or enunciated norm into the actor’s ‘internal normative 
system’.166 This process is the transnational legal process that gives the theory its name. 
The idea is that the norm enunciated at the second stage guides future interactions of the 
actor community with the actor concerned and such interactions will further the 
internalisation of the norm by the actor, increasing and strengthening the primary actor’s 
norm compliance in the process.167 
 
 From the description of the TLP above, certain of its features bear resemblance to 
the CSF outlined in Chapter 1. But there are key differences. The idea of the Compliance 
Situation, of which the Compliance Topic is a part, would cover the interaction or first 
phase of the TLP. The Compliance Situation it will be recalled in one where the actor is 
seeking or expected to comply with the norm or norms that characterise the Compliance 
Topic168. As such it encapsulates, though not explicitly, the idea of interactions with other 
actors as a factor motivating the actor to compliance. However, the idea of the 
Compliance Situation focuses attention explicitly on the Compliance Topic, which is 
important since the clear identification of the Compliance Topic helps to clarify its 
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normative aspects, which is key to identifying the compliance requirements in relation to 
the norm or norms that characterise a particular Compliance Topic. 
 
The second similarity consists in the recognition that interaction with the actor 
concerned results in the enunciation or identification of the applicable norm. The key 
difference is that the CSF highlights the importance of the actor’s characteristics as the 
mediating prism through which the norm or norms characterising the Compliance Topic 
are translated into the Applicable Norm in relation to which compliance requirements 
will be determined. It is suggested here that highlighting the actor’s characteristics is 
critical because they are key to identifying or interpreting the Applicable Norm. Finally, 
the TLP does not offer an explanation of how the norm that has been interpreted in 
response to an interaction with the actor community, is internalised by the actor 
concerned. It is suggested that the Compliance Framework (CF) can offer such an 
explanation; that the use of the CF in identifying the actor’s compliance requirements in 
relation to an international law norm can lead to the norm’s internalisation. 
 
The TLP bears resemblance with Managerialism as well in its emphasis on 
interaction, repeated interaction and iteration, recalling Managerialism’s recognition of 
the importance of persuasive discourse. Such discourse can involve a process in which 
the actor is involved in repeated participation in the interaction-interpretation-
internalisation dynamic such that ‘the interests and even the identities of the participants 
in the process’ are reconstituted. Thus there is an element of social construction at play 
96 
 
that compliance theories such as TLP and Managerialism capture169. This means that 
through repeated participation and over time, there is alignment of the actor’s interests 
with external expectations of its conduct that results in enhanced compliance with 
particular international law norms.  
 
But the process can also work in the other direction, meaning the alignment is 
achieved because of a shift in external expectation in the direction of the actor’s interests. 
This would be compliance by stealth in the sense that the actor has not had to change its 
conduct. It has not moved to compliance. Rather compliance has come to it. A third 
dynamic may also be considered that is probably a  better reflection of reality. And that is 
that interactions and iterations in both directions, taking account of changing 
circumstances along the way, lead to developments in international law that are 
internalised by both transnational actors and the actor concerned, creating ‘patterns of 
behaviour that ripen into [newer] institutions, regimes, and transnational networks.’170 
 
As mentioned earlier, legal obligations alone may be insufficient grounds for 
regulating behaviour or compliance in the absence of enforcement. Thus the compliance 
theories just reviewed offer other motivations for compliance like self-interest or aligned 
preferences). And in some cases, expectations for compliance that are internalised 
provide another reason for compliance. 
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No single theory can explain fully the compliance by an actor with its obligations 
or commitments in relation to norms of international law. In fact, the different 
compliance theories suggest different basis for compliance with international law, 
meaning they are individually indeterminate in the sense that a single theory does not 
explain or predict every instance of compliance or lack of compliance. An improved 
compliance theory is likely to incorporate aspects of existing theories. More than one 
theory may be at work for a particular situation. In the next section some implications for 
identifying compliance requirements with international norms are considered arising 
from the concept of compliance. 
 
2.3. Conceptual considerations for compliance 
There are features of the concept of compliance that give rise to certain considerations for 
the actor seeking to comply to take into account in identifying its compliance 
requirements. These considerations are referred to as compliance considerations and are 
the third basis for identifying compliance requirements. 
 
2.3.1. Compliance and causality 
One feature of compliance that gives rise to compliance considerations concerns its 
causal dimension; what causes compliance with a norm of international law. There are 
three aspects to this causality issue. The first aspects concerns the type of norm an actor 
can be said to comply with. Does an actor comply with only legal norms or also with 
non-legal norms? This aspect of the causal dimension to compliance has already been 
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addressed.171 Actors, as discussed, comply with both types of norms and so the focus 
might properly be on the reasons why actors comply with the norms they comply with; 
the actor’s motivation for compliance.172 These reasons and motivations were addressed 
in the previous section on Compliance Theories, and can be instrumental, where, 
according to Realism, the actor complies because it is in its interests to do, chief among 
which is its concern to avoid punishment and to preserve and enhance its relative power 
by securing the benefits of compliance.173 Or the actor may comply with a particular 
norm because it has internalised it, according to the Transnational Legal Process theory, 
and so complies with the norm as a matter of obedience.174 
 
But, recalling the definition of compliance from Chapter 1, that compliance is 
conformity of an actor’s conduct to an applicable norm, the definition does not specify 
the actor’s motivation for so conforming its conduct. In other words, the concern 
indicated in the definition of compliance 175  is whether the actor’s behaviour in fact 
matches the international norm. 176  So it is possible for an actor to be said to in 
compliance with a norm without actually making a conscious effort to comply with it. 
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Such compliance is referred to as automatic177 or coincidental compliance.178 It is this 
feature of the concept of compliance that gives rise to a particular consideration for 
identifying an actor’s compliance requirements with a norm of international law. 
 
Automatic compliance can come about in two ways. First, the conduct required by 
the norm already matches the actor’s current operations or practice.179 Then, as soon as 
the actor undertake the commitment reflected in the norm, it will be in compliance 
without having done anything further. In such a case, the actor’s compliance would 
simply be an artefact of the norm that was chosen.180 For instance, whale-catch quotas in 
international whaling conventions, matched the existing catch levels of the whaling 
industry, meaning compliance by countries with such industries was automatic. The 
phenomenon of agreeing to do what you are already doing anyway can be a problem for 
international law where most of the norms are set by states on a consensual basis. This 
self-regulatory scheme181  is susceptible to its subjects only agreeing to be bound by 
norms they know beforehand they will have little difficulty complying with. And the fact 
that actors posses varying capacities for compliance can justify selection of the weakest 
norms in the application of a least common denominator calculus.182 
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The second mode of automatic compliance can arise where the actor’s conduct 
moves into compliance with the norm but for entirely extraneous reasons or by 
happenstance.183 For instance, a weakening economy may cause polluting industries to 
shut down, bringing the state or the local government into compliance with international 
environmental norms for regulating harmful pollution. Since these are cases where the 
actor is in compliance despite not making any conscious effort to achieve compliance, the 
compliance exhibited in this manner may be called passive compliance in contrast to 
active compliance where the actor consciously seeks and attains compliance. 
 
In the case of active compliance, the actor does undertake those activities to 
implement international norms, that is to make them effective internally. The concept of 
the implementation of international norms is obviously a clear one to understand and 
involves activities like passing appropriate laws and enforcing those laws, in the case of 
state actors. In fact all compliance theories presuppose the actor is engaged in active 
compliance because these theories explain why the actor complies with international law 
norms. So they are explaining situations where the actor is motivated to comply. In a 
passive compliance situation, the issue of the actor’s motivation is not central and in fact 
hardly ever arises.  
 
The issue of causality as it arises in connection with the concept of compliance 
has a number of implication for identifying compliance requirements in relation to 
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international norms. One implication of that feature is that sustainability is a compliance 
consideration and must inform the identification of an actor’s compliance requirement. 
Because there can be compliance without the actor actually doing anything or engaging 
in any course of conduct, a requirement for compliance is for the actor to ensure the 
sustainability of its compliance with the norm in question. Causality is an important 
consideration in identifying compliance requirements because emphasising causality 
helps eliminate inadvertent or accidental reliance on coincidental compliance. 
 
This in turn means that a system of monitoring that compliance is required. It also 
means by implication that the norm must be clearly identified (for the purposes of the 
Compliance Framework (CF) as discussed later in the chapter). So in terms of the design 
of the CF two issues arise because of the fact of sustainability as a compliance 
requirement. One is that the applicable norm must be clearly identified. The other is that 
ensuring the sustainability of compliance must be provided for in the CF’s design by the 
requirement of having a system of monitoring the actor’s compliance with the norm 
concerned. 
 
The compliance consideration of sustainability, although it comes to the fore with 
particular relevance for cases where there is no causal connection between the actor’s 
conduct and its compliance, is also a consideration the actor or any external interested 
party would have to bear it in mind in cases where there is a causal connection between 
the actor’s conduct and its compliance with a particular norm. In this case, the basis for 
the consideration of sustainability is also that the actor wants to maintain compliance and 
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avoid becoming non-compliant. Arguably this concern with ensuring the sustainability of 
the actor’s compliance is stronger where the compliance is indirectly attained rather than 
where it is attained through a causal link between the norm and the actor’s conduct. 
Because in the former case there is greater risk that the sustainability may not be 
maintained (for whatever reason, e.g. lack of care, lack of due diligence) than in the latter 
case where the actor’s attention is already actively focused on the issue of complying 
with the norm in question. 
 
2.2.2. Compliance in stages: Implementation, Application and Effectiveness 
This sections examines the other feature of compliance from which compliance 
considerations arise in connection with the identification of compliance requirements 
relating to international norms. Unlike the case of examining the causal dimension or 
feature of compliance, here the feature of compliance is examined comparatively and 
indirectly by considering features of two concepts that are closely related to the concept 
of compliance. These are the concepts of the implementation and effectiveness of 
international norms. 
 
 The implementation of international norms refers to ‘the process of putting 
international [norms] into practice’ within the governance structure of the actor184 so that 
they are made effective internally.185 For states this would refer to putting international 
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norms into practice within its system of law. As noted earlier, international regulation is 
largely aimed at regulating activities within the territory of states and the domain of 
activities so regulated has been expanding186. The mode of such regulation within states 
is primarily legal and administrative and so the implementation of international norms in 
the context of a state actor includes activities like passing legislation, enacting regulations 
and policies, creating institutions and mechanisms, and enforcing the law,187 where the 
content of the laws, regulations and policies conform to the obligatory or prescriptive 
language of the norm.188 And depending on the issue area concerned, for both state and 
non-state actors, some form of institutional acculturation to be aware of the importance of 
compliance may also be necessary.189 
 
 Compliance, as noted, may be causally disconnected from the international norm 
in question. So it may not necessarily depend on the implementation activities undertaken 
by the actor. For instance, implementation activities may be undertaken by a state to 
comply with international environmental agreements but pollution levels in that country 
may come down because the polluting economic sectors entered a depressed state. All the 
while the implementation activities had no effect on the levels of pollution in that country 
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and it may possibly be the case that those implementation activities were ineffectual. In 
that case, the intervening economic depression not only would have had the effect of 
lowering the pollution levels but also of masking the impotency of the state’s 
implementation activities. Accordingly, snapshot views of compliance can be 
misleading190 and for an actor interested in complying with an international law norm, it 
would be necessary to trace the causal path linking the apparently compliant activity with 
the norm that the actor is seeking to comply with. 
 
 But the concern here is with active compliance, where the actor is motivated to 
comply with an applicable international norm and is interested to identify its compliance 
requirements in relation to that norm. This active compliance then is not only one where 
implementation activities are undertaken by the actor but where the actor is also 
interested to see that its implementation activities or implementing actions are complied 
with or followed through191 The focus here, as noted elsewhere in this thesis, is to prevent 
non-compliance192 and where non-compliance is suspected or detected, to remedy that 
situation and bring the actor back into compliance.  
 
 The account for this aspect of compliance, which is concerned with the actor 
following through on its implementation activities, and which comes into focus when 
features of the concepts of compliance and implementation are contracted, it can be 
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isolated as a compliance consideration call ‘application’. ‘Implementation’ is a 
compliance consideration in its own right because whether an actor is in compliance with 
an applicable international norm or not depends at the outset in large part on the nature of 
the implementing activities it undertakes in relation to that norm. As noted above, 
implementing activities can be impotent and masked in a snapshot look at an actor’s 
compliance where actually those activities are inadequate for the purpose of 
implementing the norm concerned. 
 
 ‘Application’ as a compliance consideration that follows sequentially after 
‘implementation’. It has two aspects. One is that, as discussed, ‘application’ can be 
understood as internal compliance, that is compliance with the actor’s implementing 
activities.193 The other aspect concerns the manner in which the implementing activities 
are being applied in practice. Because they may be applied as designed and thus show 
internal compliance but may not be operating as desired. For instance, affordability issues 
or concerns with cultural appropriateness may lead to mechanisms designed to carry out 
implementing policies not being used by the target population. And of course, the 
problem with taking a snapshot view of compliance, as mentioned earlier, is one where 
the actor is complying perfectly with laws, regulations, policies or mechanisms that are 
simply not fit for the purpose they are designed to meet. So the ‘application’ compliance 
consideration takes account of these type of issues that can arise when the actor is 
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following through with activities undertaken in connection with the ‘implementation’ 
consideration. 
 
Conceiving of compliance not just as a binary condition, that is the actor is either 
in compliance or not, but as a process, as it almost inevitably will be in most situations194, 
the implementation and application compliance considerations discussed here, can be 
understood as ‘stages’ of the compliance process. The two stages are part of a 
triumvirate, with the ‘effectiveness’ stage, which is discussed next. 
 
‘Effectiveness’ is a compliance consideration derived from contrasting the 
features of the concept of the effectiveness of an international norm with the concept of 
norm compliance. The idea of an international norm’s effectiveness is a broad and 
expansive one and speaks to whether the norm successfully addressed the problem it was 
designed to address.195 It is an idea that operates at the international regime level and so 
while a state may be in compliance with its treaty obligations, the treaty may nevertheless 
prove ineffective in addressing the common international problem it was designed to 
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tackle196. It can be difficult to determine with exactness that a change that ended the 
problem the treaty or the treaty norm was designed to tackle, resulted from the institution 
and application of the norm itself. Too many intervening factors may have played a role 
in that result. Accordingly, a narrower conception of an international norm’s 
effectiveness could be one where the effective norm is one ‘that leads to observable, 
desired behavioural change.’197 
 
In terms of being a compliance consideration, the concept of a norm’s 
effectiveness is the same as that just discussed but is applied to the actor’s international 
governance environment as opposed to at the international level. The focus would be, 
following sequentially along the ‘implementation’ and ‘application’ stages, on whether 
the implementing activities as applied, assuming the application of those activities to be 
correct or unproblematic, achieved their goal. And that goal most likely would be an 
‘observable, desired behavioural change’ of the appropriate kind. For instance, an 
implementing activity like an affirmative action law would be effective depending on 
whether more government positions and educational opportunities are being occupied by 
members of the minority group than before the law’s passage. 
 
So, as discussed above, the concept of compliance can be broken into three 
stages: implementation, application and effectiveness, each of which is a consideration 
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for an actor seeking to identify its compliance requirements with a norm of international 
law. 
 
 Before leaving the discussion in this sub-section, it may be noted that the point 
above observed that it can be difficult to determine that a treaty was responsible for a 
change it sought to bring about. Thus the effectiveness of treaties can be difficult to 
prove. But on a much smaller scale, the same can be said in some cases about whether an 
action taken to implement and international norm actually caused the required result that 
was observed. So in terms of the Compliance Framework as discussed later, it may be 
difficult to show that an action taken at the implementation level led to the required result 
observed at the effectiveness level. That is to say, this is another type of causality that can 
arise in relation to the concept of compliance. In the previous section the problem was 
one where there was compliance without the actor doing anything to comply. Here the 
problem is that the actor has done something to try to comply and the course of conduct 
adopted by the actor has seemed to produce the required result but it could still be that 
some other factor caused that result and not the actor’s course of conduct. 
 
 It is submitted in relation to the issue described in the paragraph above, that the 
compliance requirement would be to carefully and clearly identify the causal pathway 
that leads to the expected result. That way if the cause was not the implementing action, 
remedial activities can be undertaken to ensure a proper causal pathway exists connecting 
the implementing action and the expected result. But if the proper pathway already exists 
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then the actor can undertake some action or course of conduct to be able to sustain or 
even enhance its compliance with the international norm concerned. 
 
 The observation about causality and compliance echoes and re-emphasises the 
points made in the previous section because the nature of compliance makes causality an 
important consideration. And there are two particular aspects to that nature, as discussed 
next. First, that compliance is ongoing, there is a temporal dimension as emphasised by 
Managerialism. So it is important to ensure that an actor’s compliance is sustained, 
especially as circumstances external and internal to the actor are susceptible to change. 
Second, that compliance can be a matter of degree and in such cases, the aim will be for 
actors to keep enhancing their compliance and move to ever more compliance than 
before. An example of such a case is that of the progressiveness of human rights 
realisation. Human rights compliance is an ongoing process and actors can always do 
more to enhance their compliance with human rights norms.198 So here the causality 
element is important so that the actor can always maintain the onward momentum of its 
compliance.  
 
2.2.3. Compliance can take time and can be a matter of degree 
As noted in the discussion on Managerialism, there is a temporal dimension to the issue 
of an actor’s compliance with an applicable norm199. Compliance can take time in other 
words. Also, in noting above that compliance is often not a binary condition, it may be 
observed that in many cases, the issue is not whether the actor has complied or not but 
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how far it has complied.200 Compliance is relative and a matter of degree in other words. 
So another consideration arises from the concept of compliance, namely that one of the 
elements of an actor’s compliance requirements is likely to be the setting of targets in 
relation to the implementing activities the actor has undertaken to comply with the 
applicable international law. 
 
 The targets may be time bound or based on some quantifying measure, such as 
population. But the purpose of the target is so that it is possible to obtain an idea of the 
position of the actor on its progress to full compliance. For each target, a series of 
benchmarks may be established to mark out the stages reached by the actor in attaining 
compliance.201 Such targets and benchmarks would reflect the fact that compliance is a 
process and their purpose is to provide a check on the progress made by the actor as part 
of that process and a goal towards which the actor’s progress is headed.202 
 
 So from the consideration of the concept of compliance, a number of 
considerations arise that indicate what elements would comprise an actor’s compliance 
requirements in relation to a particular international norm. The next section will assemble 
these elements into a more developed version of the Compliance Strategy and Framework 
than the one discussed in Chapter 1. 
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2.4. The general strategy and framework for identifying and specifying 
compliance requirements with norms of international law 
 
Where the factors motivating compliance exist, actors will want to or need to comply 
with the applicable international norms. The previous two sections have discussed and 
abstracted various compliance requirements for actors seeking to comply or improve 
compliance with international norms. This section organises those requirements into the 
Compliance Strategy and Framework (CSF). 
 
The CSF has a strategic aspect in that it offers a systematic way to think through 
an actor’s compliance requirements, which helps meet the actor’s aim of achieving or 
sustaining compliance with an international norm. This strategic aspect finds resonance in 
the literature on compliance, which is concerned, explicitly or implicitly, with strategies 
to improve compliance with international norms. 203  The emphasis on compliance 
strategies is also mirrored in the aim behind theorising about compliance of improving 
institutional design in order to improve or enhance compliance204 . Features of these 
strategies and their associated institutional design involve producing incentives for the 
actor to improve its compliance with the applicable norm. 
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These incentives could be the threat of military or economic sanction or the 
sanction of reputational loss. The managerial approach to compliance for example can be 
understood as setting out a strategy to achieve compliance through iterative contact and 
dialogue with the state in contrast to the enforcement approach to compliance. 
Alternatively, the incentive could be the availability of technical assistance in order to 
improve the capacity for improved compliance. The design of reporting and monitoring 
mechanisms could yet be another means for providing incentives to comply by opening 
the actor’s conduct to public scrutiny and criticism205. 
 
Strategies to incentivise compliance could also be functional in nature, being 
based on the idea that compliance with the norm is in the actor’s operational or 
commercial interests. This could be because such compliance boosts the actor’s 
operational effectiveness both in relation to a particular area of activity and to its overall 
performance. Conversely, aligning a compliance strategy with the actor’s existing 
operational features can enhance that actor’s compliance with a particular norm. This can 
form the basis for the institutional design of compliance improvement. Here the incentive 
works by reducing the adaptive costs for the actor of incorporating the compliance 
strategy into its operations. 
 
In some cases, the improved effectiveness can imply a commercial and strategic 
advantage. The example of the World Bank in Chapter 1 where the Bank required the 
state’s compliance with norms concerning participation rights illustrates this type of 
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compliance incentive at play. Such compliance potentially helps improve the 
development and sustainability of the Bank’s projects, which would have an operational 
pay-off for the Bank and any associated creditors and in that sense also for the state 
concerned. By virtue of the state’s compliance with the norms, there could also be said to 
have been benefits for the people affected by the project in that their rights were 
respected in the manner the project was undertaken. 
 
In relation to the various types of incentives for compliance indicated above, the 
identification of compliance requirements has a useful role to play. As such the CSF can 
likewise be adopted as a strategy aimed at improving compliance. It has aspects of both 
the capacity-improving and incentive-supplying models of compliance strategies. By 
helping an actor think through its compliance requirements in a systematic manner, the 
CSF can enhance an actor’s capacity to improve its compliance or ensure current levels 
of compliance do not decline. An actor that can more clearly and accurately identify its 
compliance requirements will be better able to deploy its resources to effect compliance 
in a more effective and sustainable manner. 
 
The CSF can also be used by interested external parties to monitor and assess an 
actor’s compliance with a particular norm, generating incentives in the form of external 
pressure on the actor to improve its compliance.  
 
Ultimately, the CSF, in providing a framework for identifying compliance 
requirements, helps orchestrate an actor’s course of conduct in complying with a norm of 
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international law. In order to discuss the CSF’s strategic aspect more meaningfully, it is 
necessary first to outline the elements of the CSF. These elements have been derived 
from the foregoing analysis and discussion in Chapters 1 and 2, and are represented in 
Diagrams 2 and 3 below as the general form of the CSF. 
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Diagram 2. Compliance Strategy for identifying compliance requirements in relation 
to norms of international law. 
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Diagram 3. Compliance Framework for identifying compliance requirements in 
relation to norms of international law. The double-headed arrow signifies the non-
linear, dynamic application of the CF. 
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2.4.1. Elements of the Compliance Strategy and Framework 
The Compliance Strategy and Framework consists of four elements as shown in Diagram 
2. The last element is the Compliance Framework and will be described separately in the 
next section. The remaining three elements of the CSF are described here. 
 
 The Compliance Topic relates to the issue regarding which compliance is sought 
by the actor or is expected of the actor by other interested parties. It can be encapsulated 
in a single norm or comprise a number of norms, as for example in the case of 
participation as a human right, which is discussed in Chapter 5.206 
 
The Compliance Topic needs to be clearly identified and maintained in the actor’s 
consideration for, as seen in the section on causality207 there can be compliance without a 
causal link between the conforming conduct and the norm supposedly motivating that 
conduct. Because the CSF is a strategy based on the identification of compliance 
requirements with regards to a particular norm, there is a risk that the compliance 
requirements might be wrongly identified, and perhaps more likely, the requirements are 
not adhered to because the actor is already seemingly complying with the norm. The 
danger in the latter case is that the actor accidentally enters into a state of non-compliance. 
 
At this level the norms underlying the Compliance Topic are at a general level. The 
area of international law has been identified and the norms relating to the Compliance 
Topic under that area of international law are identified. These norms next have to be 
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particularised to the context of whom compliance with them is expected. And that context 
has two aspects – normative and operational. Once particularised as the applicable norms, 
they are used as the basis of the CF-directed exercise of identifying the actor’s 
compliance requirements. 
 
In relation to the actor’s normative characteristics, the entire normative environment 
is considered so as to identify any potential norm conflicts. The actor cannot sacrifice 
compliance with one set of international norms in order to comply with another set of 
international norms. This is the problem of fragmentation of international law discussed 
in Chapter 1. 208 If there is norm conflict, then appropriate international law standards like 
‘proportionality’ and ‘margin of appreciation’ can be used to undertake a principled 
balancing of the issues involved. The actor’s operational characteristics are taken into 
account and may also lead to an application of the international law standards just 
mentioned if there are issues as to the capacity of the actor to comply with the applicable 
international law norm. Other operational features of the actor’s characteristics will go to 
providing details of specific compliance requirements as they relate to the actor’s manner 
of operation.209 
 
As noted, the applicable norms are the particularised norms relating to the 
Compliance Topic after the Actor’s normative and operational characteristics have been 
taken in to account. In this was the problem of fragmentation of international law is 
addressed but in addition concerns as to legitimacy of the applicable norms are also 
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addressed. That is to say that the applicable norms exhibit the attributes of determinacy 
and coherence that enhance their compliance pull and so the likelihood that they will be 
complied with.210 In this sense defining the Applicable Norms as just described is a 
compliance requirement in its own right. Without this step, identifying the compliance 
requirements in relation to the general norms concerning the compliance topic may not 
help ensure or improve the actor’s compliance with those norms as those norms might be 
perceived as illegitimate in their application to the actor thus leading to non-compliance. 
 
Finally, there is also an iterative aspect to the CSF, represented in the thinner upwards 
arrow in Diagram 3. This thinner arrow represents the fact that the effects of this upwards 
iteration will likely emerge over time. It was argued in Chapter 1 that one of the practical 
effects of the CSF is that it can guide and shape actors’ compliance practices, including 
how they balance competing issues in undertaking a course of conduct aimed at 
achieving compliance with international law. In a related vein, it was also suggested that 
CSF could assist theoretical inquiries charting the development of international law. Such 
inquiries will trace the manner in which actors’ practice evolves in response to the 
application of international norms to their operations and activities. The nature and 
effects of the development of international law, as reflected in evolving practice, will 
likely emerge over time, hence the thinner or weaker arrow in he diagram, but 
nevertheless it is worthwhile to take note of it when considering the CSF in its 
application and implications in relation to international law. 
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2.4.2. Elements of the Compliance Framework 
This section addresses elements of the Compliance Framework starting with the 
Applicable Norms. This element does two things. First, it overlaps with the last element 
of the CSF and provides the basis, as mentioned, of the CF-directed exercise of 
identifying the actor’s compliance requirements. Second, it is meant to address the 
causality issue. It is important in identifying the actor’s compliance requirements that 
they are all consciously identified as relating to the Applicable Norms. Doing so provides 
all the compliance requirements with a common frame of reference, that is, they all relate 
to the applicable norms. Further, the concern here is with active and not passive 
compliance, that is with the case where the actor is actively seeking to comply with the 
identified norms. So those norms should be clearly identified and the actor’s explicit 
concern would be with complying with them. Finally, the targets that are set for the actor, 
at the top of the CF, will relate directly to the norms and the effectiveness of the actor’s 
implementing activities will be assessed in terms of those targets thus ensuring that the 
acts or omissions undertaken by the actor as identified by the CF will have been 
undertaken with an express view to complying with those norms. 
 
 The next element of the CF relates to issues of context. Again this element does 
two things. First it brings into the considerations based on the CF, the relevant 
operational characteristics identified in the CSF to produce the Applicable Norms. And 
so the actor’s capacity can be taken account of in identifying its compliance requirements 
and also its operational characteristics. Secondly, it establishes a baseline against which 
to measure the effects of the course of conduct the actor will engage upon to comply with 
121 
 
the applicable norms. This way it will be possible to assess if there is any appreciable 
difference resulting from that course of conduct that moves the actor towards greater 
compliance with the applicable norms. The targets the actor may be aiming for would be 
set against the baseline conditions at the time the actor undertakes its course of conduct. 
 
The third CF element relates to the identification of compliance requirements 
according to the Implementation, Application and Effectiveness stages. These three 
stages have been described earlier.211 The implementation stage relates to compliance 
requirements in the form of implementing activities as well requirements in terms of the 
necessary institutional features being present. The application stage relates to 
requirements touching on how those implementing activities work in practice and the 
effectiveness stage related to whether the implementation activities actually has their 
intended effect. Both the application and effectiveness stages require consideration of 
whether the implementing activities are having any negative effects. 
 
The CF’s three components representing the implementation, application and 
effectiveness stages of compliance are inter-related and so can have an effect on one 
another. Thus, for instance, a problem identified at the application or effectiveness stage 
may actually have to do with an issue at the implementation stage, which is where a 
decision-maker would seek to make an adjustment. Also, lessons learnt in connection 
with one stage or level of the CF may have implications for improving performance in 
connection with other levels of the CF. 
                                                 
211
 Section 2.4.2. Compliance in stages: Implementation, Application and Effectiveness. 
122 
 
 
The three levels are represented distinctly not only to show how they inter-relate but 
also to emphasise that compliance is an iterative process that will likely involve, 
measures aimed at compliance being designed, tried and refined. This iterative process 
will involve all monitoring and if necessary, making changes at one or all three levels. It 
is useful to distinguish the three levels so that at any one time, it is possible to identify 
where action is being taken or is required to be taken. The entire CF is iterative but in a 
particular situation most of the iterative process will occur at the implementation, 
application and effectiveness levels.  
 
The final element of the CF comprises targets and benchmarks. Targets are goals that 
the actor is aiming towards and benchmarks refer to markers or milestones along the way 
to achieving those goals. There are several reasons arising from the concept of 
compliance as to why targets and benchmarks are needed. First, compliance is about 
changing an actor’s behaviour and compliance can take time.212 So it will be important to 
know if progress is being made towards achieving compliance and even in fact that the 
actor is headed in the right direction towards compliance rather than away from it. In any 
regime or system where there are a number of actors, there will be a deficit of trust and a 
problem of free ridership meaning that rather than a propensity to comply as the 
Managerialists would have it, there could actually be a propensity to defect if one 
member of the regime is seen as not keeping up their end of the bargain. In such cases, 
establishing targets and benchmarks in a fair and transparent manner allows all the actors 
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in that regime to find out how their fellow actors are doing in terms of their compliance 
with the norms applicable to all of them. 
 
The CSF and the CF outlined an explained about are of a general nature. To explain 
them further, it is necessary to adapt them to an area of international law and this is done 
in Chapter 4 with Chapter 3 intervening to highlight some compliance requirements 
arising from the area of international law chosen, which concerns human rights. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter looked at the literature on compliance to identify elements of compliance 
requirements in relation to international norms. It did so in three parts. First it considered 
the issue of international regulation and its relationship with the issue of compliance with 
international law norms. The second part to identifying compliance requirements that was 
undertaken in this chapter involved examining theories of compliance and drawing out 
from these theories, which explain why actors comply, some indication as to what are 
compliance requirements. Finally, by looking at key considerations arising from the 
concept of compliance,  namely the issue of causality in compliance, then the definition 
of compliance as explained by being contrasted with concepts of implementation and 
effectiveness, elements of compliance requirements were noted. 
 
The compliance requirements identified by this two-part analysis were of a 
general nature. Specific regulatory frameworks under international law will have 
particular compliance requirements based on their underlying ethos, as well as on the 
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substance of their norms. The general compliance requirements provide the basic 
framework on which the more particular requirements can be overlaid. This of course is 
important from the perspective of the coherence of international law and in order for any 
conflict between international law frameworks to be validly resolved. In the next chapter, 
the features of the international regulatory framework concerning human rights are 
outlined. Those features will represent particular compliance requirements based on that 
framework. Together with the general compliance requirements identified in this chapter, 
they will form the basis for the human rights compliance requirements outlined in 
Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3 The international regulatory framework concerning 
human rights 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 have outlined the concept of compliance requirements for norms of 
international law, and have explained the Compliance Strategy and Framework (CSF) as 
a means for identifying such requirements in a particular case. As mentioned in those two 
chapters, the CSF will be illustrated with regards to the human rights issue area in 
international law. This chapter begins that illustration with an explanation and discussion 
of the normative framework for human rights at the international level, and its analysis 
will inform the subject of Chapter 4, the adaptation of the CSF for the identification of 
compliance requirements for international human rights norms. 
 
3.1. The international normative framework concerning human rights 
The normative framework concerning human rights at the international level is primarily 
encapsulated in the United Nations Charter 213  and the International Bill of Rights, 
comprising the Universal Declaration of Human Rights214 (UDHR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights215 (ICESCR) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 216  (ICCPR). As such, the framework, which 
established the basis for international scrutiny of human rights within a state’s territory, is 
a post-World War Two emanation, and was a reaction to the human rights depredations 
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of that conflict. However the concept that a state could inquire into the treatment of 
individuals by another sovereign has international law antecedents in the abolition of the 
slave trade, the treatment of aliens by host governments, and in the international labour 
movement with the creation of the International Labour Organisation in 1919. 
 
The international human rights framework remains highly relevant to this day. It 
underpins and is one of the hallmarks of international accountability as between states 
and, a more recent trend, between states, civil society and human rights non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) on the one hand, and international organisations and 
corporations on the other. For all these actors, the concern is arguably less now with the 
kinds of large-scale and widespread human rights violations that may threaten 
international peace and security217. Instead it is more to do with seeing that all human 
beings are treated decently and with dignity. For instance, the United States, concerned 
that Bangladesh ‘has not taken or is not taking steps to afford internationally recognised 
worker rights to workers in the country’, suspended preferential treatment for imports 
from Bangladesh218, providing an example of inter-state enforcement of international 
human rights norms aimed at bringing about compliance with the norms concerned. 
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States are not only held to account in relation to their obligations concerning the 
human rights set out in the ICESCR and the ICCPR. As part of the review of their 
compliance with human rights norms by the United Nations’ Human Rights Council, 
states’ conduct is examined in relation to their obligations and commitments under:219 
(a) The Charter of the United Nations; 
 (b) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
 (c) Human rights instruments to which a State is party; 
 (d) Voluntary pledges and commitments made by States, including those undertaken when 
presenting their candidatures for election to the Human Rights Council (hereinafter “the Council”). 
[and in] addition to the above and given the complementary and mutually interrelated nature of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, the review shall take into account 
applicable international humanitarian law. 
 
 These obligations and commitments have various formulations but as a general 
matter can be summarised as an obligation to ensure the realisation of human rights and 
to ensure those rights and respected and protected from being infringed by the actions of 
third parties.220A typology of human rights obligations is also applied to state actors 
stating that they are to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of individuals within 
their territory.221 
 
 The position of non-state actors is less straightforward with regards to whether 
they have obligations under international law in relation to human rights. Consensus has 
grown around the idea that while corporations do not have legal obligations under 
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international law concerning human rights, they do have a ‘corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights’ that entails that they: 
[S]hould respect human rights. This means that they should avoid infringing on the 
human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they 
are involved.’222 
 
Thus for corporations there is an element of this responsibility to respect human rights 
not to violate human rights and to remedy situations in which such rights were 
transgressed. This responsibility is not a passive one. Rather the corporate actor is 
expected to under due diligence studies to determine if its activities are or are likely to 
negatively affect the enjoyment of human rights. They are also expected to provide 
people whose human rights may have been affected with an access to a remedy.223 In 
short what the corporate responsibility to respect human rights entails is the corporate 
undertaking a course of conduct to ensure its operations do not negatively affect human 
rights that can be quite detailed and extensive. 
 
 The position of international organisations in relation to human rights obligations 
or commitments is less specific. Academic writers have suggested that such organisations 
either only have the obligation under international law to respect human rights224 or the 
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more expansive obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. 225  Much may 
depend on the nature of the operations that these organisations undertake in the territory 
of states and in most cases, international organisations do not have the regulatory power 
states have within their territory to creditably be asked to undertake obligations to protect 
and fulfil human rights. So as with corporations, the position with international 
organisations is also likely to be that they are expect to respect human rights even if there 
is no obligation on them under international law to that effect. 
 
 Thus the position is that under international law, states have legal obligations in 
connection with human rights while non-state actors generally have a non-binding 
responsibility to respect human rights. But as noted above in relation to corporation even 
through the responsibility to respect human rights is non-binding, it can still entail 
considerable effort to comply. And as noted in earlier chapters, the issue of compliance 
can arise in connection with non-legally binding norms with as much force as in relation 
to legally binding norms. So the question may not be as much whether a human rights 
norm is binding or not but what the actor faced with its compliance has done about 
complying with the norm. 
 
The international regulatory framework concerning human rights therefore 
comprises three main elements, namely the actor with some responsibility or obligation 
in relation to human rights, the general human rights norms pertaining to that actor and 
the specific human rights recognised under international law that are at issue in relation to 
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the conduct of that actor in a particular compliance situation. The last element is a 
constant in the sense that the human rights recognised under international law are a finite 
number at any particular point in time. The key variable is the actor. The characteristics 
of the actor, its normative environment and operational conduct, will mainly reflect and 
determine the manner and extent to which internationally recognised human rights may 
be affected by the actor’s behaviour. Accordingly the general human rights norms are 
formulated so as to limit encroachment on the protection afforded by the international 
human rights framework by the actor’s conduct. In this sense, the norm is determined by 
the actor’s characteristics, in particular the manner in which the actor’s conduct can affect 
the enjoyment and realisation of human rights. 
 
Under international law in general and under the international law of human 
rights, there are concepts relating to the interpretation and application of international 
human rights norms to states that take into account the characteristics of the state in 
determining whether the state is in compliance with its international human rights 
obligations or not. The underlying rationale of these concepts allows for their 
transposition and application to the case of non-state actors. These concepts will be 
relevant to the identification of an actor’s compliance requirements in relation to 
international human rights norms, and are discussed next.  
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3.2. Concepts relevant to the interpretation and application of 
international human rights norms 
The previous section outline the international normative framework concerning human 
rights in terms of the actors whose conduct is regulated by that framework as well as its 
basic normative provisions and their sources in international law. This section examines 
key concepts concerning the interpretation and application of those key provisions. These 
concepts relate to: the content of obligations and commitments concerning human 
rights226, the nature of those obligations and commitments227, the actor’s exercise of 
discretion in complying with such obligations and commitments228, and its power to limit 
the enjoyment of various human rights.229 
 
 All of these concepts have been developed for the interpretation and application 
of human rights norms as they relate to the conduct of states. Some, like the obligation to 
respect, have been applied to non-state actors230 in recognition of the fact, and to the 
extent that, the conduct of such actors can interfere with the enjoyment of human rights. 
In the same way, the approach in this section, to the examination of the concepts listed 
above is to focus on their underlying rationale and regulatory purpose. The basis of these 
concepts’ application to the case of state conduct may then inform the basis of their 
application to the case of non-state actors. In this connection, the discussion in Chapter 1 
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on the Actor’s Characteristics and in Chapter 2 about how such characteristics are taken 
into account when using the Compliance Strategy and Framework (CSF) is relevant. 
 
In transposing norms of international law, and the concepts interpreting and 
applying those norms, from the case of states to non-state actors, the actor’s 
characteristics will be key because they inform the manner in which the non-state actor 
could negatively affect the interests protected by the norms. In the area of human rights 
for instance, the interests of concern are the enjoyment and protection of internationally 
recognised human rights. 
 
The discussion in this section starts with an examination of general international 
law concepts that are relevant to the interpretation and application of human rights norms. 
Following will be an examination of such concepts from the international human rights 
issue area specifically. The aim is to single out those aspects of these concepts that will 
be relevant to an actor’s identification of its compliance requirements in relation to 
international law norms concerning human rights. So a key issue will be to see to what 
extent, and how, these concepts relate to the elements of the CSF described in Chapter 2, 
and the considerations underlying those elements. 
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3.2.1. General international law concepts relevant to the interpretation and 
application of human rights norms 
 
Three general international law concepts or doctrines as discussed in this section. As 
mentioned earlier, they relate to the interpretation and application of international law 
norms, including norms concerning human rights. In this way, in any specific instance or 
compliance situation, these concepts will determine the content of the applicable human 
rights norms, and whether the actor is in compliance with those norms or not. The three 
concepts discussed in this section concern the actor’s power to limit or restrict the 
enjoyment of various human rights (proportionality), the actor’s exercise of discretion in 
complying with its obligations and commitments concerning human rights, and the 
degree of fault exhibited in the actor’s conduct in carrying out those obligations and 
commitments. 
 
3.2.1.1 Proportionality 
International law recognises situations where the rights and interests protected by 
international norms in a particular situation conflicts with an actor’s need to protect other 
important interests. For instance, the state’s power to regulate affairs within its territory 
for public interest purposes may conflict with an investor’s rights 231  or with rights 
protected under international human rights instruments232. In such situations, the doctrine 
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of proportionality and the analysis it provides for helps determine the where the balance 
between such competing interests can validly be struck. 
 
 The doctrine of proportionality is not a substantive norm of international law but 
instead is applied in particular cases to smooth the application of international law233, 
through providing a means for assessing and weighing competing claims and a basis and 
structure for justifying authoritative decisions involving the balancing of interests.234 
Having its roots in domestic law concerning the balance between the rights of the 
individual and the power vested in the state to account and provide for community 
interests, the doctrine of proportionality was developed in the context of German 
constitutional and administrative law before migrating to other civil law jurisdictions and 
eventually also to common law ones.235 Thus for instance Canada’s Supreme Court in 
considering whether a piece of legislation complied with the country’s Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, used a three-part proportionality analysis or test: 
First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in 
question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In 
short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if 
rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair ‘as little as 
possible’ the right or freedom in question. Third, there must be a proportionality between 
the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or 
freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of ‘sufficient importance’.236 
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And in South Africa, the Constitutional Court expressed the test of the proportionality of 
a state measure in terms of the following factors: 
In the balancing process, the relevant considerations will include the nature of the right 
that is limited, and its importance to an open and democratic society based on freedom 
and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose 
to such a society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy, and particularly where the 
limitation has to be necessary, whether the desired ends could reasonably be achieved 
through other means less damaging to the right in question.237 
 
Proportionality analysis is also employed in relation to international human rights 
norms. For instance, at the regional level, in the context of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights has applied and explicated the 
proportionality doctrine in striking the balance between the individual’s right to property 
and the state’s right to regulate.238 And at the international level, the proportionality 
doctrine has been explicated by the United Nation’s human rights bodies. In 1984, the 
Siracusa Principles 239  were put forward in terms of assisting the interpretation and 
application of the human rights set out in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.240 
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Thus the doctrine of proportionality relates to the idea that certain human rights 
are qualified, meaning that actors may legitimately restrict the scope of protection or 
provision made in relation to a particular human right and yet still be in compliance with 
its human rights obligation or responsibility. Where human rights are set out in treaties, 
the relevant treaty articles mention the grounds upon which the protection afforded to 
those rights might be restricted. It is a requirement for compliance with their human 
rights treaty obligations, that states seeking to restrict human rights only adopt measures 
proportionate to the pursuit of legitimate aims so as to ensure the continuous and 
effective protection of those rights241. While states parties to human rights treaties have 
the power to restrict certain human rights in this manner, they are prohibited from 
applying restrictions that ‘would impair the essence of a Covenant right.’242 
 
The doctrine also highlights the importance of considering the actor’s context in 
relation to human rights compliance assessment. It is allied with the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, which is discussed in the next section, in that it relates to a specific 
instance of deference to the discretion of the actor. The doctrine of proportionality 
ensures that any limitations or restrictions placed on the enjoyment of human rights is 
subject to review. The basis of such review is to ensure that the limits imposed on the 
enjoyment of the human right concerned was proportional to the aim being sought by 
imposing a limitation to begin with. Although the review may bring the matter up to the 
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international level, the question as to whether the limitation was proportional given the 
circumstances will involve a consideration of local conditions and contexts. 
 
Accordingly the proportionality doctrine is relevant to the identification of 
compliance requirements with norms of international law as it permits actors to deal with 
situations where the norms governing them and so the compliance expectations they face 
conflict. Such cases require principled balancing of competing interests which 
proportionality analysis allows for. In the CSF and CF discussed in Chapter 2, 
proportionality analysis is particularly relevant at the application and effectiveness levels 
for the purposes of identifying compliance requirements for an actor in situations where 
compliance with the norm in question potentially causes restrictions of other rights and 
interests. 
  
In Chapter 4, where the CSF is applied to area of international human rights 
norms, the CSF takes account of the need for such balancing at the stage of designing 
implementation activities, their application and in assessing their effectiveness. For the 
actor employing the CSF the incorporation of proportionality considerations in 
identifying its compliance requirements in relation to human rights norms or even more 
generally, helps ensure that competing claims are not ignored such that in complying 
with one set of norms, another set of norms is ignored or not complied with. Further 
incorporating the proportionality analysis within the CSF helps to ensure that the 
consideration of the factors to arrive at a particular balance among competing claims is 
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undertaken in a transparent manner with reasons that can be relatively easily explained by 
reference to the ‘boxes’ or elements of the CSF. 
 
Applying the proportionality analysis in identifying or determining its compliance 
requirements also helps the actor show it arrived at those requirements through ‘right 
process’ as Legitimacy Theory emphasises. This can enhance the perception that the 
actor’s compliance requirements are fair and legitimate and so help ensure that they will 
be accepted as valid both by individuals internal to the actor and by external individuals 
and groups who are either going to be directly affected by the actor’s conduct or who are 
interested in assessing that conduct for compliance with the applicable human rights 
norm or other norm. 
 
3.2.1.2. Margin of appreciation 
The margin of appreciation relates to the discretion allowed states in interpreting and 
applying international norms internally. The doctrine is referred to implicitly in the ILC’s 
analysis of the rationale underlying obligations of result. 
 
The margin of appreciation doctrine is one of review or judicial review by international 
courts and bodies over national decisions or conduct243. The question of its application 
therefore arises whenever a state’s conduct comes under authoritative scrutiny at the 
international level. As such, discussion and commentary of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine often takes the perspective of the external authoritative decision-maker making 
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an ex post determination of whether or not the state’s conduct falls within the margin. Put 
simply, falling within the margin means the state is in compliance with the applicable 
international norm while falling without the margin means the state has failed to comply. 
So from the perspective of the state actor, the margin of appreciation doctrine raises the 
ex ante consideration of whether a proposed conduct falls within the margin or not. The 
actor seeking to comply with a norm will obviously choose the conduct it determines as 
falling within the margin.  
 
In both the ex ante and ex post cases the margin of appreciation doctrine operates 
to define the boundaries of compliance and so the content of a particular international 
norm. From the perspective of the actor identifying compliance requirements in relation 
to a particular international norm, the doctrine can help determine those requirements 
because it defines what an actor can or cannot validly do, under international law, to 
comply with that norm. And so for that actor, whether a state, corporation or international 
organisation, faced with a compliance situation, the determination of its compliance 
requirements in relation to a particular norm is an ex ante exercise. For the external party 
scrutinising or reviewing that actor’s conduct, the application of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine to identify the actor’s compliance requirements would be an ex post 
exercise. 
 
This section firsts explain the criteria for consideration when applying the margin 
of appreciation doctrine, illustrating the use of the doctrine at the international level. 
Then the doctrine’s implications for identifying compliance requirements in relation to 
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norms of international law will be discussed. Finally some limitations in and criticisms of 
the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine are considered. 
 
The doctrine explained 
The margin of appreciation doctrine recognises that state officials have a degree of 
discretion in conducting their international obligations and operates as a presumption 
deferring to that exercise of discretion.244 The conduct amenable to that discretion relates 
to the interpretation and application of the international norm, covering both the laws and 
policies concerning the norm’s subject-matter and their interpretation and application, as 
explained by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Handyside v. UK.245 
There, in considering whether the United Kingdom was in compliance with Article 10(2) 
of the European Convention on Human Rights246 , which permits restrictions on the 
human right to freedom of expression, the ECtHR said, 
‘Article 10(2) leaves to the Contracting States a margin of appreciation. This margin is 
given both to the domestic legislator (“prescribed by law”) and to the bodies, judicial 
amongst others, that are called upon to interpret and apply the laws in force’.247 
 
Because of the discretion possessed by the state and the indeterminacy of 
international norms248, the doctrine allows for the possibility of different actors applying 
the same international norm in a different manner with both actors being in compliance 
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with the norm.249 In this way it takes into account actors’ varying circumstances and 
contexts in determining if they have complied with an applicable international norm.  
 
However that compliance is conditioned on the criteria for the valid application of 
the doctrine. Thus for an actor’s conduct to enjoy the presumption and fall within the 
margin of appreciation, the actor must have exercised its discretion in good faith and its 
conduct must conform ‘with the object and purpose of the governing norm.’250  The 
margin of appreciation thus permits an allowance to actors in light of their different 
capacities to comply with a norm251. It also allows actors to balance competing interests 
and thus attempt to resolve competing normative demands they might face, which in the 
case of international human rights norms means balancing the national interests involved 
against the rights that are to be limited.252 
 
The table of international examples 
Apart from the case of the European Court of Human Rights 253  the margin of 
appreciation doctrine and its underlying principle of deferring, within limits, to the 
discretion exercised by the state actor has also been applied by various other international 
tribunals and international review or decision-making bodies as indicated in Table xx in 
the Appendix to this chapter. 254  The cases either expressly refer to the margin of 
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appreciation doctrine255 or its underlying rationale of deference to national authorities 
subject to review.256 
 
Covering issue areas ranging from human rights, trade, investment, consular 
assistance and the law of the sea, the decisions referred to in this chapter’s Appendix 
establish the margin of appreciation as a principle of review at the international level and 
arguably as a general doctrine of international law257. It is submitted that this is correct 
and that the doctrine is of general applicability because it simply reflects the reality of 
interactions among actors in connection with their compliance with international norms, 
which take account of, as the discussions in Chapter Two show, of the actor’s 
circumstances, context and capacity. The interpretation and application of international 
norms in a compliance situation necessarily take account of such aspects of the actor’s 
characteristics, and legitimately so, where, according to the margin of appreciation 
doctrine, the actor is acting in good faith. 
 
The implications for identifying compliance requirements 
As indicated earlier, the margin of appreciation doctrine informs the identification of an 
actor’s compliance requirements in relation to an applicable norm. It does so in two ways. 
First, it clarifies and specifies the content of the norm with which compliance is sought or 
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expected. In terms of the CSF this means that the Applicable Norm is identified through 
the consideration of the Compliance Topic in light of the Actor’s Characteristics. In other 
words, and at this stage, the norm has been interpreted, according to the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, in light of the actor’s characteristics. 
 
The actor may then think through its compliance requirements in relation the 
norm by employing the Compliance Framework. At this stage, the dynamic nature of the 
compliance situation and of the compliance phenomenon have to be accounted for. By 
this is recalled the fact that compliance with a norm is an iterative, dynamic process that 
unfolds over a period of time that can range up to a period of years. As a consequence, 
there may be modifications made at various times to the actor’s compliance requirements, 
particularly those identified at the Implementation and Application stages of the 
Compliance Framework. In making these modifications the actor would also be applying 
the margin of appreciation doctrine as circumstances may be changing and new 
applications of the norm may be presenting themselves. Given this nature of the 
compliance situation, the margin of appreciation doctrine will influence the identification 
of compliance requirements by the actor using the Compliance Framework in terms that 
the requirement identified resolves any conflicting interests in a balanced manner taking 
account of the norm’s object and purpose, and of the interests it protects. 
 
The limitations and criticisms of the margin of appreciation doctrine 
One of the criticisms of the doctrine is that is allows for actors to evade compliance and 
that it detracts from developing more concrete understandings of a norm if the norm can 
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always be amenable to flexible understanding. These are valid concerns and will manifest 
in some cases. But against them must be set aside the observation that employing the 
margin of appreciation enhances the coherence of the international normative framework 
and so the compliance pull of the norm. Also, by allowing for deference to the actor 
governed by the norm, it is possible to foster compliance and build on that compliance 
because the actor may feel such deference enhances the legitimacy of the norm as it 
applies to the actor since the actor has a hand in shaping the application of the norm to its 
particular circumstances. In terms of the Legitimacy Theory of compliance, actors are 
more apt to comply with a norm they perceive as legitimate or fair258, and a norm that an 
actor can shape to its circumstances is likely to be better complied with. 
 
As for the criticisms mentioned earlier, the concerns they highlight may be 
overcome somewhat by the use of the CSF. First, in working through its compliance 
requirements, including through the application and influence of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, the actor is having to behave in a transparent manner. This can 
counter motives aimed at evading or diluting compliance. Second, the CSF provides a 
means for comparing the compliance requirements of various actors, those facing similar 
circumstances in complying with a norm, as well those who may be faced with the same 
norm but under different circumstances. Such comparison, added to by comparative 
research that the CSF might help in framing, can facilitate lesson-learning and 
information sharing between fellow actors. This could lead increasingly reduced 
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 Harold H. Koh, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law’, 106 Yale Law Journal (1996-1997) pp. 
2599-2659, p. 2645. 
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flexibility in the interpretation of the norm and accordingly to the narrowing of the 
margin for such actors in such situations. 
 
This section examined the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, noting its use as 
a doctrine of international law applicable to many important issue areas. Although the 
doctrine is one of review and usually applied by international tribunals and bodies 
reviewing the conduct of states, from the perspective of the actor wanting to having to 
comply with a norm of international law, the doctrine can help inform the actor’s conduct 
so that it falls within the margin and complies with the norm in question. From the actor’s 
perspective therefore, the doctrine can guide the identification of and influences the 
nature of the actor’s compliance requirements. The next section considers the relevance 
of the international law concept of due diligence for identifying an actor’s compliance 
requirements. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table 1: Examples of the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine and its 
underlying principle of deference to discretion at the national level.259 
International body 
or tribunal 
Decision or case Relevant case extract 
International Court of 
Justice 
LaGrand (Germany v. 
US) [2001] ICJ Rep 
466. 
‘it would be incumbent upon the 
United States to allow the review and 
reconsideration of the conviction and 
sentence by taking account of the 
violation of the rights set forth in the 
Convention. This obligation can be 
carried out in various ways. The 
choice of means must be left to the 
United States.’ (p. 514, para. 125, 
emphasis added) 
International Court of 
Justice 
Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals 
(Mexico v. United States 
of America) [2004] ICJ 
Rep 12 
‘The question ... is an integral part of 
criminal proceedings before the courts 
of the United States and it is for them 
to determine the process of review and 
reconsideration.’ (p. 60, para. 122)  
 ‘In stating in its Judgment in the 
LaGrand case that "the United States 
of America, by means of its choosing, 
shall allow the review and 
reconsideration of the conviction and 
sentence" (I. C..J. Reports 2001, p. 
516, para. 128 (7); emphasis added), 
the Court acknowledged that the 
concrete modalities for such review 
and reconsideration should be left 
primarily to the United States. It 
should be underlined, however, that 
this freedom in the choice of means 
for such review and reconsideration is 
not without qualification: as the 
passage of the Judgment quoted above 
makes abundantly clear, such review 
and reconsideration has to be carried 
out "by taking account of the violation 
of the rights set forth in the 
Convention" (I. C. J. Reports, p. 514, 
                                                 
259
 Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Values’, 31 NYU J Int’l L & Pol 
(1999) 843; Yuval Shany, ‘Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?’, 
16(5) EJIL (2005), pp. 926-935. 
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para. 125); including, in particular, the 
question of the legal consequences of 
the violation upon the criminal 
proceedings that have followed the 
violation.’ (p. 62, para. 131) 
International Court of 
Justice 
Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear 
Weapons [1996] ICJ 
Rep 226. 
‘a balance has to be struck between 
the degree of suffering inflicted and 
the military advantage in view... And, 
of course, the balance has to be struck 
by States. The Court cannot usurp 
their judgment; but, in this case, it has 
a duty to find what that judgment is.’ 
(Separate Opinion of Judge 
Shahabuddeen, at p. 402) 
WTO Appellate 
Body 
EC – Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing 
Products, WTO Doc 
WT/ 
DS135/AB/R (2001) 
‘it is undisputed that WTO Members 
have the right to determine the level of 
protection of health that they consider 
appropriate in a given situation’ (para. 
168) 
 
GATT panel US – Restrictions on 
Imports of Tuna, 33 
ILM (1994) 839 
‘The reasonableness inherent in the 
interpretation of “necessary” was not a 
test of what was reasonable for a 
government to do, but of what a 
reasonable government would or 
could do. In this way, the panel did 
not substitute its judgment for that of 
the government’ (para. 3.73) 
WTO Art. 22.6 
arbitration panel 
US – Tax Treatment of 
‘Foreign Sales Corp’ 
(Art. 22.6 arbitration), 
WTO Doc. 
WT/DS108/ARB 
(2002) 
‘Not only is a Member entitled to take 
countermeasures that are tailored to 
offset the original wrongful act and 
the upset of the balancing of rights 
and obligations which that wrongful 
act entails, but in assessing the 
“appropriateness” of such 
countermeasures – in light of the 
gravity of the breach – a margin of 
appreciation is to be granted, due to 
the severity of that breach’ (para. 5, 
expressing the view of one WTO 
arbitrator) 
Human Rights 
Committee 
Hertzberg v Finland, 
Comm. R.14/61 (7 
August 1979), UN Doc. 
A/37/40 (1982) 
‘[P]ublic morals differ widely. There 
is no universally applicable common 
standard. Consequently, in this 
respect, a certain margin of discretion 
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must be accorded to the responsible 
national authorities’ (para. 10.3) 
Human Rights 
Committee 
Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v 
Mauritius, Comm. 
35/1978, UN Doc. 
A/36/40 (1981) 
‘[T]he legal protection or measures a 
society or a State can afford to the 
family may vary from country to 
country and depend on different 
social, economic, political and cultural 
conditions and traditions’ (para. 
9.2(b)(2)(ii)) 
Human Rights 
Committee 
Marshall v Canada,  
Comm. No. 205/l986, 
UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/43/D/205/l986 
(1991) 
‘It remains to be determined what is 
the scope of the right of every citizen, 
without unreasonable restrictions, to 
take part in the conduct of public 
affairs, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives. Surely, it 
cannot be the meaning of article 25(a) 
of the Covenant that every citizen may 
determine either to take part directly 
in the conduct of public affairs or to 
leave it to freely chosen 
representatives. It is for the legal and 
constitutional system of the State 
party to provide for the modalities of 
such participation.’ (para. 5.4) 
Human Rights 
Committee 
Mahuika v New 
Zealand, Comm. 
547/1993, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 
(2000) 
‘While in the abstract it would be 
objectionable and in violation of the 
right to access to court if a State party 
would by law discontinue cases that 
are pending before the courts, in the 
specific circumstances of the instant 
case, the discontinuance occurred 
within the framework of a nationwide 
settlement of exactly those claims that 
were pending before the courts and 
that had been adjourned awaiting the 
outcome of negotiations. In the 
circumstances, the Committee finds 
that the discontinuance of the authors' 
court cases does not amount to a 
violation of article 14(1) of the 
Covenant.’ (para. 9.10) 
Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights 
Proposed Amendments 
to the Naturalization 
Provision of the 
Constitution of Costa 
Rica, Inter-AmCtHR, 
‘One is here dealing with values 
which take on concrete dimensions in 
the face of those real situations in 
which they have to be applied and 
which permit in each case a certain 
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Series A, No 4 (1984) margin of appreciation in giving 
expression to them’ (para. 58) 
European Court of 
Human Rights 
Handyside v UK, 1 EHRR 
737 (1976) 
‘Consequently, Article 10 para. 2 (art. 
10-2) leaves to the Contracting States 
a margin of appreciation. This margin 
is given both to the domestic legislator 
("prescribed by law") and to the 
bodies, judicial amongst others, that 
are called upon to interpret and apply 
the laws in force … Nevertheless, 
Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) does not 
give the Contracting States an 
unlimited power of appreciation. The 
Court, which, with the Commission, is 
responsible for ensuring the 
observance of those States' 
engagements (Article 19) (art. 19), is 
empowered to give the final ruling on 
whether a "restriction" or "penalty" is 
reconcilable with freedom of 
expression as protected by Article 10 
(art. 10). The domestic margin of 
appreciation thus goes hand in hand 
with a European supervision. Such 
supervision concerns both the aim of 
the measure challenged and its 
"necessity"’ (paras. 48-49) 
European Court of 
Human Rights 
Leander v Sweden, 9 EHRR 
(1987) 433 
‘national authorities enjoy a margin of 
appreciation, the scope of which will 
depend not only on the nature of the 
legitimate aim pursued but also on the 
particular nature of the interference 
involved. In the instant case, the 
interest of the respondent State in 
protecting its national security must be 
balanced against the seriousness of the 
interference with the applicant’s right 
to respect for his private life’ (para. 59) 
North American Free 
Trade Agreement 
Arbitral Tribunal 
D. Myers, Inc v Canada 
(Partial Award), 40 ILM 
(2001) 1408 
‘[A] breach of Article 1105 occurs 
only when it is shown that an investor 
has been treated in such an unjust or 
arbitrary manner that the treatment 
rises to the level that is unacceptable 
from the international perspective. 
That determination must be made in 
the light of the high measure of 
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deference that international law 
generally extends to the right of 
domestic authorities to regulate 
matters within their own borders.’ (p. 
1438) 
International Tribunal 
for the Law of the 
Sea 
The Volga Case (Russia 
v Australia) 
(Application for Prompt 
Release), Case No. 11, 
Judgement, 23 
December 2002, 
Separate Opinion of 
Judge Cot. 
‘While the coastal State does not have 
the right to take measures that are 
arbitrary or would contravene an 
obligation under international law, it 
has a considerable margin of 
appreciation within that framework.’ 
(para. 12) 
Arbitration Tribunal 
appointed pursuant to 
the Agreement 
between the 
Government of the 
United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and 
the Government of 
the United States of 
America Concerning 
Air Services 
(“Bermuda 2”) 
United States-United 
Kingdom Arbitration 
concerning Heathrow 
Airport User Charges 
(United States-United 
Kingdom): Award on 
the First Question 
(revised 18 June 1993), 
30 November 1992, 
Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards, Vol. 
XXIV, pp. 3-334 
‘With regard to the conduct required 
by the obligation, in the view of the 
Tribunal a Party is entitled to 
recognise the normal margin of 
appreciation enjoyed by charging 
authorities in relation to the complex 
economic situation that is relevant to 
the establishment of charges.’ (Chapter 5, 
para. 2.2.6) 
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3.2.2. Concepts specifically relating to human rights 
In the previous section, general international law concepts relevant to the interpretation 
and application of human rights norms were examined to consider their implications for 
the identification of an actor’s compliance requirements in relation to international law 
norms, and in relation to international human rights norms in particular. In this section 
specific concepts relating to the human rights issue area for the interpretation and 
application of human rights norms are considered. The aim is similar to that in the 
previous section. It is to analyse and assess what implications these concepts have for 
identifying an actor’s compliance requirements in connection with international human 
rights norms. 
 
 Again, the concepts discussed here have mainly been designed with reference to a 
state actor and the expectation of its compliance with applicable norms of international 
human rights. And so the issue of generalising these concepts to the application of non-
state actors has to be addressed, which will be done by focusing on the underlying basis 
for each concept and how that relates to securing the interests protected by the norms, 
namely the protection and enjoyment of human rights. By analogy and extension, the 
concepts discussed here would also apply to non-state actors that threaten those interests. 
Although the mode of operation of the non-state actor may vary from that of the state, 
meaning that in applying these concepts to non-state actors, their operational 
characteristics have to be taken into account so that the concepts can properly cover the 
impact such actors can have on the enjoyment and protection of human rights. 
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Apart from the issue of their application to non-state actors, there is an added 
dimension to discussing the concepts addressed in this section that relates to the division 
of internationally recognised human rights norms into the category of economic, social 
and cultural rights and the category of civil and political rights. This division was noted 
in Section 3.1 and stems from the difficulty states had in agreeing to a single treaty to 
legally bind states to the commitments contained in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. But the differences in thinking about the two sets of rights have narrowed 
substantially over time. No longer is it valid to conceive of civil and political rights as 
being the subjects of negative obligations while economic, social and cultural rights are 
secured by positive obligations.260 Or to think that the obligations relating to economic, 
social and cultural rights are progressive in nature and so not justiciable while those 
relating to civil and political rights are of an immediate character and thus amenable to 
adjudication.261 In fact, the motivation to dispel this distinction between the two sets of 
human rights led to the development of the first three concepts considered below.262 They 
were developed in part to more concretely specify states’ obligations concerning 
economic, social and cultural rights so as to address the justiciability concerns regarding 
this category of human rights and thereby negate the view that these rights were distinct 
from civil and political rights  address the justiciability concerns regarding this category 
of human rights.263 
 
                                                 
260
 See General Comment 31 for the positive obligations concerning civil and political rights. 
261
 See General Comment 3. 
262
 Section 3.2.2.1. Obligations of conduct and result, Section 3.2.2.2. Obligations to respect, protect and 
fulfill human rights, Section 3.2.2.3. Availability, acceptability, accessibility, adaptability and quality of 
compliance measures (AAAAQ). 
263
 Olivier de Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, materials, commentary, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p. . 
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 But with the narrowing of the differences between the two sets of rights and the 
emphasis on and recognition of their interdependent and interrelated nature264, the issue 
of the applicability or translation of concepts designed and developed in connection with 
one set of internationally recognised human rights, namely economic, social and cultural 
rights, to the understanding of compliance requirements in connection with civil and 
political rights arises.265 The concepts are in terms of what the state actor is required to do 
to meet its international obligation in connection with human rights and what individual 
rights-holders are entitled to, and it is suggested that they are applicable to both sets of 
human rights. This is because in both cases, the manner of complying with those 
obligations, which includes providing for and facilitating the rights-holders entitlements, 
will generally be the same in terms of the legislative, administrative, judicial and 
enforcement activities of the state. There may be unique or specific requirements relating 
to particular human rights but at a general level they will largely be the same, as the 
discussion below highlights. Accordingly,  it is suggested that a discussion of the 
general aspects of the concepts in this section, will show their transposable features as 
between the two sets of human rights and as between state and non-state actors.  
 
 It should also be noted that the issue addressed in this thesis concerns the 
identification of compliance requirements with norms of international law. The CSF, 
explained and justified in Chapter 2, provides a framework for identifying such 
requirements in aid of complying with an applicable norm or of improving norm 
                                                 
264
 Mention Vienna Declaration as well as the Preamble of the two covenants. 
265
 For a reference to the possibility that these concepts may not be translatable to civil and political rights, 
see Olivier de Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, materials, commentary, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p. 241. 
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compliance. So the interest here is not with whether the concepts discussed below 
improve the justiciability of certain rights and are in that respect transferable to define an 
actor’s obligations or commitments relating to civil and political rights. Instead, the 
concern is with examining those concepts for how they conceive of what the actor’s 
requirements for complying with obligations or commitments relating to human rights in 
general might be. From this, together with the work done in Chapters 1 and 2, it is 
suggested that it will be possible to identify considerations in connection with complying 
with human rights norms, which will be outlined in Chapter 4. The discussion in this 
chapter plus that of the compliance considerations concerning human rights in the next 
chapter will inform the adaptation of the general CSF developed in Chapter 2 to the case 
of human rights norms. That adapted CSF will also be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
3.2.2.1. Obligation of conduct and result 
 
The concept of obligations of conduct and of result are derived from Roman law and civil 
law traditions but as noted in Chapter 1, in their international law incarnations were 
analysed carefully by the International Law Commission (ILC) in its earlier work on the 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 266  This distinction between international 
obligations was deleted in the final version of the Draft Articles267, and so to that extent  
                                                 
266
 ILC Report on the Work of its 29th Session, 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 10) 38-66, UN Doc. A/32/10 
(1977), reprinted in [1977] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 2, at 11-30, with the reference to Roman law at 
footnote 22 p. 12; James Crawford, International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: 
Introduction, text, and commentaries, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 20-22.  
267
 James Crawford, International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, pp. 20-22. It was felt 
and country representatives said that the distinction did not add to any practical value to the determination 
of an internationally wrongful act. In addition, it was noted that the translation of the concepts from the 
domestic to the international context inverted their effect, thus rendering a suspect inconsistency to be 
deleted rather than preserved.The effect of the distinction of the concept at the international level as to 
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calls into question their use in identifying non-compliance with international obligations. 
However, in its commentary to the final version of the Draft Articles, the ILC recognised 
that the concepts of the obligations or conduct and result are nevertheless ‘an accepted 
part of the language of international law’268 and discussed their recognition and use by 
international tribunals.269 Likewise, the distinction between obligations of conduct and 
obligations of results is recognised in the international human rights issue area.270, which 
is why the concepts are discussed here rather than with the general international law 
concepts above. 
 
An obligation of conduct is an international obligation requiring the state ‘to 
adopt a particular course of conduct’271 or ‘to perform or to refrain from a specifically 
determined action.’272 As discussed in Chapter 1, an obligation of result by contrast is one 
requiring a state ‘to achieve, by means of its own choice, a specified result’273 or one that 
‘requires the State to bring about a certain situation or result, leaving it free to do so by 
                                                                                                                                                 
invert the effect of the concept such that the obligation of result, which was the more exacting at the 
domestic level, became the one more easy to comply with at the international level. 
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 James Crawford, International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, p. 21. 
269
 James Crawford, International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, p. 129. 
270
 Christine Chinkin, ‘The United Nations Decade for the Elimination of Poverty: what role for 
international law?’ Current Legal Problems, 54 (2002) 553-589, p. 575; Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, 
‘Obligations of Conduct and Result’, in Philip Alston and Katerina Tomasevski (eds.), The Right to Food, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984, pp. 111-118; Oscar Schachter, ‘The Obligation of the Parties to Give 
Effect to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, 73 American Journal of International Law, 462 
(1979), p. 462; Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A 
perspective on its development, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 107-109; CESCR, General Comment 
No. 3 on Article 2(1): The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, (5th session, 1990), 14 December 1990, 
para. 1. 
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 ILC Report on the Work of its 29th Session, Draft Article 20, [1977] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 2, at pp. 
11-30, p. 11. 
272
 ILC 1977, p. 12.  
273
 ILC Report on the Work of its 29th Session, Draft Article 21, [1977] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 2, at pp. 
11-30, p. 18. 
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whatever means it chooses.’274 The ILC further distinguished the two types of obligations 
on the basis that:275 
Obligations of [conduct] are frequently encountered in international law where the action 
required of the State has to be taken at the level of direct relations between States. 
Obligations "of result", on the other hand, the breach of which is the subject of article 21 
of the draft, predominate where the State is required to bring about a certain situation 
within its system of internal law. In such cases, international law naturally respects the 
freedom of the State and confines itself to informing the State of the result to be 
achieved, leaving it free to choose the means to be used for that purpose. 
 
The provision of discretion to the state in carrying out its international obligations at the 
domestic level is similar to the that discussed earlier in relation to the margin of 
appreciation doctrine.276 It is an indication of the difficulty of international review at a 
distance from the site of action at the domestic level where local officials are having to 
make decisions balancing various issues. It is also a reference to the need to take the 
actor’s characteristics into account in determining its compliance or non-compliance with 
its international obligations. 
 
The obligations in the two main human rights treaties, the International 
Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights277 (ICESCR) and the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights278 (ICCPR) are by their terms obligations of 
results. These obligations are as follows: 
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 ILC 1977, p. 12. 
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 ILC 1977, P. 13. 
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 Refer to Section 3.2.1.2. Margin of appreciation. 
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 993 UNTS 3. 
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 999 UNTS 171. 
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Article 2(1), ICESCR: Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps 
... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
 
Article 2(1), ICCPR: Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognised in the present Covenant … 
 
Article 2(2), ICCPR: Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other 
measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary 
steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the 
present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give 
effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant. (emphasis added) 
 
The obligations are to achieve a specific result, namely, in the ICESCR’s case, ‘to 
achieve progressively the full realization of the [recognised] rights’, and in the ICCPR’s 
case, ‘to respect and ensure to all individuals … the [recognised] rights’. But there is no 
requirement as to a ‘particular course of conduct’ or for the state to ‘to perform or to 
refrain from a specifically determined action’, although a preference for legislative 
means 279  to achieve the mandated result is indicated. But while a preference for a 
particular conduct is stated, namely to enact some law, the state is free to proceed 
towards achieving the specified result by other means as opposed to a situation where the 
state is faced with an international obligation specifically stating that the state shall enact 
a law.280 
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280
 ILC 1977, p. 14. 
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Because a preference as to some conduct is specified in the obligations created in 
the ICCPR and the ICESCR such obligations are considered to be obligations of result 
conditional as to means281 or conditional as to conduct.282 In the view of the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 2(1) of the ICESCR includes both 
‘obligations of conduct and obligations of result’.283 And further in connection with the 
obligation under the ICESCR, it has been observed that: 
Where the texts of the various rights are silent on the concrete steps to be taken by states 
in fulfilment of their obligations with regard to the rights “recognised” by the relevant 
obligations can best be understood as hybrids between obligations of result and 
obligations of conduct. They are obligations of result in the sense that states must match 
their performance with their objective capabilities. They are loose obligations of conduct 
in the sense that states obliged to take active, though largely unspecified, steps toward 
their satisfaction. This hybrid mixture of obligation types is due to the fact that the 
concept of “progressive achievement” mandates the existence of an ongoing process of 
development [where] ... such a process or course of conduct is ... a necessary but not a 
sufficient element of the full satisfaction of state obligations under the Covenant.284 
 
In using the phrase ‘course of conduct’ the observation just quoted recalls the 
ILC’s use of the same phrase in describing obligations of result as discussed in Chapter 1. 
There it was noted that the ILC described the means by which the state was to achieve the 
result required by an obligation of result as the ‘course of conduct’ to be undertaken by 
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the state285. It is submitted that the previous sentence conveys the full understanding of 
the obligations of states under the two primary human rights treaties. That is to say that 
the obligation is one of result and that the reference to or conception of a conditional 
obligation of conduct or a mixed obligation of conduct and result only provides a 
distinction without a difference. For however the obligations under the two treaties are 
conceived, the focus is on the course of conduct the state undertakes to achieve the result 
specified, namely that the recognised rights are fully realised (ICESCR) or 
ensured(ICCPR). And this idea of the respective obligations is fully conveyed by the 
concept of ‘obligation of result’.  
 
While states have discretion as to how the specified result in an obligation of 
result is to be achieved, this does not mean that the state has absolute discretion as to the 
course of conduct to adopt under the ICCPR and the ICESCR.286 As noted already, the 
course of conduct adopted must lead reasonably to the attainment of the specified result 
for this obligation must be read in light of the pacta sund servanda obligation under 
general international law whereby states parties to treaties must perform them in good 
faith.287 In addition, states parties will have to justify their conduct to the relevant human 
rights treaty body and before the United Nations’ Human Rights Council, thus militating 
against the state adopting a course of conduct that is objectively capricious.288  
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The characterisation of states parties’ general obligations under the ICCPR and 
the ICESCR as obligations of result is not to say that the two treaties do not refer to any 
obligations of conduct. Particular provisions, for example, of the ICESCR, do specify 
conduct the state must undertake. For example, Article 6(2) of the ICESCR states that 
‘[t]he steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right [the right to work] shall include technical and vocational guidance 
and training programmes’ (emphasis added). And at least seven other provisions of the 
ICESCR similarly specify conduct the state must undertake.289 
 
But given that the general obligations are obligations of conduct, the main focus, 
as noted above, is on the state actor’s course of conduct in relation to the human rights 
recognised in the treaties. And this is why the treaty bodies to relating to the two treaties, 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), in their guidance to states parties for compliance with their 
obligations under the ICESCR and the ICCPR respectively, consists largely of elements 
of the course of conduct to be adopted towards the end of achieving that compliance. So 
for instance, these treaty bodies identify the need for states to adopt legislative, 
administrative, judicial and fiscal measures to meet their obligations under their 
respective treaties, including to provide their officials will training on human rights 
awareness. Each of these elements of conduct will not meet the state’s obligation on their 
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own. Instead they must be considered part of the course of conduct that moves the state 
towards compliance with its obligations under the applicable human rights treaty. In this 
sense, and as discussed in Chapter 1 290 , each element of the course of conduct so 
identified may be considered part of the actor’s compliance requirements. 
 
 But the identification of an actor’s compliance requirements does not only involve 
the identification of elements of the course of conduct that leads to compliance with a 
result specified in an international norm. For instance, the adoption of a relevant piece of 
legislation could be part of the course of conduct required of a state actor in compliance 
with its human rights treaty obligation. But how that legislation works in practice and its 
effectiveness would also be factors to be taken into account for the state actor seeking to 
comply with that obligation. Not only must these discreet aspects of the legislation be 
identified, but also the ways in which they interrelate needs to be taken into 
consideration. 
 
As the discussion in Chapters 1 and 2 showed, the compliance requirements 
identified in relation to a particular compliance situation are likely to be dynamically 
interrelated and will be derived from elements of the course of conduct required, as just 
noted, as well as from elements of compliance considerations and aspects of the 
compliance theories, both discussed in Chapter 2. And these factors for identifying 
compliance requirements, which have led to the design of the Compliance Strategy and 
Framework in Chapter 2, must be considered in the context of the actor’s characteristics 
                                                 
290
 See Section 1.2. Compliance requirements. 
162 
 
given the specific features of the Compliance Situation. Taking the legislation example 
again, the adoption of the legislation would be an implementing activity for the state 
actor. But as discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of compliance has three stages. So it 
will be necessary to see how the legislation operates in practice, which is the application 
stage and if it was effective in achieving its goal in terms of respecting, protecting or 
fulfilling human rights. The identification of the actor’s compliance requirements in other 
words, and as emphasised in the previous chapters, help to orchestrate the actor’s course 
of conduct towards compliance and towards sustaining that compliance. 
 
In identifying the appropriate and valid course of conduct for a state to adopt to 
comply with obligations in connection with applicable human rights treaties, state actors 
can have recourse to the respective human rights treaty bodies, as noted above. It is 
submitted that for non-state actors, indications of the expected course of conduct for 
compliance with any human rights commitments that have undertaken may be obtained 
from authoritative reports such as the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
for corporations, which issued from the Human Rights Council291, or the International 
Law Association’s report on the accountability of international organisations, which 
contained a study and recommendations of the accountability of international 
organisations in relation to international human rights norms.292 
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 Alternatively it is suggested it would be valid to identify the appropriate course 
of conduct for such actors by means of a functional analogy with the course of conduct 
human rights treaty bodies identify for states. Thus where for states the adoption of 
legislation would be an appropriate course of conduct, non-state actors may employ 
similar normative systems such as the formulation and promulgation of policies to 
inculcate awareness of human rights issues among its staff and employees. 
 
Lastly it should be noted, as mentioned elsewhere, that the perspective taken in 
identifying an actor’s compliance requirements is to produce and sustain compliance 
prior to any norm violation. On the other hand, the characterisation of obligations as 
obligations of conduct and result is to identify the conditions under which an 
international legal obligation is breached, thus potentially giving rise to the state actor’s 
international responsibility. In this sense, the perspective this thesis is concerned with 
regarding obligations of conduct and result is not their legal effects or natures but their 
conceptual significance in focusing on the actor’s course of conduct and its valid and 
authoritative identification in aid of identifying the actor’s compliance requirements in 
the context of a particular compliance situation. 
 
3.2.2.2. Obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human rights and to undertake 
institutional measures 
In the previous section, the basic human rights obligations under the two main human 
rights treaties, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, were discussed. These obligations have been 
analysed by the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the human 
rights treaty bodies in terms of a three-part typology under which an actor is required to 
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respect, protect and fulfil human rights 293 . The elements of the typology may be 
understood as representing different categorisations of the course of conduct an actor may 
adopt to comply with its human rights obligations or commitments. So the state actor 
may comply with its human rights obligations just by respecting the human rights of 
individuals within its territory. But that may not be enough to secure compliance and so it 
may also need to adopt the course of conduct relevant to protecting and fulfilling human 
rights. 
 
The duty to respect human rights requires of the actor that it not interfere with 
individuals’ enjoyment of their human rights or with self-help measures taken by people 
to secure their rights. In this sense the duty to respect requires a ‘do no harm’ attitude by 
the actor towards a human rights issue or that the actor refrain from violating human 
rights294. The respect component of an actor’s human rights obligation or responsibility 
also requires that the actor considers and takes account of human rights consequences of 
any measures it proposes295. In the case of states, adopting human rights-based budgetary 
processes would be one way to reduce the likelihood that measures proposed by the 
government might negatively affect the enjoyment of human rights. Clearly to take this 
type of human rights-focused prospective view, the officials representing the actor must 
possess an adequate understanding of human rights. In this regard, the Human Rights 
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Committee has mentioned the importance of raising awareness levels about the ICCPR 
among public officials, other agents of the state and also among the general population296. 
 
However, the requirement to respect human rights is also directed towards non-state 
actors and individuals297. As noted in Section 3.1., a consensus has emerged around the 
idea that corporations have a responsibility to respect human rights and that this entails 
the requirement not to violate human rights and to remedy situations in which such rights 
were transgressed. It also includes the corporate actor enacting and complying with its 
own human rights policies.298 
 
Thus the requirement to educate officials and staff about the human rights aspects of 
an organisation’s activity also extends to non-state actors like international organisations, 
private corporations and non-governmental organisations. The implications of the 
expanded reach of the duty to respect human rights to non-state actors means that the 
protection afforded for human rights is potentially very extensive especially considering 
that the duty is not simply to refrain from violating rights but also has a positive 
dimension.  
 
The requirement to educate officials and staff is an example of this positive aspect of 
the duty to respect. Other examples include the passing of relevant laws or instituting 
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measures to monitor the actor’s human rights performance to ensure that any directives or 
guidelines issued concerning the need for employees to ensure human rights are respected 
in their organisation’s conduct are followed or implemented.  
 
The duty to protect human rights may be regarded as being primarily concerned 
with the control of third parties by the actor concerned so that they do not act in a manner 
that undermines human rights realisation. Under this duty, the actor can be expected to 
institute the relevant laws and mechanisms to regulate third parties and to ensure that 
these laws and mechanisms operate as intended. 
 
The duty to fulfil human rights is concerned with the situation where individuals 
are unable to enjoy their human rights because of a lack of capability or entitlement. For 
instance, people living below subsistence levels will have to be given access to state aid. 
Again here the actor will have to ensure that the appropriate policies and mechanisms are 
in place to ensure the relevant assistance is provided in order to help individuals enjoy 
their human rights. This effectively involves the entire administrative apparatus of the 
state at various levels and extends to the requirement to monitor and evaluate the 
compliance-seeking measures being undertaken299. 
 
The tripartite typology to respect, protect and fulfil human rights also applies to 
civil and political rights.300 So for example there would be a need to provide a well-
trained police force, prosecutor’s office and judiciary to respect the right to a fair trial. 
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And there would be a need to create and empower regulatory bodies to monitor the 
activities of private actors in order to protect the right to privacy. Finally, in relation to 
fulfilling human rights, there would be a need to create electoral laws and electoral 
machinery to fulfil the right to participate in public affairs by facilitating regular voting. 
 
In furtherance of this typology, an institutional approach or perspective has been 
developed that asks 'what institutions would need to be functioning effectively in order 
for people generally to have secure access to what they have rights to?'301  By this 
reasoning each right requires its own 'institutional machinery' for its realisation and 
though the specific nature of that machinery may vary according to the right, the 
obligation to 'create and operate … institutions and processes' applies in relation to all 
human rights302. 
 
The focus on such institutional measures in fact provides a template for all human 
rights obligations in whatever form they are expressed because the addressees of those 
obligations, whether state or non-state actors are organised internally in terms of various 
institutions, both formal and informal, and it is change in terms of those institutions that 
the realisation of human rights is fundamentally concerned with. 
 
But institutional effects can be determined by institutional culture. So in addition 
to the institutional aspects discussed, all of the component aspects of the human rights 
typology discussed here require a culture within the state or other relevant organisation of 
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respect for human rights and can therefore involve or extend to programmes for human 
rights training. In a sense this criteria asks, ‘What is the organisation not required to do?’ 
In addition to stipulating the need for effective institutions for the realisation of human 
rights, such analyses are not complete without also asking, 'what institutions need to be 
abolished in order to implement human rights?' Asking only which institutions 'need to be 
functioning effectively' does not therefore directly identify all aspects of institutional 
change necessary for the implementation of human rights. 
 
Once the role of institutions and the need to institutionalise change is understood, 
the question of what type of institutional activity to include in the CSF arises.  Almost all 
sources of human rights acknowledge three dimensions of institutional activity that are 
undertaken within most organisations, namely the legislative or law-making, 
administrative or law-executing or implementing, and enforcement activities . Thus one 
aspect of compliance requirements is whether the appropriate laws and policies are in 
place and are functioning as intended. In addition however, there is also a need to focus 
on issues of the training of personnel and staff development as well as of the level of 
familiarity with human rights and of changes in attitude and culture . The processes 
leading to those changes are dynamic and would likely have involved feedback 
mechanisms. 
 
In conclusion, the typology of human rights duties and the subsequent focus on 
the institutional aspects of providing for human rights all speak to the fact that the actor 
with human rights obligations or commitments to comply with has to consider the course 
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of conduct it will adopt in order to comply. However, in relation to the CSF and the CF 
developed in Chapter 2, it may be observed that much of the conception of the actor’s 
requirements relate to the implementation level. But as seen in Section 2.5.2., the CF 
covers all levels from Implementation to Effectiveness showing how conduct towards 
compliance at different levels interrelates. In that sense the CF will likely be able to guide 
the actor to identifying more compliance requirements than a reliance on the typology of 
respect, protect, fulfil. Still, an important observation can be made in relation to the 
respect typology. Because it emphasises the agency of the rights-holder securing its own 
rights, it supports the idea of the ‘Stakeholder’s actions’ at the Application stage, as 
discussed in Section 4.2.2.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The duty to create institutions. Steiner and Alston, in their restatement, refer to 
the duty to create institutional machinery essential to the realisation of rights303. The other 
duties within this typology require the creation of institutions such as laws, machineries 
and policies and it useful to identify this requirement explicitly. In doing so however, 
what is equally important is to assess is that they function in practice according to their 
aim and purpose. This is a key factor to consider in designing the CSF. 
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3.2.2.3. Availability, acceptability, accessibility, adaptability and quality of compliance 
measures (AAAAQ) 
 
The AAAAQ criteria or human rights elements, were conceived in the work of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights304 and that of Katarina Tomasevski, 
the then UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education. The criteria have three 
dimensions of human rights compliance requirement for the actor in relation to its human 
rights obligations and responsibilities: 
1. They inform the content of the actors laws, policies and other measures adopted in 
relation to those obligations. (Implementation level) 
2. They represent requirements for compliance in relation to how the laws, policies and 
measures are operationalised or practically instituted. (Application level) 
3. They represent the objectives and goals of those law, policies and measures and so 
provide the criteria for assessing if those objectives and goals were successfully met. 
(Effectiveness level) 
The precise application of these criteria to a particular actor will depend on the best 
interest of the rights-holder305 given the prevailing conditions and context under which 
the actor’s activities are being conducted306. 
 
Availability – This element requires the actor to ensure its laws and policies in relation to 
a particular human right provide for the availability of a sufficient number of facilities, 
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goods and services in relation to the human right in question307. It has implications for 
budgetary allocations and for the prioritisation of programmes by the actor within the 
context of the actor’s mandate. A state’s allocation of funds to its defence budget at the 
cost of healthcare spending could be likely to contravene the availability requirement. 
Even if laws and policies provide for the maximum availability of facilities within the 
actor’s fiscal context, the facilities may not be built or provided as planned and the actor 
is required to assess whether the planned facilities are in fact provided so that if the 
facilities provided fall short of the number planned for, the discrepancy can be identified 
and remedied. Budgetary allocations may exceed the ability of the actor to provide the 
required facilities, in which case the actor may seek assistance whereas if the planned 
facilities are not provided because of misfeasance, the actor ought to ensure such 
misfeasance is not repeated. 
 
Acceptability – The institutional arrangements in question must be assessed in terms of 
their suitability and appropriateness for facilitating participation and accountability.  
Institutional arrangements that, for example, go against cultural expectations and norms 
of the rights-holders would not be acceptable to them and should not be utilised. 
 
Accessibility – Institutional arrangements for participation and accountability must be 
accessible to the rights-holders concerned.  Thus assessments of the operational aspects 
of the relevant institutional arrangements must take into account the issue of their 
accessibility.  Barriers due to physical or economic factors, the lack of information or 
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because of other discriminatory factors ought to be identified and assessed as to whether 
they are unreasonable as a balance has to be stuck in every case between the requirements 
of those wishing to participate and the requirement of society for systems of governance 
that are manageable and effective308. 
 
Adaptability – The adaptability and flexibility of institutional arrangements for 
participation and accountability to suit a particular situation and context must be 
assessed.  If such mechanisms are not adapted to particular situations, there will be a 
danger of applying them in a ‘one size fits all’ manner.  Institutional arrangements that 
work in one context may not necessary work in another. 
 
Quality – It is necessary to assess the quality of the available institutional arrangements 
for participation and accountability.  Arrangements of insufficient quality could result in 
deliberation and consultation procedures that are superficial and pointless in the eyes of 
rights-holders.  This category of assessment allows for the distinction between de jure 
and de facto compliance to be captured and acted upon. 
 
The typologies that together make up the rules of provision do not necessarily help to 
set the boundary of such obligations and so they are limited in the extent to which they, 
on their own, can adequately specify the requirements for compliance. Human rights, like 
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other types of rights evolve309, so their boundaries are never truly fixed. Nevertheless, for 
the purpose of compliance assessment, a determination of where human rights boundaries 
are fixed at any one point in time must be made. Specifying the requirements for human 
rights compliance involves an exercise of balancing the human rights of the individual or 
group concerned with the interests of the broader community affected by the particular 
human rights in question. Only when this element of balance is introduced into the 
consideration of what the requirements for compliance might be, is it possible to provide 
clarity as to the specification of such requirements. The element of balance is introduced 
with the second set of rules, the ‘rules of context’310. 
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3.2.2.4. Progressive realisation 
The idea that human rights are realised progressively originally applied to economic, 
social and cultural rights but the fact that progressive realisation is a function of an 
actor’s capacity to fulfil human rights obligations, means that the realisation of all human 
rights is progressive. Henry Steiner has shown this for instance in relation to the human 
right to political participation. One reason for this is, as Steiner mentions, is that the 
meaning of specific human rights evolve over time. 311  Thus there is always future 
realisation of that human right as its meaning changes, in particular as the scope of that 
right expands. 
 
The second reason is that the realisation of human rights involves the expenditure 
and distribution of resources and other issues relating to capacity such as capabilities in 
terms of knowledge and expertise. Hence, human rights treaties refer to international 
cooperation in terms of technical assistance, acknowledging technical limitations of states 
to fulfil human rights obligations. Social factors too can be limiting in terms of capacity 
for undertaking measures to comply with human rights requirements312. The allocation of 
resources has political implications and these can get in the way of the realisation of 
human rights, especially say for groups that are traditionally discriminated against. 
However, the resources of an actor at any point in time are finite and the realisation of 
human rights through measures taken by that actor will be limited by the amount of its 
resources at that time. 
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A distinction is still to be made however, between an actor’s immediate obligation 
to fulfil its human rights obligations and the progressive realisation of those rights. For 
instance, the obligation to realise the right to freedom from discrimination or the right to 
freedom from torture are referred to as obligations of immediate obligation on the 
assumption that the state actor is not required to act positively but to instead desist from 
behaving in a biased manner towards certain groups, or from the use of torture. The 
assumption does not take into account the fact that the changes in attitude among the 
agents of the state may take time and will involve the dissemination of information and 
training and thus the expenditure of resources. 
 
Even here the issue of capacity arises except that the liability on the state in 
relation to violations of the rights to freedom from discrimination and torture is strict. In 
cases not involving strict liability, immediate obligations in relation to human rights may 
be understood as obligations for the actor to adopt measures and make other changes 
without delay although the full realisation of the human rights concerned will be achieved 
in a progressive manner. In any case, the fact that there are immediate obligations in 
relation to human rights does not remove the actor’s capacity from considerations of 
human rights compliance assessment and such capacity must be a feature of the CSF. 
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3.2.2.5. Minimum core obligation 
Another feature of the international human rights framework that reflects the fact that the 
actor’s capacity is a valid criterion for consideration in relation to compliance with 
human rights norms is the idea of minimum core obligations. Since the level of the 
realisation of human rights varies with the actor’s capacity, the idea of a minimum core 
obligation in relation to each right is meant to ensure that actors with human rights 
obligations meet certain performance standards in terms of what they do to meet those 
obligations. However, the notion of maintaining minimum core obligations for actors to 
attain is more useful if at all, in theory than in practice. 
 
First, the idea of minimum core obligations has been found to be of limited use in 
deciding specific cases, as decision-makers may not have access to all the data and 
factors to be considered to make the determination as to what the minimum level is313.  
 
Second, the idea of minimum core obligations must involve a race to the bottom 
as it is difficult to maintain, when deciding minimum international standards, that it is not 
the case that those standards are set by reference to the circumstances of, for instance, the 
poorest state. It may be argued that minimum standards can be set by an objective method 
and that those states too poor to attain the standards must be provided with technical 
assistance to be able to meet the standards. However, this is problematic because for as 
long as those states fail to meet the standards314, the prevailing state of affairs will be one 
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where “those that can do and those that can’t don’t”, effectively rendering the idea of 
minimum standards meaningless.  
 
Third, the idea of minimum core obligations appears to reflect the idea that there 
is a limitation to deference paid to national authorities as to the measures to adopt in 
fulfilling their human rights obligations. This limitation already exists in international 
human rights law in relation to the idea of the margin of appreciation, which will be 
discussed next, so it is not apparent that the idea of a minimum core obligation for human 
rights realisation makes any contribution to the theory of international human rights law. 
 
The limited utility of the idea of minimum core obligations for the realisation of 
human rights means it is difficult to apply for the purposes of human rights compliance 
assessment. Nevertheless, the formulation of this idea is another indication of the fact that 
an actor’s capacity is a relevant capacity in assessing human rights compliance. 
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3.3. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the international regulatory framework for human rights was considered. 
Under that framework, state have international legal obligations in relation to the 
protection of human rights but non-state actors do not. Instead non-state actors are 
regarded as having to respect the human rights of individuals who may be affected by 
their operations. But the lack of legal obligation does not mean that non-state actors are 
likely to face any less pressure than state actors to comply with the international human 
rights norms applicable to them. As Chapters 1 and 2 indicated, compliance can be 
expected on equal terms of legal norms as well as of non-legal norms. 
 
 But for the purposes of identifying an actor’s compliance requirements in relation 
to those norms additional concepts are required. These are the concepts that used in 
interpreting and applying the human rights norms that apply to state actors. It is 
submitted that based on their underlying rationale and purpose they are also applicable to 
the case of non-state actors. 
 
Accordingly, the main part of the chapter related to the examination of the 
international law concepts and concepts specific to the international human rights 
regulatory framework that are used to interpret and apply human rights norms. The 
examination showed the relevance of an actor’s context to the identification of its 
compliance requirements in relation to international human rights norms. The progressive 
nature of human rights also highlighted the relevance of the sustainability of the measures 
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undertaken to comply with an actor’s human rights obligations or commitments to the 
issue of identifying the actor’s compliance requirements. 
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Chapter 4 Human rights compliance: Requirements, strategy 
and framework 
 
The aim of this chapter is to identify, describe and examine the requirements for 
compliance with norms of international law concerning internationally recognised human 
rights. Firstly, this chapter brings together and develops the key aspects of human rights 
compliance identified in Chapter 3. The first section outlines and discusses these key 
aspects and considerations in relation to identifying compliance requirements in relation 
to international human rights norms. These considerations are then used in the second 
part of this chapter to adapt the general Compliance Strategy and Framework (CSF) 
developed in Chapter 2 so that it can be used to identify compliance requirements relating 
to international human rights norms. Finally, the chapter concludes by explaining the uses 
of the CSF thus adapted to the human rights area. 
 
 The explanation of the adapted CSF will be from the perspective of the human 
rights practitioner from the compliance perspective. The human rights practitioner in any 
particular case could be internal or external to the actor. A human rights practitioner that 
is internal to the actor could be an official of a state, international organisation or of a 
corporation, depending on the actor concerned. And that official is interested to ensure 
that the actor complies with its applicable international human rights norms. 
 
A human rights practitioner operating externally to an actor could be an official of 
the United Nations’ Human Rights Council, or of the relevant human rights treaty body, 
of a human rights non-governmental organisation (NGO), or even an official in a judicial 
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or quasi-judicial body before whom comes the question of the actor’s compliance with 
applicable human rights norms. For example, in Chapter 1, where the problem of 
fragmentation in international law was discussed, it was noted that in connection with 
human rights, a key issue was how to resolve the parallel international normative 
frameworks governing a state’s conduct in relation to international investment protection 
and international human rights protection. Even here the use of the CSF can be relevant. 
 
Since many international investor-state disputes are referred to international 
arbitration, international arbitrators are being asked to reconcile the two parallel 
international frameworks regarding international investment and international human 
rights. They are being asked to do so in the course of determining whether the investor’s 
rights were violated, and if those rights were violated, whether the investor suffered 
damage that was compensable by the state. It is submitted that even in this scenario the 
international arbitrator may be regarded as human rights practitioner. He or she will be 
presented by claims on both sides, including arguments by human rights NGOs as amici 
curiae. In sifting through these arguments and deciding them, the international arbitrator 
is effectively occupying the role of a human rights expert and practitioner. And it is 
submitted that, even in this case, the human rights adapted CSF discussed in this chapter 
can help the international arbitrator think through or reason through the issues before him 
or her. 
 
Conceiving the term human rights practitioner in this way highlights the objective 
nature of the CSF developed in Chapter 2 and of any application that may be made of it, 
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as for example, in this chapter in connection with international human rights norms. The 
CSF is objective because it is based upon a compliance considerations based upon an 
objective assessment of compliance theories, the concept of compliance, and the 
international normative framework governing the issue area in connection with which it 
is applied. So whether the CSF is applied by an official internal or external to the actor 
whose compliance is at issue, the mode of using the CSF and the compliance 
requirements identified by that use should, in large part though not wholly, be the same.  
 
Where different human rights practitioners are using the CSF in relation to the 
same compliance situation, the compliance requirements identified using the CSF will not 
wholly be the same for a few reasons. One reason is that different individuals are using 
the same tool, where that tool is meant to guide their reasoning processes in connection 
with a particular issue, namely the identifying of compliance requirements in connection 
with a particular international norm. Such reasoning processes are subject to the 
idiosyncrasies of the individual and by definition since no two individuals see the same 
situation in exactly the same way in every single respect, that idiosyncrasy will result in 
different human rights practitioners identifying different compliance requirements in 
connection with the same compliance situation. 
 
But absent any pre-existing bias, such differences should not be too great and 
should be reconcilable so that ultimately a commonly agreed set of compliance 
requirements can be identified and agreed upon. After all the identification of compliance 
requirements using the CSF is a process. But it is meant to be a transparent process based 
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on objective criteria. And, it is submitted, it is these attributes of transparency and 
objectivity that lend to the reconciliation of the varying compliance requirements that the 
personal idiosyncrasies of different CSF users will inevitably produce. 
 
The other reason why different users of the CSF will produce different sets of 
compliance requirements in connection with the same compliance situation is that the 
normative underpinnings of the issue they are considering are unsettled, contested and so 
still under development. But even here the CSF can help to clearly identify the fault lines 
so a resolution of the divergent normative position can eventually be produced. In fact 
this thesis contends that one of the useful features of the CSF is that is allows users to 
undertake the balancing of different, sometimes conflicting, interests in a transparent 
manner and in an as valid a manner as the current state of the law allows. For example, 
through the identification of compliance requirements using a proportionality analysis, a 
principled balance among competing interests can be achieved. But deeper normative 
divergences and disagreements may exist that highlight areas where the law is yet to 
develop. Using the CSF can highlight, probably with some specificity, where 
fundamental issues of justice and fairness need to be addressed. However, it is suggested 
that in the meantime the CSF allows for a valid determination of an actor’s compliance 
requirements given the current state of the law. 
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4.1. Human rights compliance requirements: key aspects 
As noted above, from the examination of the concepts relating to international human 
rights norms discussed in Chapter 3, coupled with the features of the Compliance 
Strategy and Framework developed in Chapter 2, key aspects of requirements for 
compliance with international law norms concerning human rights can be identified. 
These requirements are referred to as ‘human rights compliance requirements’ and this 
section builds on Chapter 3 by bringing together and developing the aspects of human 
rights compliance requirements identified in that chapter. 
 
Based on the explanation of compliance requirements in Chapter 1, human rights 
compliance requirements are acts, omissions and considerations an actor must undertake 
or take into account in order to be in compliance with international human rights 
norms315. And the actor would be any actor that has made a commitment to comply with 
international human rights norms. As explained in the foregoing chapters, these 
requirements are not the same as requirements derived explicating the content of an 
internationally recognised human right, although there may be some overlap between the 
two categories of requirements316. 
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 For instance, non-compliance with compliance requirements need not necessarily result in an 
international wrong because (a) there is no international legal obligation to perform the compliance 
requirement and (b) there may be automatic compliance or coincidence, where compliance is achieved 
without any overt move by the actor to comply. In other words, the actor’s initial state is already a state of 
compliance.  Hence the actual role and nature of compliance requirements is that they facilitate thinking 
through what an actor needs to do or needs to refrain from doing in order to achieve or maintain 
compliance. 
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The elements of human rights compliance requirements discussed here have both 
legal and non-legal aspects. The problem of compliance, it is argued in this thesis, relates 
both to legally binding and non-legally binding norms. So the legal aspects of human 
rights compliance requirements related to states while the non-legal aspects apply to non-
state actors and to cases involving the application of non-legally binding norms. 
Accordingly, there is an element of transposition and adaptation involved in relation to 
the non-legal aspects. However, what the two aspects share in common, and the reason 
they are treated as one here, is their implications for the behaviour of the actor seeking to 
comply with the human rights norm in question. 
 
Further, there is also an external perspective at work here, which is that of the 
external observer wishing to or required to assess the actor’s compliance. This observer 
has to take into account considerations of fairness, justice and the allocation of risks, 
burdens and responsibilities. To help him or her, a framework for reasoning is needed 
and, it is argued in this thesis, that the CSF is such a framework. Legal principles and 
norms will guide that reasoning where an actor’s legal obligations are involved. Where 
non-legally binding norms are involved, but the regulatory framework is the same as 
where legally-binding norms apply, such as in the case of human rights in relation to both 
state and non-state actors, then it is right to transpose the legal norms and principles to 
the case of the non-state actor. This then allows for the human rights compliance 
requirements relating to non-legally binding human rights norms to be derived from the 
transposed legal norms and principles. It is argued that this is a valid way to proceed and 
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provide guidance for reasoning about human rights compliance requirements where 
human rights norms apply but are not legally binding. 
 
Proceeding in the manner outlined above also makes sense from the perspective of 
the legitimacy and coherence of the guidance for such reasoning where the issue is 
compliance with non-legally binding norms. First, the guidance relates to the same 
regulatory framework and so should be based on similar principles and understandings of 
the content and contours of the applicable human rights norms and the specific human 
rights at issue. Second, this can then ensure the service of, or facilitating of, the aim of 
behavioural coherence across actors. This must be the implicit aim where there is a 
single, unified, overarching framework for regulating and guiding the conduct of all 
actors whose behaviour can affect the realisation of the rights and interests underlying 
and safeguarded by that framework. So for example, since the regulatory framework 
under international law for the protection of human rights is concerned with the conduct 
of all actors that may undermine that protection, it is suggested that it makes sense to 
apply the norms and principles of that regulatory framework to the conduct of all such 
actors in a unified and coherent way. And where that involves the transposition of legal 
norms and principles to guide reasoning for compliance, whether internal or external to 
the actor concerned, then such is a reasonable and valid thing to do. 
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4.1.1. The applicable human rights norm 
A key aspect of compliance is the question of the norm with which an actor is under an 
obligation or under an expectation to comply and the question of compliance is 
concerned with the degree to which the actor’s behaviour matches that norm. In the case 
of the international regulatory framework concerning human rights, a number of such 
norms have been established. Identifying the applicable human rights norm matters 
because the CSF is applicable to all actors and it would be inaccurate to ascribe the same 
normative aspects concerning human rights to all actors. The issue of which general 
human rights norm applies to a particular actor will depend on the particular features of 
the compliance situation in question and will be one of the first aspects of the human 
rights compliance problem to be addressed in any case. 
 
In any human rights compliance situation, which norm applies will vary 
depending on the actor concerned and the manner in which the actor’s conduct may affect 
the human rights of concern. So to identify the applicable human rights norm for a 
particular actor, that actor’s characteristics must be taken into account, meaning as 
discussed in Chapter 2 the actor’s normative and operational aspects. And in the 
explanation of the CSF below, the manner in which the applicable norms are identified 
will be discussed. 
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4.1.2. Context, capacity and control 
The relevance of considerations of context pertaining to a compliance situation, which 
includes the capacity and control characteristics of the actor, has been identified in the 
previous chapters. Chapter 1 discussed issues of context, capacity and control in relation 
to the actor’s characteristics while Chapter 2 noted how the actor’s context is taken 
account of in international regulation. In Chapter 3, the issue of context in relation to the 
international framework concerning human rights arose in the discussion on the doctrines 
or concepts of proportionality and the margin of appreciation. Considerations of context, 
capacity and control are therefore important for the identification of an actor’s specific 
compliance requirements in a particular case. 
 
But while gaps in the protection afforded for human rights gaps may therefore exist 
due to the actor’s lack of capacity rather than lack of willingness to comply317, from a 
human rights perspective there is another aspect to the issue of context and capacity. That 
is, the capability of the rights-holder will be factor for consideration alongside the 
capability of the actor occupying the role of duty-holder. 
 
In the case of human rights, a balance often needs to be struck between the interests 
of the individual and the interests of the community. This is where issues of context arise 
and need to be taken into consideration. For instance, the concept of proportionality 
allows for a principled balancing of the individual’s and the community’s interests where 
situations change and due to public health reasons for example, the right of individuals to 
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freedom of movement may be restricted. The measure restricting the freedom of 
movement must be appropriate and necessary318 both being conditions that depend on the 
features of the case in question. Thus the concept of proportionality introduces issues of 
context in determining compliance with human rights in a particular situation. And while 
proportionality points to context as a valid consideration in identifying an actor’s 
compliance requirements, the conditions of appropriateness and necessity will specify 
those requirements in a particular case. 
 
Specifying compliance requirements by taking account of context in this way is part 
of the principled dialogue between rights-holders and their representative, and actors 
whose conduct can affect the enjoyment of human rights, that international norms on 
human rights make possible319. It is important that such dialogue and balancing is done in 
a transparent manner, which it is submitted is promoted by using the CSF as adapted to 
identifying human rights compliance requirements below. That transparency will likely 
promote participation in the dialogue of those whose interests are at issue and will help 
facilitate accountability in the decision-making process and of the decision-makers to 
those whose interests are affected by the decision. 
 
It is a requirement of human rights compliance that the actor’s context and capacity 
be gauged so that the actor is able to formulate the appropriate policies to take to respect 
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and ensure human rights320. Some of the contextual factors to assess would be the actor’s 
governance systems (administrative, legal and political) and the level of social systems 
development (media and communications, education, health, science and technology, 
registration and census, economic and cultural) in relation to the population concerned. 
The actor’s context matters not only for the policies or programmes it might develop to 
further the realisation of human rights, but also has implications for the benchmarks, 
goals, targets and indicators the actor develops to gauge its human rights performance; 
global benchmarks or indicators might be of little use321.  
 
The CSF is designed so as to be contextualised to the situation of the actor and 
specifically highlights the need to take the actor’s context into account. Accordingly, in 
using the CSF different actors can be expected to develop different policies, benchmarks, 
goals and indicators with regards to their human rights responsibilities. Within states, 
local governments might be expected to exhibit variation in their human rights policies 
and goals. This variation could reasonably be expected to be more marked when the CSF 
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is used by global actors such as international organisations and multinational 
corporations322. 
 
There is a further reason why the CSF is designed to highlight the need to assess the 
actor’s context. An assessment of the actor’s context is needed to identify the level of 
human rights realisation or protection already in existence in the situation in which the 
actor is carrying out its activity. In other words, the CSF requires that the actor’s context 
be assessed so as to establish the baseline measures of human rights realisation. The 
actor’s human rights compliance is premised on its not making an existing human rights 
situation worse. Without a baseline measure of existing human rights realisation it could 
be difficult to establish if existing levels of human rights protection have declined and it 
would not be possible to measure the actor’s human rights performance over time323. The 
need for baseline measures is also important as actor’s may seek to impose permitted 
limitations on human rights protection. Without a baseline measure, it could be difficult 
to determine if the decline in human rights protection was too come within any of the 
justified grounds for restricting rights. 
 
4.1.3. Sustainability 
Sustainability is a consideration for human rights compliance and identifying compliance 
requirements in relation to international human right norms, and it arises from two 
concepts. One is the concept of the progressiveness of rights. Although actors must act 
immediately to meet their human rights obligations and commitments, the realisation of 
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rights is a process that will unfold over time. So human rights compliance is an ongoing 
process and thus the question of its sustainability arises. Mechanisms for monitoring and 
for the publication of periodic reports can be adopted to ensure the process of human 
rights compliance keeps its onward momentum and does not stall. But the 
progressiveness of human rights realisation does mean that ensuring the sustainability of 
an actor’s course of conduct to meet its human rights obligations or commitments is a 
human rights compliance requirement. 
 
 The other concept giving rise to the consideration of sustainability in relation to 
human rights compliance has to do with the causality element of the concept of 
compliance. So this is a more universal approach to the issue of sustainability and 
compliance requirements because it relates to all areas of international law and not 
human rights alone. The causality aspect of compliance was described earlier324  and 
refers to the fact that there can be compliance with an international law norm without 
causality, that is the actor is not conducting itself in the compliant manner because it is 
seeking to comply with the norm concerned. Compliance is purely coincidental in such 
cases. There the issue of sustainability arises because the actor wants to avoid falling into 
non-compliance or want to maintain its compliance and the added dimension the 
causality issue brings is that to sustain and maintain compliance it will be important to 
identify the norm to be complied with. That way situations are less likely to arise where 
the actor falls into coincidental compliance. If the actor falls into coincidental compliance, 
it is more likely to find itself to be out of compliance. In other words, by always linking 
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the actor’s conduct to the norm, which requires clearly identifying the norm and 
consciously acknowledging compliance with it, the actor’s state of compliance is more 
likely to be sustained. And as noted above, given the progressive nature of human rights, 
this is an important human rights compliance consideration. 
 
4.1.4. The indivisibility and interdependence of human rights 
The nature of human rights is that they are all equally important for a life of human 
dignity, As such there is no hierarchy of human rights with some superior to others but 
instead human rights are considered to be indivisible325. The equal importance of human 
rights is also a function of the fact that they are mutually reinforcing. The protection of 
one right, say the human right to education, is also likely to have a benefit for the 
realisation of other rights, such as the right to health as it may be easier for people to gain 
access to more knowledge about health care and disease prevention. In this sense human 
rights, in addition to having the property of indivisibility, are interrelated and 
interdependent326. 
 
This interdependent relationship does not always result in an overall human rights 
gain. As the discussion on the rules as to margin of appreciation and proportionality 
showed327, international law recognises that a balance exists between the protections 
afforded to the various human rights. Measures taken to respect or ensure individual 
human rights may necessitate the restriction of other human rights. In any one case, such 
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restriction must not be such as to undermine the essence of the interests protected by the 
conflicting human rights. Accordingly the measures taken by an actor in respecting a 
particular human right must be assessed in terms of their potential and actual impact on 
the realisation or enjoyment of other human rights. Such an assessment would be a 
requirement of the actor’s human rights compliance. 
 
 For the Compliance Framework, as discussed later, especially at the Application 
and Effectiveness levels the consideration of the indivisibility and interdependence of 
human rights plays an important role. Specifically it gives rise to the compliance 
requirement to assess whether actions taken to improve the realisation of one human right 
might be causing negative effects on other human rights and if so to take action to 
remedy the situation. 
 
4.2. The Compliance Strategy and Framework adapted to identify 
compliance requirements relating to international human rights norms 
 
Based on the discussion above, the following sections explain the adaptation of the CSF 
explained in Chapter 2 for the purpose of identifying compliance requirements in relation 
to international human rights norms. Diagrams 6 and 7 below show the CSF as adapted 
for that purpose. 
 
Diagram 6 displays the adapted CSF. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is headed by 
the compliance topic with its normative aspects followed by a consideration of the actor 
concerned and its characteristics, both normative and operational. Taking account of the 
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compliance topic’s normative aspects with the actor’s characteristics yields the normative 
aspects of the compliance topic as they apply to the particular actor, which are signified 
as ‘applicable norms’ in the diagram’s third box. As that box indicates, the ‘applicable 
norms’ are modified by the concepts relevant to their application and interpretation.328 In 
the final stage of the CSF, the compliance requirements relating to the applicable human 
rights norms are identified using the Compliance Framework (CF), which is represented 
in Diagram 7. Before discussing the CF as shown in Diagram, the first three stages of the 
CSF are discussed in more detail. 
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Diagram 6. Compliance Strategy for identifying compliance requirements in 
relation to human rights norms under international law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPLIANCE TOPIC 
e.g. Human rights associated with 
participation and accountability 
APPLICABLE NORMS 
• Customary law 
• Treaty 
• General principles 
• ‘Soft law’ 
• Code of conduct 
• Contract 
 
 CONCEPTS RELEVANT TO THE APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE 
APPLICABLE NORMS 
From international law generally 
- Proportionality 
- Margin of appreciation 
- Due diligence 
- Reasonableness 
 
Specific to the international law framework concerning human rights 
- Obligations of conduct/ result 
- Obligation to respect/ protect/ fulfil human rights and to undertake institutional measures 
- Availability, acceptability, accessibility, adaptability and quality of compliance measures 
- Progressive realisation 
- Minimum core obligations 
 
COMPLIANCE FRAMEWORK 
Taking account of the actor’s context, 
this comprises three levels: 
• Implementation 
• Application 
• Effectiveness 
ACTOR CHARACTERISTICS 
• Normative characteristics 
• Operational characteristics 
o Context 
o Control 
o Capacity 
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Diagram 7. Compliance Framework for identifying compliance requirements in 
relation to human rights norms under international law. The double-headed arrow 
signifies the non-linear, dynamic application of the CF. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The relevant human rights norms and the specific human rights as authoritatively identified 
and interpreted 
 
 
Effectiveness 
Effect of the laws, policies and 
mechanisms employed on the level 
of realisation of the relevant human 
rights 
Effect of the laws, policies and 
mechanisms employed on the level of 
realisation of other human rights  
 
 
Application 
Operation of 
Law/Policy /Mechanism 
• AAAAQ 
• Monitoring and 
cost accounting 
Stakeholders’ practice 
• Demand for and use 
of mechanisms 
• Special interest/ 
advocacy group 
formation & activity 
• Monitoring activity 
Environmental, socio-
economic and 
institutional effects of 
applying the laws/ 
policies/mechanisms 
 
Implementation 
Laws/ policies covering: 
• Level of law/ policy 
• Type of law/ policy 
• AAAAQ 
• Rights-holders 
input 
Mechanisms for: 
• Level of mechanism 
• Type of mechanism 
• AAAAQ 
• Rights-holders input 
Institutional 
environment and human 
rights capacity 
• Compliance review  
• Monitoring and 
oversight capacity 
• Human rights 
training provided 
• Level of human 
rights awareness  
 
 
Target – The aim of the relevant human rights norm 
Benchmarks for the human rights concerned framed within overarching human rights goals 
Set by duty-holders, rights-holders, and monitoring bodies 
 
Context 
• Social, political and economic environment  
• Level of social systems development 
• Baseline measures of the level of realisation of human rights 
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4.2.1. The first three stages of the CSF 
As mentioned in Section 2.5.1., the first three stages of the CSF comprise ‘The 
Compliance Topic’, ‘The Actor’s Characteristics’ and ‘The Applicable Norms’. 
 
4.2.1.1. The compliance topic 
The first step of the CSF is the identification of the issue the actor is seeking or expected 
to comply with. The problem of causality in relation to the concept of compliance was 
addressed in Section 2.4.1. and suggests that it is a requirement for compliance that the 
human rights norm or norms be clearly identified. This is so the actor’s compliance is 
always active rather than passive and accordingly the risk of accidental non-compliance 
is lessened. 
 
In seeking to clearly identify the human rights norm involved, it is necessary to note 
that a single compliance topic can be related to a number of human rights norms and so 
the relevant norms have to be directly identified. In the case of the human rights issue 
area, this observation is of particular importance because of the interdependence of 
human rights, that is an actor’s compliance with a particular human rights norm can have 
implications for the enjoyments of other human rights. 
 
The human rights norms identified in relation to the compliance topic will be the 
general norms concerning that issue under international law. They next have to be 
specified by taking into account relevant aspects of the actor’s characteristics. 
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4.2.1.2. The actor’s characteristics 
This section plus the previous one on the ‘Compliance topic’ considers the issues and 
factors that will provide the basis for the determination and characterisation of the 
applicable norms for which the compliance requirements need to be identified. 
 
Actors’ characteristics feature prominently in the consideration of compliance with 
norms of international human rights. For instance, although the rights of individuals are 
the key focus of international norms protecting human rights, the normative impact is 
directed at the conduct of the actors whose conduct can undermine the enjoyment of 
those rights. Thus in human rights treaties, the provisions setting out the duties of the 
state are key. International tribunals and the human rights treaty bodies are also focused 
on the state actor and its conduct as it relates to the protection and enjoyment of human 
rights within the territory of the state. So too is the state the focus of the mechanism of 
state reporting and review under human rights treaties. Discussion and commentary over 
the duty or responsibility of non-state actors in connection with the impact their activities 
may have on human rights are also naturally focused on the features and characteristics of 
those actors.329 
 
This section discusses how the CSF addresses the issue of the actor’s characteristics 
from the human rights perspective. The discussion is generally applicable to both state 
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and non-state actors that are themselves seeking to, or that are expected to, comply with 
international human rights norms. 
 
4.2.1.2.1. Normative aspects 
The normative aspects of the actor’s characteristics are obviously key considerations for 
identifying its compliance requirements in relation to a particular compliance topic. From 
a human rights perspective, the particular human rights norms governing the actor’s 
conduct are of prime importance. However, the other norms operative and governing the 
actor’s conduct are also relevant for they go to defining the actor’s the range and scope of 
what activities the actor is free to undertake and to control. This in turn defines the nature 
and scope of activities that the actor may undertaken in order to comply with the relevant 
human rights norms concerning the compliance topic. 
 
So the CSF points the user to making a comprehensive consideration of the 
actor’s normative aspects. For instance, the actor’s legal characteristics relate to its 
relations as a legal person at both the international and domestic levels.  These relations 
have implications for the norms the actor’s compliance is to be assessed against and its 
participation in creating those norms or in determining their interpretation. Thus 
depending on the actor, its legal character can be such as require consideration of any 
rules of customary law or general principles of international law that apply. And in 
certain other cases, otherwise non-binding norms may acquire legal effect. For instance, 
non-binding norms like guidelines, policies or codes of conduct may be incorporated into 
the actor’s contracts or other forms of legal relations.  
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The actor‘s normative aspects will be a key factor in determining which 
categories of human rights norms to consider in relation to the actor. The categories 
concerned may extend beyond the legal relations the actor has entered into to include also 
other commitments made by the actor, such as those for instance, expressed in statements 
or its agreement to voluntary codes of conduct. Both entering into formal legal relations 
and undertaking commitments as to its future conduct generate expectations relating to 
the actor’s conduct both on the part of the actor itself, its immediate counter-parties or 
relevant third parties, such as those affected by the actor’s activities330. 
 
To completely identify all the relevant prescriptions and so accurately define the 
actor’s operative normative framework, its legal character at the domestic and 
international levels must both be considered. This is the standard position with regards to 
state actors but if the CSF is being applied to a non-state actor, it may be necessary to 
consider prescriptions aimed at it directly at the international level. For instance, 
corporations may undertake commitments to respect human rights and this arguably then 
means that international human rights norms that normally apply to states now also apply 
to such corporations. 
 
In other cases, for non-state actor’s, the relevant human rights prescriptions 
emanating at the international level, apply indirectly through the mediation of domestic 
incorporation by the laws of the state under the jurisdiction of which the non-State actor 
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operates. The provenances and effects of these different prescriptions must be taken into 
account when applying the CSF in any case. 
 
So the question is, given the nature and characteristics of the actor, what particular 
norms apply to it and what is the nature of those norms. This is a question that would be 
asked by a user of the CSF in that the aim of the CSF is to take a user step-by-step 
through the process of identifying an actor’s compliance requirements in relation to a 
particular international norm. 
 
The observation that the actor’s normative aspects determine what it can or cannot do 
in order to comply with particular human rights norms points to the capacity of the actor 
to comply with those norms or the extent of compliance it can undertake with regard to 
those norms. For example, in relation to the domestic level, a non-state actor may be 
faced with the situation that its requirement to comply with domestic law does not meet 
with human rights compliance requirements. The non-state actor may wish to comply or 
at least may wish not to contradict various binding or non-binding human rights norms, 
but its legal character subjecting it to the jurisdiction of a third party state may act as a 
restraint on efforts aimed at compliance or at non-transgression of the norms concerned. 
For example, a company may be required to take measures in a country that would ignore 
or violate the human rights of citizens of that country such as the case of Yahoo being 
required to provide the Chinese authorities with account details of Yahoo customers in 
China. Thus Chinese domestic law requires Yahoo to ignore or violate the right to 
privacy and to freedom of expression of its customers. In such cases it may be possible 
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that a non-state actor’s aim of conducting its operations in a human rights positive or 
neutral manner will be defeated. At the same time, if a company like Yahoo pulls out of 
China, arguably the degree of enjoyment by Chinese citizens of the right to freedom of 
information would be reduced.  
 
In a situation such as that described in the example concerning Yahoo, it could be 
argued that the non-state actor ought not to commence operations in countries where 
there is a risk of its operations leading to a negative human rights impact or ought to 
divest operations that have already been commenced. The issue of divestment or 
sanctions can however be complicated by the fact that such decisions in themselves have 
a greater cumulative negative human rights impact than decisions to invest or to continue 
operations in such countries. In every case, a balancing of competing human rights 
considerations will likely have to be undertaken. In any event, the legal character of a 
non-state actor as a resident within a country must remain an active consideration for the 
purposes of identifying its compliance requirements. Keeping in mind such a 
consideration has the benefit of at least exposing the decisions of non-state actors in the 
face of legal restraints on human rights compliance to some decree of scrutiny and 
transparency. It also allows for the distribution of responsibility for a negative human 
rights impact among all the relevant actors, possibly allowing for more effective 
strategies aimed at easing or correcting that negative impact that are aimed at the 
responsibilities of all relevant actors. 
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Finally, the actor’s normative character will also have a bearing on the 
jurisdictions in which the actor’s accountability will be in issue, including the court of 
public opinion, and the related issue of the extent of the actor’s participation in such 
accountability mechanism. 
 
4.2.1.2.2. Operational aspects 
There are two elements to the operational aspects of an actor’s characteristics. First, the 
manner in which the actor operates will largely determine the nature of its effect on the 
enjoyment of human rights in any particular case. Second, the operational aspects of the 
actor will determine its capacity to comply with applicable international human rights 
norms. As such, the actor’s operational aspects will suggest the manner in which it ought 
to be regulated from a human rights perspective. 
 
As mentioned, it is necessary to focus on the actor’s operational characteristics to 
clearly determine the effect its operations may have on the enjoyment of human rights by 
the individuals affected by those operations. In this regard, it is necessary to consider all 
aspects of the actor’s operations so as to get as complete picture as possible of them. This 
is the purpose of this aspect of the CSF. When the actor’s characteristics are fully 
considered,  three factors should emerge: 
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1. Those concerning an actor’s capacity to comply with the applicable human rights 
norms and the margin of discretion that the actor may exercise in complying with 
those norms.331 
2. Those concerning other rights and interests that the actor needs to take into account in 
balance with the rights and interests protected by the human rights in issue.332 The 
CSF, as emphasised elsewhere in this thesis, can facilitate thinking through these 
balancing issues in a systematic manner. 
3. The organisational and operational features of the actor that determine what its 
specific compliance requirements would be. That is to say those requirements will be 
expressed in terms of the actor’s organisational and operational features. 
 
In relation to the issue of taking into account the actor’s context and any competing 
rights or interests it may need to balance with the human rights in issue, it may be noted 
that these matters are addressed by the international law concepts of proportionality and 
the margin of appreciation. These concepts have developed in relation to the obligation of 
state actors. But they can be helpful in showing by analogy how factors like context, 
capacity and control can also be validly taken into account in identifying non-state actors’ 
compliance requirements in relation to international human rights norms. 
 
This section plus the previous section on the ‘Compliance topic’ considered the issues 
and factors that will provide the basis for the specification and characterisation of the 
applicable norms for which the compliance requirements need to be identified. 
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 See Section 3.2.1.2. Margin of appreciation. 
332
 See Section 3.2.1.1. Proportionality. 
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4.2.1.3. The applicable norms 
As discussed in Section 2.5.1. the applicable international law norms are those relating to 
the compliance topic as they are defined or contextualised given the actor’s 
characteristics, that is its operative normative environment and operational details. The 
same applies here in connection with the applicable human rights norms. So once the 
relevant actor is identified the applicable human rights norms are identified from the 
categories of human rights norms that have a regulatory effect in relation to the actor 
concerned. These identified norms are then specified considering the characteristics of 
the actor concerned. And this is done with regard to their interpretation and application 
according to concepts of international law in general and to concepts relating to 
international human rights norms in particular. 
 
4.2.2. The Compliance Framework 
In this section the Compliance Framework (CF) designed and explained  in Chapter Two 
is adapted to the purpose of identifying compliance requirements in relation to 
international human rights norms. The adapted CF comprises the factors for determining 
human rights compliance requirements in a valid and systematic manner and this section 
explains those factors and what their manner of application in a particular case might 
comprise of. 
 
A key observation relating to the use of the CF concerns the principle of the 
interdependence of human rights, which holds that the protection of one human right 
must not be achieved at the expense of the enjoyment of other human rights. This is an 
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important consideration so as to avoid an intervention that on the face of it improves 
human rights in one area but actually negatively affects other rights. The issue of 
interdependence recurs throughout the CF, as does that of ensuring that any strategy for 
human rights compliance is inclusive and non-discriminatory. The norm of non-
discrimination is a fundamental human rights norm whose consideration is required of 
any measure aimed at improving human rights compliance.333  
 
4.2.2.1. The relevant human rights as authoritatively identified and interpreted 
In Section 4.2.1.3. the applicable human rights norms were discussed. These now form 
the basis of the CF being adapted to identify the compliance requirements relating to 
those norms and the specific human rights relating to the compliance topic. In a sense, 
both the norms and the specific rights are now being applied having earlier been 
identified in the previous stages of the CSF. 
 
 Diagram 7 above accordingly refers to, in the lowest box, to the applicable human 
rights norms and specific human rights. The human rights are described as having been 
authoritatively identified and interpreted. That is to say, at this stage, in the application of 
the CF, the specific human rights at issue are expressly addressed and  defined in terms of 
their content. In the earlier stages of the CSF, the task was to identify the specifically 
applicable human rights norms relating to the compliance topic given the actor’s 
characteristics. 
 
                                                 
333
 Actor can ensure the non-discriminatory nature of the measures undertaken for instance by ensuring data 
tracking the impact of any intervention is disaggregated according to the relevant categories, race and sex 
being among the most likely. 
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 As noted in Section 2.5.2. when the general CF was being described, the causality 
aspect of the concept of compliance requires that the applicable human rights norms and 
human rights be clearly identified. This is particularly key in relation to the human rights 
area because these rights are of a progressive nature. Actors must act immediately to 
respect and protect human rights but the realisation of human rights takes time and the 
concepts of the rights themselves can change and evolve over time. So human rights 
compliance is an ongoing enterprise and to help sustain that compliance it is important 
that the norms being complied with are clearly identified as that will provide a clear 
frame of reference for the identification of the compliance requirements relating to those 
rights. 
 
4.2.2.2. Context 
The issue of taking into account of contextual factors was discussed in Section 2.5.2. and 
it bears emphasising here the importance of establishing a baseline to assess how the 
enjoyment of the subject-matter of the human right at issue changes over time as the actor 
undertake a course of conduct to comply with the applicable human rights norm. If the 
baseline condition is not improving according to pace set in the targets adopted as part of 
the CF, the actor’s course of conduct and how it is being applied will need to be 
reviewed. 
 
 The actor’s context also relates to its capacity to comply. That capacity can 
change over time. It can improve or decline and so as a compliance requirements relating 
to the human rights norms the CF is concerned with, the actor’s capacity to comply with 
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those norms should be assessed over time and appropriate technical assistance provided 
to help improve that capacity as needed. 
 
4.2.2.3. Implementation 
At the implementation stage or level, the actor is required to have the relevant 
institutional and organisational structures in place by the adoption of appropriate 
legislative, judicial, administrative and educative measures334. These requirements are set 
out in the CF in terms of (1) the actor’s laws and policies, (2) the actor’s mechanisms for 
operationalising or implementing its laws and policies, and (3) the actor’s institutional 
environment and human rights capacity.  These requirements are what the normative 
framework for human rights requires of actors whose operations can have an effect on 
individuals’ enjoyment of their human rights. The requirements may not only require 
adaptation of an actor’s existing  institutional and organisational aspects but could require 
new ones to be created. The actor for instance may not have policies of non-
discrimination based on appropriately disaggregated data and would have to create such a 
policy in order to be human rights compliant. The presence or absence of these aspects 
can be gleaned from relatively readily available information  obtainable from a survey of 
the actor’s constitution, laws and policies. Thus there are three main compliance 
requirement issues or components to the implementation stage of the CF. They are (1) the 
actor’s laws and policies, (2) the actor’s mechanisms for operationalising or 
implementing its laws and policies, and (3) the actor’s institutional environment and 
human rights capacity. 
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 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, para.7. 
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Law and policy: Actors seeking compliance with an applicable human rights norm will 
likely have to pass laws and policies that protect and respect human rights as one of the 
first steps towards compliance with those norms. Whether they have done so and whether 
those laws and policies are applied in practice as intended are relevant considerations for 
human rights consideration. Lastly it is necessary to assess whether the aims of those 
laws and policies were appropriate and whether those aims were achieved. In addition to 
checking if such policies are present and cover all relevant aspects of the actor’s 
operations, stakeholders and decision-makers should assess if existing policies unfairly 
restrict the enjoyment of human rights or are discriminatory. 
 
An actor is likely to have to put in place various programmes and mechanisms as 
required by the laws and policies or otherwise to facilitate the enjoyment and protection 
of human rights. It is necessary to assess whether these actually have been designed, 
created and are in place and whether the institutions and mechanisms are used or 
implemented as intended according to the requirements of the international norms. As 
with the previous category on law and policy, it is also necessary to assess the outcome 
associated with having those programmes and mechanisms in place. It is necessary to 
assess laws and policies distinctly from their associated mechanisms because lack of 
human rights compliance may lie with issues relating to the mechanisms employed rather 
than the law or policy adopted. The mechanism may be contractual in nature as when 
government agencies or private corporations seek a commitment to their human rights 
policies from suppliers. On-site visits with suppliers would be another example of a 
mechanism designed to ensure human rights compliance. 
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Level of human rights awareness: For an organisation to adequately comply with human 
rights norms, the people who carry out its work must be aware of the human rights 
standards and what they require. Hence it is important to assess the level of human rights 
awareness and commitment of people in an organisation. Issues of  monitoring, capacity 
building and level of technical knowledge are also key. Actors are expected to undertake 
their human rights commitments effectively and in good faith, implying that some system 
for monitoring policy implementation and a schedule for assessment should be in place 
covering all aspects of the CF. Such a monitoring system should be well-resourced and 
effective. In order for such review systems to fulfil their objectives, it is necessary for the 
staffs and officials concerned to have an adequate understanding of the human rights 
provisions and norms to be complied with.  The availability of human rights education is 
thus a key structural consideration.  Human rights awareness is also matter of 
organisational culture, an area for capacity-building in order to ensure measures aimed at 
human rights compliance are sustained and enhanced. 
 
4.2.2.4. Application 
The second stage is the application stage or level and concerns requirements relating to 
whether the laws, policies and mechanisms identified in the implementation stage are 
applied and used in practice in accordance with their designed purpose and for achieving 
that purpose. Many actors may have the appropriate laws, policies and mechanisms in 
place but it is in putting them into practice that mistake or oversights occur, leading to a 
failure of the law or policy. For example, it can be important to identify whether a policy 
for increasing human rights-based participation in the implementation stage of a 
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development project is not effective because it is poorly worded or because decision-
makers at the local level are misapplying, ignoring or contravening the policy. The 
application level aspects of the CF help capture any such failures or oversight. An 
appropriate response can then be produced that will accord with other CF requirements to 
ensure those requirements are not ignored or contravened. There are three requirements 
for human rights compliance at the process level. 
 
Operation of laws, policies and mechanisms: The first component of the application stage 
of the CF highlights the actor’s requirement to assess whether the laws, policies and 
mechanisms it has to facilitate human rights enjoyment and protection are functioning as 
intended. Another requirement of this component of the application level is for the actor 
to assess that the relevant laws, policies and mechanisms are being applied in a manner 
consistent with human rights norms. For instance, the actor would be required to assess if 
the laws, policies and mechanisms are being applied in an equal and non-discriminatory 
manner. In this way the requirements of this application level component of the CF help 
monitor the progress being made by the actor’s laws, policies and mechanisms towards 
their goals of improved or increased realisation of the human rights concerned. 
 
In assessing how the actor’s laws, policies and mechanisms are being applied, 
such assessment ought to be framed around the rights-holders’ perspective. For many 
actors, including government agencies and corporations, in many cases this involves 
assessing how such policies and mechanisms are working within branches or subsidiaries. 
As mentioned earlier, as context varies, so local practices can be expected to be different. 
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By highlighting the potential for variations the application of laws, policies and 
mechanisms in practice, the CF offers the opportunity for different parts or units of an 
actor to learn from one another. 
 
Stakeholders’ practice: This component of the CF’s application level is new and was not 
found in the general CF represented in Diagram 4 in Chapter 2335. It requires that the 
actor take account of the conduct or activity of rights-holders in relation to the practical 
implementation of the actor’s laws, policies and mechanisms. As mentioned before, the 
issue of compliance with human rights norms can be dependent on the capabilities of the 
rights-holders as much as on the capability of the actor. For instance mechanisms may 
have been designed and applied that were in fact culturally inappropriate or 
inadequate 336 , causing them to be avoided or under-utilised. Alternatively, the 
mechanisms in question may require a capability on the part of the rights-holders, such as 
a certain level of literacy, that is lacking, resulting in the rights-holders not making use of 
the service provided by the actor.  
 
The lack of response by rights-holders in such cases would not be because the 
level of human rights provision with regard to that particular human right was 
insufficient. Instead it would more likely be due to cultural inadequacy of the provision 
that was made. It is a requirement for human rights compliance that the actor assess the 
activity of rights-holders with regard to the operationalisation of the measures it has 
adopted so that if the activity is not what was expected or anticipated, the actor can be 
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 See Section 2.5. The general strategy and framework for identifying and specifying compliance 
requirements with norms of international law. 
336
 CESCR, General Comment 12 on the Right to Food, E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, para. 7. 
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alerted to ascertaining the reason. If the reason is that the law, policy or mechanism was 
somehow inappropriate or lacking, the actor will be alerted to make any needed changes. 
 
Environmental, socio-economic and institutional effects of applying the laws/ 
policies/mechanisms: Finally, there is a component to human rights compliance 
requirements at the application level that involves the actor taking into account the 
consequences of applying the laws, policies and mechanisms at issue on the enjoyment 
and protection of other human rights or other interests. The application of those measures 
may have the effect of interfering with the realisation of other human rights, in which 
case the issue of balancing rights arises. Or they may have other negative, unintended 
effects that could affect the further application of those measures or that could have some 
deleterious societal or organisational effect. 
 
Insofar as the effects on other human rights are concerned, this requirement arises 
in relation to the principle of the indivisibility, interrelatedness and interdependence of 
human rights, discussed earlier. As this component relates to the effects of the application 
of the actor’s laws, policies and mechanisms on other interests, be they state or corporate 
interests, depending on the actor, these requirements arises in relation to the issue of 
fragmentation and the conflict of norms discussed in Chapters 1337. These interests will 
have been taken into account in defining the applicable norms through the CSF earlier. 
But the issue arises again here to remind the user of its ongoing obligations in relation to 
those interests so that the balance struck earlier is maintained. 
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With reference specifically to the effect on other human rights, the requirement is 
for the actor to ensure that the enjoyment and protection of other human rights are not 
undermined by the application of the laws, policies and mechanisms it is employing to 
comply with the human rights norms at issue. The application of those laws, policies and 
mechanisms may result in changes to living, work and physical activity environments 
that may have an impact on the lives of people that could be an impediment on the 
enjoyment of other human rights. Thus, the principle of the interdependence of rights 
requires that human rights measures undertaken by an actor be assessed in terms of any 
negative impact they might have on the enjoyment of other human rights. The aim of this 
requirement is to direct the mind of the CF user to consider the effect of applying the law 
or policy on the enjoyment of other human rights338 so that the user can look to taking 
pre-emptive measures or remedial policy measures if they are needed. By making this 
assessment, the actor can avoid or mitigate a scenario involving unintended, negative 
human rights consequences. In other words, this CF component serves to remind the user 
to take these aspects of the application of its law, policies or mechanisms into 
consideration when determining whether they are being applied as intended. 
 
So in requiring the CF user to consider the effects of its conduct in complying 
with a set of human rights norms, this component represents the locus of the actor’s 
balancing the application of laws, policies and mechanisms for a set of rights against the 
effect of those measures on the enjoyment of other human rights or other interests. It is 
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 The CF user would need to know the state of enjoyment of the other human rights at the start of the 
project – this would be part of the purpose of the baseline considerations in the ‘Context’ component of the 
CF. 
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suggested that this component is especially useful. For instance, it can help ensure the 
sustainability of the measures undertaken to realise the human rights in question. It also 
allows for a consideration of the effect the measures undertaken have on the 
sustainability of other activities of the actor that may not have an effect on the enjoyment 
and realisation of other human rights but may affect other interests. 
 
Further, it is not only useful to the actor as CF user in helping it maintain 
awareness of the balancing issues at hand. It is also useful to alerting interested external 
parties so that the balancing of rights and other interests it represents can be undertaken 
and maintained in a transparent manner. By helping with transparency in this way, it is 
hoped the legitimacy of the balancing involved will be enhanced and that such deliberate 
consideration of the issues involved that is prompted by this component of the CF will 
contribute to the coherence of international law in general and the international law 
concerning human rights in particular. 
 
4.2.2.5 Effectiveness 
While the reasons why human rights compliance requires the assessment of the 
effectiveness of human rights interventions are clear, assessing those effects involves 
several complexities. The range of actors and factors that potentially influence human 
rights and socio-political effects make it difficult to determine the extent to which those 
effects are directly attributable to any specific actor, policy or process. Additionally, 
some effects may be evident immediately while others could take much longer to 
develop. Finding appropriate methods to assess the effectiveness of an actor’s 
implementing activities can be difficult and assessment may involve considerable time 
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and resources. Despite these difficulties and limitations, it is still important that such 
effects be monitored and assessed. It is important for state and non-state actors to 
understand the effect of their policies, in relation to human rights as much as in relation 
to any other aspect of their operations. Identifying negative effects is in fact a key 
component of the duties to respect human rights and to act with due diligence. Whether 
the effects are found to be negative or positive, important lessons are learnt that otherwise 
might not have been. 
 
The requirement for the actor to monitor its human rights performance relates in 
particular to the CF’s effectiveness level, the third stage of the CF. First though the 
requirement that the actor monitors the effects of its day-to-day activity for any human 
rights impact has an implication for the implementation and application levels of the CF. 
In particular, the actor is required to have a policy for monitoring its human rights 
performance and an effective monitoring capability in relation to that policy. The 
requirement to monitor and evaluate that measures aimed at ensuring the respect for 
human rights also requires that policy and capability. 
 
At the CF’s effectiveness level, the compliance requirement is for an assessment 
of the extent to which steps taken by the actor in applying its implementing activities 
have resulted in improved protection for and enjoyment of human rights. This assessment 
must be carried out, from the rights-holder’s perspective, to see how the respective 
knowledge systems, laws/policies and programmes/mechanisms have affected the rights-
holder. As with assessments at the application level, assessments at the effectiveness 
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level can be used to assess the actor’s progress over time towards achieving defined 
human rights targets or benchmarks. However, while application level assessment looks 
at the effort in terms of the level and manner of implementation and utilisation of laws, 
policies and mechanisms, effectiveness assessment is concerned with the effects of law 
and policy implementation and utilisation. The doctrine of the indivisibility of human 
rights means that it is important to ensure that the realisation of specific human rights 
does not occur at the detriment of other human rights. 
 
4.2.2.6. Targets and benchmarks 
While the outcome of the human rights regime is the improved realisation of the human 
rights of all, such realisation is progressive in nature in that the actual realisation of those 
rights involves social or organisational change which may take time depending on the 
circumstances and context of individual cases.  In order for both duty-holders and rights-
holders to monitor the progress of this change, it is also necessary to set reasonable 
benchmarks and targets for the duty-holder for achieving the desired outcomes. It is 
important that these benchmarks and targets are set with other stakeholders, especially 
rights-holders’ representatives, both so that they are relevant to the rights-holders and to 
avoid setting them too low. 
 
Two requirements for human rights compliance have to be borne in mind in using 
these benchmarks. First, is the requirement for disaggregating the measures used to 
ensure compliance with the human rights norm of non-discrimination. Second, is the 
recognition that the goal of respecting or protecting human rights is not time-bound but 
an ongoing effort. As such benchmarks are not targets to be met and set aside or 
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maintained as status quo but instead ought more accurately be understood as milestones 
in need of recalibration as the actor’s and indeed society’s capacities, contexts and 
circumstances evolve. 
 
Although the issue of human rights indicators is not addressed in this thesis, an 
implication of the CF for developing human rights indicators, or other indicators, 
depending on the area of international law it is applied to, may be noted. That implication 
is that once the compliance requirements, that is the course of conduct, whether acts or 
omissions, according to the CF’s considerations for identifying such requirements, are 
validly identified, then the appropriate indicators, and maybe benchmarks, can be 
specified accordingly for each of the boxes in the Implementation, Application and 
Effectiveness levels. This could be the subject for further research and analysis. 
 
In concluding the discussion on the CF as applied to the identification of compliance 
requirements relating to human rights norms a few points are worth noting. First, as noted 
in Section 2.5.2., the CF’s three main components representing the implementation, 
application and effectiveness stages of compliance are inter-related and so can have an 
effect on one another. Thus, for instance, a problem identified at the application or 
effectiveness stage may actually have to do with an issue at the implementation stage, 
which is where a correction may be needed. Also, lessons learnt in connection with one 
stage or level of the CF may have implications for improving performance in connection 
with other levels of the CF. In relation to the human rights area, this last observation, it is 
submitted, could have useful applications because it may not only allow lessons to be 
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transferred between the same category of actor but also between different categories of 
actors. So corporations with experience in identifying their compliance requirements in 
relation to their commitment to respect human rights, can share their lessons and 
experiences with the states in which they operate. This way it is possible to begin to 
imagine a coherent human rights regulatory regime across actors. 
 
Second, and as noted elsewhere in this thesis, the application and use of the CF is 
iterative and this iterative aspect of the CF reflects the dynamic character of compliance 
and the process of international law itself339. This helps capture the fact that norms, their 
interpretation and content, evolve. This evolutionary character plus the fact that 
compliance is not complete in any field means that compliance is an ongoing, dynamic 
process. 
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4.3 Uses of the CSF in identifying compliance requirements concerning 
human rights norms 
The CSF adapted for the identification of compliance requirements in relation to 
international human rights norms has various uses, which are discussed below. Some of 
these uses are based on uses of the general CSF that were discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
Using the framework allows the range of requirements for compliance with the 
human rights norms relating to participation and accountability to be better defined.  By 
setting out the various requirements systematically, and giving thought to each one, the 
human rights norms concerned are explained in more detail and understanding of them is 
deepened.  As the understanding deepens, the definition of the human rights norms 
develops in a recursive manner. 
Definition of norms                                Deliberation and application of the framework 
 
The framework can provide a common objective basis for dialogue.  The various 
actors interested in increasing the levels of participation and accountability can use the 
framework as a vehicle to facilitate dialogue among themselves.  The framework is 
composed of what are regarded as universal norms, and can be used as a staring point and 
facilitator of debates over the norms and what is required to operationalise them.  Even if 
there is disagreement over the norms that were included in the framework or their 
requirements, the framework provides a basis for discussing those differences.  The 
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framework can also be used to facilitate dialogue among different policy-making 
bodies340. 
 
The CSF can help actors improve their capacity in terms of having the requisite 
level of knowledge about their compliance requirements to be able to improve their levels 
of compliance with international human rights norms and in relation to particular human 
rights. An analysis such as this, from the compliance perspective, will provide an idea of 
the operational requirements for human rights compliance. For instance, in relation to 
human rights treaties, it is normally observed that human rights compliance is weak, 
either because the number of states parties actively complying with their obligations is 
small, or because treaty-monitoring is deficient and problematic.  It may be however, that 
low levels of compliance are due to a lack of knowledge as to what the operational 
requirements for human rights compliance are. By looking at compliance from the 
institutional or operational perspective, it is possible to get a clearer picture of what the 
requirements for human rights compliance are in operational terms. A compliance 
perspective may also help explain the boundary of human rights in terms of 
organisational efficiency, or at least explain how human rights considerations are 
balanced against other, competing interests. 
 
Duty-holders and other interested parties can use the framework to identify which 
requirements for rights-based participation and accountability already exist within the 
duty-holder’s organisational structure.  This allows the duty-holder to demonstrate 
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where it is in compliance with the relevant human rights norms341.  By identifying what is 
being done, the framework highlights what needs to be done in order for the duty-holder 
to comply with the requirements set out in the framework, thereby identifying gaps in 
compliance.  Once such gaps have been identified, investigations can be conducted to 
understand why they are there and their precise nature.  Where the duty-holder is already 
in compliance with the requirements for rights-based participation and accountability, 
work can be done to understand the factors responsible for such compliance better with a 
view to replicating that compliance in relation to other aspects of the duty-holder’s 
requirements.  In this way, the framework helps to build on and strengthen the purposes 
of state reporting under human rights treaty regimes.  For example, one objective of such 
reporting is to comprehensively review existing structures and processes within the state 
in relation to a particular human rights outcome, be it positive or negative.  Having a 
framework that can systematically guide such a review, in the manner just described 
above, strengthens this objective.  All duty-holders, not just states, need to carry out such 
reviews and identify gaps, if any, in their protection of human rights. 
 
The CSF can help the actor analyse its compliance activities in terms of its 
institutional activity and this can help improve levels of compliance at the organisational 
level rather than in connection with one specific are of the actor’s operations. In 
addition, by focussing on the degree of compliance, attention is drawn to the institutional 
activity of the actor concerned.  That activity may be analysed in terms of law-making or 
rule-making activity, implementation activity and enforcement or adjudicatory activity.  
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Each category of activity could be further analysed in terms of its process or output 
aspects, i.e. is the process compliant with human rights norms, or is the output human 
rights compliant.  Seen from this perspective, the issue of human rights compliance may 
be identified not with the lack of violations alleged against an actor but the degree to 
which the actor complies with its obligations at the operational level. Improvements for 
compliance may also be more easily suggested at this organisational level than if each 
instance of violations was litigated individually. 
 
The framework is a basis on which strategic planning of programs and policies 
can be conducted, in order to meet the goals of the human rights norms.   By setting out 
the requirements for compliance with the relevant human rights norms, the framework 
systematically guides the process of deciding which programs and policies to carry out.  
Again, this objective facilitates one of the purposes of reporting under human rights 
treaty regimes which is to aid the ‘elaboration of clearly state and carefully targeted 
policies’, including how priorities should be set342 .  The framework strengthens this 
objective. 
 
For example, the framework identifies where the results are lacking in terms of 
the realisation of the human rights concerned. Where this happens, there is a likelihood 
that the measures adopted by the actor for the purposes of complying with the 
requirement of the particular human right concerned were not optimal from the 
perspective of that rights realisation. Although the content of the right itself is evolving 
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and so the right may in their never be fully realised, nevertheless it is necessary to 
identify the case at any point in time where the measures taken in order to realise the 
right are not the best set of measures that could be adopted at that point in time. 
 
The framework can be used to identify the methods that are needed to assess or 
measure the duty-holder’s compliance with the various requirements set out in it, and to 
identify instances where new methods must be developed and tested.  Assessing 
compliance with human rights norms is an interdisciplinary process as it draws on 
various fields from social science that can potentially range from anthropology to 
economics, each with specific research and evaluation methods.  By systematically 
setting out the requirements for duty-holders’ compliance with the relevant human rights 
norms, the framework can be used to identify the means for assessing compliance that 
may possibly be used.  Using the framework to identify what needs to be measured and 
how best to do it may also reveal that the methods to assess compliance are lacking or 
underdeveloped and this can lead to a development of the methods needed. 
 
In addition to using or developing methods of assessing compliance the 
development of human rights indicators is another area in which the framework may be 
used.  According to Maria Green,  
“[a] Human Rights Indicator is a piece of information used in measuring the extent to which a 
legal right is being fulfilled or enjoyed in a given situation“343. 
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226 
 
The methods that are used to assess human rights compliance must operate with the use 
of human rights indicators.  If political or social indicators are used without the necessary 
adaptation to be human rights indicators, it will not be possible to measure the state of 
human rights compliance by the duty-holder concerned.  Designing human rights 
indicators can be complex because there are various issues involved. 
 
As noted in Section 4.2.2.6. above, the CSF can be used to develop human rights 
indicators in relation to each of the categories or ‘boxes’ at the Implementation, 
Application and Effectiveness levels in Diagram 7. 
 
Using the framework allows the interrelationships of the socio-legal process to be 
identified.  This global perspective is important because it allows for an understanding of 
how the structural, process and outcome aspects of increasing rights-based participation 
and accountability are related and how they may influence one another.  Such a 
perspective can be important from the perspective of strategic planning as well as 
monitoring.  For example, it is important to identify whether a policy for increasing 
participation in the implementation stage of a development project is not effective 
because it is poorly worded or because decision-makers at the local level are 
contravening the policy.  Appropriately designed human rights indicators can identify 
which is the case.  An appropriate response can then be produced in the context of how it 
might influence the structural and other process aspects of increasing rights-based 
participation in project implementation as well as the outcomes themselves. 
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The framework allows for the identification of specific studies to be carried out on 
different aspects of the framework as applied to different contexts and cases.  As the 
framework is an overarching framework, it does not provide all the details required for 
each aspect of the framework.  Providing detail to such an extent would compromise the 
benefit of an overarching framework as described above.  The framework provides a 
common basis for undertaking comparative work, for example, on specific aspects of the 
framework.  Focussing on individual aspects of the overall framework allows for the 
deepening of understanding of the factors required for compliance with the human rights 
norms underlying participation and accountability. 
 
The framework may be used as a menu/checklist of human rights norms.  The 
assessment framework on participation and accountability is presented here could be 
used as a menu from which specific studies could select based on the assessment 
objectives, context and target audiences. Developing and using the full range of 
structural, process, and outcome indicators makes it possible for people and 
organizations, “from grass-roots activists and civil society to governments and the United 
Nations”344 to monitor progress towards the full realisation of rights, provide a common 
ground for dialogue and facilitate continuity of assessment, help identify gaps and 
barriers to rights realisation, and identify and hold actors accountable for failures to 
respect, protect, and fully realise human rights. 
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The framework can be used to assess how the duty-holder’s internal governance 
and practice is being changed, or not changed, as a result of lessons learnt.  It could thus 
aid compliance review in broader terms than with only specific project reviews.  For 
example, within the Asian Development Bank, management has developed a practice of 
submitting non-project specific requirements to the Compliance Review Panel allowing 
the Panel to provide ‘Advisory Opinons’, as it were that could influence the ADB’s 
practice across various projects345.  The framework developed here could be used in that 
process. 
 
The CSF might aid with Such a review of decision-making processes within the 
actor concerned to ensure the relevant compliance considerations were taken into 
account. It would also be concerned with ensuring that the outcome resulting from the 
course of action adopted by the actor in complying with the human rights norm helps to 
attain the purpose behind the norm and does not involve any regressive effects, either in 
relation to the human rights of concern or to other human rights346. 
 
4.3.1. Challenges in using the CSF to identify compliance requirements concerning 
human rights norms 
There may also be several challenges faced in using the CSF to identify compliance 
requirements in relation to human rights norms: 
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Individual versus community rights or interests. Human rights are individual 
entitlements, but the usual methods of assessment, e.g. through sampling, often result in 
data that is in the aggregate or estimated, making it difficult to tie assessment in with 
individual entitlements 347 .  Further, that increasingly, there is a tension between 
individual rights themselves and between individual and community rights, the trade-off 
argued for by some between civil liberties and national security providing an example of 
this balancing act. 
 
Lack of basic information for monitoring human rights.  Basic data about 
populations is often lacking and estimates for individual or population data are resorted 
to.  The usefulness of estimates to monitor the realization of human rights is be fairly 
limited348 . The lack of relevant data itself is indicative that a situation is not being 
assessed from a human rights perspective and that the duty-holder concerned must 
develop its capacity in this regard.  If there is lack of data because the duty-holder has not 
kept records, the duty-holder is remiss in its obligation to monitor the situation and ought 
to take appropriate remedial steps immediately.  If there is lack of data because the duty-
holder lacks the capacity to collect such data, the international community has an 
obligation to provide the relevant assistance and individual actors may be accountable to 
the extent that they fail to provide the required assistance349. 
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Systemic biases.  Basic data collection processes such as registering births or 
classifying household data may be discriminatory350. For example, land reform programs 
in Latin America systematically excluded women from the process as land was allocated 
by household, but only through the ‘male head of the household’ 351. Changing these 
biases and practices will have to take place for there to be meaningful human rights 
assessment.  As discussed earlier, gender bias in the language used to formulate policies 
and whether participation is only at the political and not economic level.  This may 
require changes but changes may be at the cultural, political and social levels which 
would be a major challenge. 
 
Lack of evidence on costs and impacts.  Currently it is unclear what costs are 
involved352 in designing and implementing policies and mechanisms for participation and 
accountability in different contexts. The pathways by which human rights impacts or 
outcomes are achieved are also not fully understood.  Given resource constraints this is 
an important area, given ubiquitous resource constraints, that requires further research.  
These is much work to be done to further define and validate human rights norms and to 
develop and test assessment methods and tools. 
 
Definition of human rights assessment indicators.  Defining and deciding on 
assessment indicators carry a certain amount of power e.g. in terms of influencing the 
focus and outcomes of assessment.  Unequal distribution of power in assessment 
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processes could be counteracted by ensuring that indicators are selected in as 
participatory a manner as possible. 
 
Enforcement capacity of regulatory systems.  A major challenge remains in terms 
of the enforcement capacity within the international human rights framework.  Structural 
weaknesses within the human rights treaty-monitoring bodies is one reason for this.  
These bodies are for example, often poorly resourced.  Structural weakness in terms of 
enforcement undermines the legitimacy of the international human rights regime and is a 
key challenge yet to be adequately addressed though progress has been made and it is 
more difficult for all international actors to maintain impunity when violating human 
rights. 
 
Building capacity of filling gaps in regulatory systems.  The international human 
rights framework acknowledges the responsibility of all actors to assist those that lack the 
capacity to protect human rights to build their capacity in that regard.  Technical 
assistance provisions in the UN Charter and individual human rights treaties address this 
concern 353 .  The challenge remains however in translating such recognised 
responsibilities into sustained and effective capacity building operations. 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
The CSF developed in Chapter 2 was adapted to identify compliance requirements 
relating to international human rights norms. It is possible to use this framework for 
                                                 
353
 UN Charter Arts. 55, 56; ICESCR Art.2(1). 
232 
 
identifying compliance requirements in relation to various human rights norms and in the 
next chapter, the framework will be detailed in relation to the human rights norms 
associated with the concepts of participation and accountability. Because the framework 
takes into account issues of an actor’s context and capacity, which are key issues for 
identifying compliance requirements in any field and systematically sets out a method of 
identifying such requirements at the implementation, application an effectiveness levels, 
it is further submitted that versions of the CF can be suitably adapted for the purpose of 
identifying compliance requirements in other fields of international legal regulation 
besides human rights. 
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Chapter 5 – Illustrating the CSF: Participation, accountability 
and human rights 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to illustration the use of the Compliance Strategy and Framework, in 
particular the Compliance Framework developed in Chapter 4, to identify the compliance 
requirements in relation to the human rights associated with the principles of participation 
and accountability which are part of the human rights-based approach to development 
developed by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
 
 The concepts of participation and accountability are both key issues for 
development practitioners and for governance generally. 354  The UN in its work has 
adopted a human rights based approach to development for which participation and 
accountability are two key principles expressed in the following term:  
Participation and inclusion: Every person and all peoples are entitled to active, free and 
meaningful participation in, contribution to, and enjoyment of civil, economic, social, 
cultural and political development in which human rights and fundamental freedoms can 
be realised. 
 
Accountability and the Rule of Law: States and other duty-bearers are answerable for the 
observance of human rights. In this regard, they have to comply with the legal norms and 
standards enshrined in human rights instruments. Where they fail to do so, aggrieved 
rights-holders are entitled to institute proceedings for appropriate redress before a 
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competent court or other adjudicator in accordance with the rules and procedures 
provided by law. 355 
 
These principles have been further explained in terms of poverty reduction356, which is a 
key dimension of the UN’s development efforts. Those two principles are explained as 
follows in terms of poverty reduction strategies: 
Participation: [T]he human rights approach emphasizes the importance of ensuring the 
active and informed participation by the poor in the formulation, implementation and 
monitoring of poverty reduction strategies. It draws attention to the fact that participation 
is valuable not just as a means to other ends, but also as a fundamental human right that 
should be realized for its own sake. Effective participation by the poor requires specific 
mechanisms and arrangements at different levels of decision-making in order to 
overcome the impediments that people living in poverty, and marginalized groups in 
general, face in their efforts to play an effective part in the life of the community. 
 
Accountability: The human rights approach to poverty reduction emphasizes the 
accountability of policymakers and others whose actions have an impact on the rights of 
people. Rights imply duties, and duties demand accountability. It is therefore an intrinsic 
feature of the human rights approach that institutions and legal/administrative 
arrangements for ensuring accountability are built into any poverty reduction strategy. 
While duty-bearers must determine for themselves which mechanisms of accountability 
are most appropriate in their particular case, all mechanisms must be accessible, 
transparent and effective.357 
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The principles of participation and accountability as expressed above may be 
considered the Compliance Topic. As will be seen they comprise a number of human 
rights. The CF will be used to identify the compliance requirements relating to those 
human rights. 
 
This chapter shall first examine the human rights aspects of the principles of 
participation and accountability that are expressed above to identify the human rights 
associated with them. The content of those human rights will then be specified after 
which the CF will used to identify their compliance requirements. 
 
5.2. The human rights aspects of participation and accountability 
The theory of human rights explains why the concepts of participation and accountability 
are such important aspects of the framework for human rights protection under 
international law. The international human rights framework is founded on the theory of 
equal human dignity358. Underlying dignity is the concept of human agency in that human 
rights protect the autonomy of an individual as a ‘self-controlling, self-developing 
agent’359. In other words, human rights are recognised and protected at the international 
level so that individuals are not merely dependent on others or simply the passive 
recipient of the agency of others360. The basis of human rights on the idea of human 
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dignity grounded in agency assumes the individual rights-holder will play the role of an 
active agent in seeking to control his life. In this regard, both participation and 
accountability are key aspects of the human rights framework, as both these concepts 
recognise the autonomy of the individual with regards to other agents in relation to the 
decisions that affects the individual. Participation, the idea that the individual can 
influence societal decisions affecting his interests, is a recognised human right at the 
international level 361 . Accountability is a concept permeating the framework for the 
protection of human rights at the international level as that framework provides the basis 
for holding actors to account for the impact of their acts or omissions on the enjoyment 
and protection of human rights. 
 
The centrality of the two concepts to human rights is recognised in rights-based 
approaches. Participation relates to participation in decision-making and the instrumental 
aspect of participation is also explicitly recognised within the international human rights 
framework where participation is regarded to be critical to the full realisation of other 
human rights, such as the rights to work, health and education362 . Accountability is 
understood in terms of power in the sense that it provides the means to control the 
exercise of delegated power 363 . There are two forms of accountability, namely 
answerability or the capacity to demand reasons or the provision of information where 
required (weak form) and enforceability or the capacity to impose sanctions and penalties 
(strong form). Accountability can be examined on different levels namely in terms of its 
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form, type, and time of operation. Accountability can also be distinguished by when it is 
sought.  Ex post accountability is focused on the impact of an action, which, by 
definition, only arises after the event, as for example with the case of legal accountability 
since, as a general matter, an actor’s legal accountability becomes an issue after its 
violation of a particular right.364  Ex ante accountability exists when a decision-making 
process is subject to inquiry before action is approved for example when a participant in a 
policy implementation exercise seeks answers before the policy is put into practice. 
 
In arriving at an understanding of the human rights compliance requirements relating 
to participation and accountability, it may be noted that the description of those concepts 
in term of rights-based approaches is similar to their description in the areas of 
environmental law365, administrative law366  and with regards to the concept of good 
governance367. In these areas too, the theory underlying the concepts of participation and 
accountability are concerned with dignity, autonomy and the protection of the interests of 
the individual. In this fundamental sense, understandings of participation and 
accountability in these other fields mirror those in the human rights field. Though not 
recognised in human rights terms in these other fields, the concepts of participation and 
accountability have the same functional effect in that they bind the actor’s concerned to 
act a certain way. They also create expectations of the actors on which individuals can 
base claims for performance. 
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The concepts of participation and accountability are related. By participating in 
decisions affecting their lives, individuals are empowered to hold those in positions of 
authority, trust and power to account.  Concomitantly the impetus for greater 
accountability has led to calls for enhanced participation by those whose rights and 
interests are at stake in the policy-making process368.  In other words participation and 
accountability are instrumental in securing one another; by participating one holds to 
account, by holding to account one ensures participation. 
 
The human rights framework encapsulates this symbiotic relationship between 
participation and accountability exists in each sphere where power is delegated.  The 
application of the concepts of participation and accountability serves to ensure such 
power is exercised lawfully and thus underlie the framework of human rights, which is a 
check on the arbitrary exercise of power.  Within that framework however, the concept of 
participation is itself a human right.  As a consequence, a legal dimension is added to the 
symbiotic relationship between participation and accountability in the sense that legal 
accountability ensures the exercise and enjoyment of participation as a right.  Underneath 
the legal dimension however, the symbiotic instrumentality of participation and 
accountability remains.   
 
Hence within the human rights framework participation and accountability operate on 
two planes, one that is purely conceptual and the other relating to their legal dimension.  
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For example, when a woman enjoys her right to participate in implementing government 
policy369, she enjoys the benefits of participation as a concept and can demand answers 
from state officials who are tasked to implement the policy if she feels the policy is not 
being implemented as it was meant to be.  If the woman is not allowed to participate in 
the implementation of that government policy, she can exercise her right to participate by 
seeking legal accountability from the state for the violation of a human right.  If she is 
successful, the legal accountability she has sought paves the way to ensuring her right to 
participate.  If she then chooses to enjoy the object of that right, which is to participate in 
the implementation of a government policy, she again enjoys the right to participate in 
public affairs and thereby the concept of accountability by again being in a position to 
ask questions of state officials. The relationship between participation and accountability 
means that when the Compliance Framework is used to identify compliance requirements 
in relation to the human rights associated with participation and accountability, the 
compliance requirements identified can have implications and be relevant for the human 
rights aspects of both participation and accountability. 
 
Thus human rights theory is concerned with issues of participation and accountability 
and those concepts have multiple human rights aspects as the next sections show. In 
seeking to identify the compliance requirements relating to the human rights aspects of 
participation and accountability, it is necessary to first identify the human rights 
associated with those concepts. 
 
                                                 
369
 CEDAW Art. 7. 
240 
 
5.2.1. The human rights aspects of participation 
The right of the individual to participate in decision-making in relation to issues 
regarding his or her interests is given protection by various human rights instruments. 
The understanding of the right to participation as the right to take part in decision-making 
processes affecting the interests of individuals is reflected in Article 14 of the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). That 
article refers to the right of women in the rural sector to participate in decision-making in 
relation to development-related activities370. 
 
Whereas Article 25 of the ICCPR refers to the right to participate in decision-making 
processes in the public sphere, Article 14 of CEDAW arguably extends beyond that to the 
private sphere because it appears to covers situations where development-related 
activities in the rural sector are undertaken by private sector actors, for instance, a private 
sector project sponsor building a road near a rural village. Conceptually, such an 
interpretation of Article 14 of CEDAW accords with the human rights rationale 
underlying the right to participation, which is to recognise the autonomy of the individual 
in having some say in decisions affecting his or her life, there being no conceptual reason 
to restrict the right only to the public sphere371. 
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The right is also recognised in human rights jurisprudence. In Marshall v. Canada,372 
one of the few complaints brought before the Human Rights Committee on Article 25, 
participation in a national-level consultation on the constitutional rights of Canada’s First 
Nations tribes was considered to be in the conduct of public affairs. 
 
There are other human rights associated with the right to participation. General 
Comment 25 of the Human Rights Committee for instance, refers to the right to freedom 
of expression373 and to the rights of freedom of assembly and association. The internal 
dimension of the right to self-determination is also relevant to the right to participation as 
has been referred to in General Recommendation 21(4) of the International Convention 
against Racial Discrimination. 
 
5.2.2. The human rights aspects of accountability 
While accountability is not a human right per se, the international human rights regime 
represents a regulatory framework in which duty-holders are accountable to rights-
holders for failing to meet obligations to respect and protect human rights or for the 
violation of human rights.  One aspect of this framework of accountability is that duty-
holders must establish systems for prosecuting human rights violations and to provide 
remedies to the victims of such violations374.  The second aspect of accountability derives 
from the requirement that duty-holders monitor and review the state of human rights 
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realisation within their ambit of influence and control thus establishing internal and 
external scrutiny of their human rights record.  This relates to the provisions within the 
international human rights regime for duty- holders to compile and submit reports 
concerning the human rights situations subject to their influence375.  The substantive 
human rights provisions associated with the principle of accountability are the right to a 
remedy376 while procedurally the right of access to independent and impartial tribunals377, 
and the right to freedom from discrimination are important. 
 
In addition to these provisions, the symbiotic relationship between the principles 
of participation and accountability means that the provisions from human rights treaties 
discussed above in relation to the principal of participation are also relevant to the 
principal of accountability. Participation is relevant to accountability because by 
participation in decision-making processes, the relevant decision-makers are held to 
account. In addition, there is also an overlap in that the degree to which a rights-holder is 
allowed to participate in accountability mechanisms is a factor in determining the 
efficacy of that mechanism. Accountability is relevant to participation in a like manner. 
By holding decision-makers to account, individuals are participating in the decision-
making process. 
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5.2.3. Specific human rights relating to participation and accountability 
The human rights identified as being related to participation and accountability are 
discussed below. The specific relevance of the content of those human rights to 
participation and accountability is examined. 
 
5.2.3.1. Right to participation 
Participation as a right within the international human rights framework generally derives 
from, or is connected with, the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs378 
where ‘public affairs’ is regarded as    
a broad concept which relates to the exercise of political power, in particular the exercise 
of legislative, executive and administrative powers. It covers all aspects of public 
administration, and the formulation and implementation of policy at international, 
national, regional and local levels.379 
 
Participation is also an important aspect of the enjoyment of other human rights380, 
not least as a component of good governance381 and democratic accountability382.  The 
right to participation protects individuals’ interests by ensuring they have an opportunity 
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to influence the decisions that affect their lives.  Such decisions may be taken in the 
private sector as well as the public sector and they may be made at the national level 
within state institutions or at the international level within the institutions of international 
organisations. 
 
There are various ways in which people can directly participate in decision-making.  
For example, at the state level, people may participate as members of legislative bodies or 
of other elected bodies, through electoral processes or referenda, or through popular 
assemblies and public debate.  There is also representative participation by which people 
participate in decision-making through elected or delegated representatives.  This form of 
participation is more common at the international level where people may be thought of 
participating in decision-making within international organisations through state or NGO 
representatives. 
 
The human right to participation is concerned with the identification and inclusion of 
relevant stakeholders, particularly those whose interests and rights will be directly 
affected, either positively or negatively, by the proposed law or policy383.  Thus the right 
to participation is also concerned with public participation in review, compliance and 
dispute settlement mechanisms384 including in establishing those mechanisms 385.  In the 
case of representative participation, assessing compliance with the right to participation 
means assessing the legitimacy of the representatives386 concerned as well as the breadth 
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of representation in terms of being non-discriminatory and the level of coordination and 
consultation with constituencies. 
 
5.2.3.2. Right to freedom of expression and information 
The right to freedom of expression helps guarantee that the media and other organs of 
civil society can play a role in providing comment on public issues and informing public 
opinion.  This right is broad in scope and requires that duty-holders respect and protect 
freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, or through any other media387. 
 
The right to information is not expressed as an independent right in human rights 
instruments.  However, the obligation to provide access to information may be inferred as 
being correlative or derived388 from the right to participate389 or the right to a remedy390.  
Rights-holders must be provided access to adequate and relevant information in a user-
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friendly, clear and transparent391 manner at different stages of the law or policy-making 
process,392 such as information about voting procedures, candidates, and the rights of the 
voter393.  The duty-holder must also ensure that participants are allowed sufficient time to 
gain access to and prepare for taking part in the relevant phase of the decision-making 
process394. 
 
The right to freedom of expression and information carries with it special duties and 
responsibilities with respect to protecting the rights or reputations of others and with 
regards to the protection of national security, public order, public health or morals395.  In 
addition a reasonable balance has to be struck, as Alistair Mowbray notes, 
“between the interests of directly affected individuals and the correlative burdens on public 
authorities [in having to provide information requested].”396 
 
5.2.3.3. Freedom of association and assembly 
The rights to freedom of assembly and association may be understood in terms of the 
obligations of duty-holders to facilitate popular mobilisation.  Freedom of association 
relates to the freedom to engage in public affairs and decision-making processes through 
political parties and other civil society organisations397.  Freedom of assembly relates to 
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the freedom of such organisations to hold peaceful demonstrations and meetings398 .  
These rights and freedoms are important because they protect the formation and 
functioning of support groups through which people can participate for otherwise people 
may not feel empowered to participate in decision-making processes399. 
 
The rights to freedom of assembly and association are not absolute.  Duty-holders that 
proscribe civil society organisations or ban them from operating or restrict their 
operations such as organising meetings and demonstrations may still be in compliance 
with the relevant human rights norms provided such restrictions reasonable and 
proportionate400. 
 
5.2.3.4. Right to an effective remedy 
The right to a remedy is recognised in relation to both civil and political rights as well as 
economic, social and cultural rights401.  The right to an effective remedy imposes on the 
duty-holder the obligation to investigate the facts causing the violation of rights402, to 
provide for injunctive and other measures to prevent violations, to end the violation of 
rights, to take measures to prevent a recurrence of the violation, to prosecute those 
responsible for the violations, and to provide financial or other compensation to the 
                                                 
398
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399
 Andrea Cornwall and Vera Schattan P. Coelho (eds.), 'New democratic spaces?’, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 35 
No. 2, April 2004.  
400
 ICCPR, Arts. 21, 22. 
401
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3. 
402
 And thereby to seek answers and explanations from duty-holders as to the manner in which they have 
discharged their obligations to realise substantive human rights under the respective human rights 
instruments. 
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victims of the violations403.  Duty-holders must establish the appropriate administrative 
and judicial institutions and mechanisms to address claims of human rights violations, 
ensuring that such mechanisms are accessible to individuals, and that the remedies 
afforded by such mechanisms are adapted to the special circumstances of the victims, and 
are affordable and timely404. 
 
5.2.3.5. Access to independent and impartial tribunals 
The right to access to independent and impartial tribunals is key to the principle of 
accountability since without such access it would be impossible to protect one’s human 
rights and other interests.  The right of access to tribunals is also a feature of the right to 
participate in decision-making processes and guarantees such participation405 .  Often 
access to and participation in such tribunals is constrained by economic factors such as 
high legal and court fees and a lack of necessary information to allow people to 
adequately defend their rights or seek remedies.  Duty-holders must ensure that these 
mechanisms are accessible406 to and adequate for the needs of the individuals concerned.  
In some cases, the criteria for the opportunity to bring a claim or complaint before 
accountability mechanisms, known as ‘standing’, may restrict access to such 
mechanisms407.  Thus such criteria are a key consideration when assessing the duty-
holder’s compliance with its obligations in this regard.  The duty-holder also must ensure 
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that the mechanisms are impartial, independent, fair, equitable, open and transparent408 
and that there are legal guarantees to this effect. 
 
5.2.3.6. Right to self-determination 
The right to self-determination has an internal and external aspect409.  The internal aspect 
overlaps with the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs and reaffirms the status 
of that right as a group right as well as a right of individual.  The external aspect of the 
right to self-determination relates to the right of peoples to freely determine their political 
status and economic, social and cultural development410.  This external aspect is based 
upon the principle of equal rights of all people and the prohibition against the 
subjugation, domination and exploitation of peoples411.  Accordingly, a key issue relating 
to the right to self-determination is whether states or civil society organisations that are 
represented as members of, or accredited to, international organisations are able to 
participate equally in international decision-making processes.  The question of whether 
all parties are treated equally in relation to the implementation of their obligations under 
individual international agreements is another consideration when assessing the degree to 
which a peoples’ right to self-determination is realised. 
 
5.2.3.7. Non-discrimination 
All the above rights should be realised in a non-discriminatory manner, which is an 
overarching principle of the human rights framework. Non-discrimination refers to the 
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right not to be discriminated against on the basis of any kind of distinction, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status412.   In addition, provisions may be required for temporary 
special measures or differentiated treatment413 in favour of traditionally disadvantaged or 
marginalized groups414 with differentiated capacity, resources, socio-cultural status, and 
political power. In the case of participation, this could include recruitment and training 
individuals from disadvantaged or minority groups for positions in public service.  Duty-
holders would have to ensure, for example, that laws and mechanisms facilitating 
participation and accountability are free of language-based, or other, bias against women 
or other disadvantaged groups415. 
 
  In the context of representative decision-making for example, one issue is whether 
NGOs are allowed to participate on equal terms as business interests, and if not whether 
the process by which the distinction is made is fair in as much as they are ‘based on 
transparent and clearly stated norms which are established in advance’416.  In this regard, 
a further consideration is whether decisions restricting participation and the reasons on 
which they are based are made publicly available contemporaneously. 
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5.2.3.8. The right to equality 
“The Council of Europe's Thematic Commentary on the Issue of Political Participation of 
Minorities … locates the international legal entitlement to political participation within 
the wider context of the right to democratic governance. It also considers effective 
participation in relation to the right to full and effective equality, as well as the legal 
entrenchment of these provisions and implementation mechanisms. Individual chapters 
then consider each of the principal mechanisms aimed at enhancing political 
participation, ranging from procedures covering minority representation in political 
institutions to consultative mechanisms and autonomy solutions.”417 
 
To conclude this section, the rights identified above are constituent of the principles 
of participation and accountability in the human rights framework. Table 2 below 
contains a reference to the relevant provisions, which will be used to develop the relevant 
human rights norms. Not all the norms that are reviewed and explicated here will be 
relevant to all duty-holders and in all contexts. There may be particular issues for 
example in connection with aspects of other human rights such as the right to education 
or the right to health, as well as in relation to specific marginalized groups such as 
children, women, migrant workers and refugees.  In addition, the rights themselves are 
not distinct in that they overlap in their scope and are mutually reinforcing, 
interdependent and interrelated418. 
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Table 2: International human rights provisions related to participation & 
accountability. 
 
Human right Human rights norms 
Right to participation UDHR Arts.21, 27(1), ICCPR Art.25, ICESCR 
Art.15(1)(a), ICERD Art.5(c), CEDAW Arts.7, 8, 
14(2)(a)(f), CRC Art. 12(2), ICRMW Arts.41, 42, 
43(1)(g), 45(1)(d) 
Self-determination ICESCR Art.1(1), ICCPR Art.1(1) 
Freedom of expression 
and access to information 
UDHR Art.19, ICCPR Art.19, ICERD Art.5(d)(viii), 
CRC Arts.12(1), 13, ICRMW Art.13(2) 
Freedom of assembly 
and association 
UDHR Art.20, ICCPR Arts.21, 22, ICESCR 
Art.8(1), ICERD Arts.4(b), 5(d)(ix), CEDAW 
Art.14(2)(e), CRC Art.15, ICRMW Arts.26, 40 
Right to an effective 
remedy 
UDHR Art.8, ICCPR Art.2(3), CERD Art.6, 
CEDAW Art.2(c) 
Access to independent 
and impartial tribunals  
UDHR Art.10, ICCPR Arts.14(1), 14(3)(d),(f), 
CERD Art.5(a), CEDAW Art.15(2), CRC 
Art.40(2)(b)(iii)(v), ICRMW Art.18(1) 
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Non-discrimination  UDHR Art.2, ICCPR Art.2(1), ICESCR Art.2(2), 
ICERD Art.2, CEDAW Art.2, CRC Art.2, ICRMW 
Art.7  
 
Having identified the human rights relating to participation and accountability, it is 
important to note that many of the rights are qualified. The permitted limitations on the 
enjoyment of these human rights define their content in particular cases and thus have 
implications for the identification of the related compliance requirements. The right to 
participation, thus framed is very broad but there are concepts from international law, and 
applied in the human rights area, that narrow down the content of that right, taking into 
consideration not least the logistical impossibility of guaranteeing that every individual 
takes part in every decision affecting his or her interests419. What the broad formulation 
of the right to participation does however is signal the recognition at the international 
level of the importance of the principle of individual autonomy. Such recognition means 
for example that while there may be countervailing principles to that of the need to 
protect the autonomy of the individual human person, any decision that takes away from 
that protection must be made carefully420. 
 
The importance of the principle of individual autonomy also means, as with other 
human rights, that effort and innovative thinking must be constantly undertaken to ensure 
                                                 
419
 These are rules that effectively balance the interests of the individual against those of society, taking into 
consideration, among other things, the cost of human rights provision, and are discussed further in Chapter 
3. 
420
 By, for example, being subject to checks and balances such as the regulatory oversight provided by the 
international human rights regime. 
254 
 
that there is perpetual movement towards ever better and fuller realisation of the human 
rights in question. This will involve pressure from individuals, community groups and 
other NGOs because the interests of the duty-holders, whether state or non-state actor, are 
often not aligned to the interests of the individual rights-holder. In this sense, the 
realisation of all human rights, including the right to participation, is progressive in 
nature, requiring an ongoing drive for institutional and social change421. 
 
5.3 Outlining the Compliance Framework in relation to the human rights 
concerning participation and accountability 
 
The Compliance Framework (CF) developed in Chapter 2 and adapted in Chapter 4 to 
help identify human rights compliance requirements is now applied, as represented in 
Diagram 8 below, to the internationally recognised human rights relating to participation 
and accountability. These human rights were identified and discussed above. 
 
In the discussion, I cite examples relating to state and non-state actors. While the 
provisions of the international human rights treaties and the associated jurisprudence, 
serve as an indication of the human rights compliance requirements of non-state actors, 
these ought to also be read with soft law and other human rights initiatives associated 
with non-state actors such as the Human Rights Council’s Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights422, the Tilburg Guiding Principles on World Bank, IMF and Human 
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Rights 423  and the Equator Principles 424 , which aim to reduce the negative impact 
international projects can have on people’s lives and livelihoods. 
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Diagram 8. Compliance Framework for identifying compliance requirements in 
relation to the human rights associated with the principles of participation and 
accountability. The double-headed arrow signifies the non-linear, dynamic 
application of the CF. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Human rights associated with participation and accountability 
 
• Right to participation 
• Non-discrimination 
• Freedom of expression 
• Freedom of information 
• Freedom of association 
• Freedom of assembly 
 
• Right to legal remedy 
• Accessibility to tribunals 
• Impartiality and procedural fairness of 
tribunals 
• Resource allocation 
• Evaluation 
Effectiveness 
Effect of the corporation’s 
operations on the level of 
realisation of human rights 
associated with  participation and 
accountability 
Effect of the corporation’s operations on 
the level of realisation of other human 
rights  
e.g. Right to health; Education; Healthy 
environments; Work; Social security; 
Adequate standard of living; 
Participation in cultural life and benefits 
of scientific progress 
Application 
Operation of 
Law/Policy /Mechanism 
• Acceptability 
• Accessibility 
• Adaptability 
• Availability 
• Quality 
• Monitoring and 
cost accounting 
Stakeholders’ practice 
• Level of participation 
and accountability 
• Demand for and use 
of mechanisms 
• Special interest/ 
advocacy group 
formation & activity 
• Monitoring activity 
Environmental, socio-
economic and 
institutional effects 
• e.g. social costs of 
participation, 
impact on project 
management costs, 
and processes 
 
Implementation 
Laws/ policies covering: 
• Subject matter of 
human rights 
relevant to the 
principles of 
participation and 
accountability 
• Level of law/ policy 
• Type of law/ policy 
Mechanisms for: 
• Subject matter of 
human rights relevant 
to the principles of 
participation and 
accountability 
• Level of mechanism 
• Type of mechanism 
Institutional 
environment and human 
rights capacity 
• Compliance review  
• Monitoring and 
oversight capacity 
• Human rights 
training provided 
• Level of human 
rights awareness  
 
 
Target – The aim of the norm in question 
Benchmarks for the human rights concerned framed within overarching human rights goals 
Set by duty-holders, rights-holders, and monitoring bodies 
 
Context 
• Social, political and economic environment  
• Level of social systems development 
• Baseline measures of the level of realisation of human rights 
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5.3.1. Implementation 
The implementation level of the framework refers to requirements as to whether or not 
key structures and systems relating to a particular human right are in place.  In addition to 
institutional arrangements such as legislation, policies and mechanisms, the 
implementation level also points to capacities such as knowledge of the law or civic 
literacy that facilitate the exercise of the right in question. 
 
5.3.1.1. Laws and policies for participation in decision-making and accountability 
The international human rights framework requires actors to have measures in place 
in terms of laws or policies that facilitate participation by individuals in decision-making 
concerning their interests425 and their ability to hold the actor accountable in relation to 
any denial or violation of their human rights426. This requirement relates to particular 
human rights, namely the right to participation in decision-making, the right to 
information, the freedom of assembly and association and the right to a remedy427. The 
requirement for the adoption of relevant measures is stated in terms of the general 
obligation in Article 2(2) of the ICCPR: 
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as 
may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognised in the present Covenant. 
                                                 
425
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An effective and valid compliance assessment framework relating to the human rights 
associated with participation and accountability must therefore assess whether the actor 
concerned has the required laws and policies in place. Thus the actor would be required, 
as part of the course of conduct it adopts to comply with the general obligation, to enact 
the relevant legislation and institute appropriate policies. 
 
Where the actor is a state party to a human rights treaty, such as the ICCPR, these 
laws and policies will be meant to ‘ensure that the existence and the exercise of [the 
human rights in question] are protected against their denial or violation’ not only in 
relation to state parties but also third parties428. Thus the compliance requirement will be 
for the state to have laws and policies relating to the human rights associated with 
participation and accountability in relation to its own activities and also those of its 
agents but also in relation to third parties. 
 
Before discussing the laws and policies relating to the specific human rights in 
question, there are two general points to note concerning the compliance requirements at 
the implementation. Firstly, they are not only limited to laws or policies that require 
participation and accountability but also laws and policies that may restrict them. The 
human rights in question, as discussed earlier and in Chapter 3, are not absolute and may 
be restricted or limited in certain cases depending on the circumstances facing the actor 
concerned. While there may be restrictions or limitations placed on these rights, the 
compliance requirements are that the restrictions or conditions are based on objective and 
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reasonable criteria429 and are necessary for a countervailing community interest that has 
precedence because of the greater human rights payoff it offers430. The balance between 
individual and community interest however can disfavour the individual as when the 
restriction is such as to deprive the individual of the substance of the right in question. It 
is possible that in many cases where the CF is applied, the relevant laws and policies do 
exist but contain limitations on the exercise of the rights in question. Hence it may be the 
case that the CF is used most often to ensure the restrictions are valid according to the 
criterion mentioned above. 
 
The second compliance requirement is that the laws and policies must not be 
discriminatory. The principle of non-discrimination is a ‘basic and general principle 
relating to the protection of human rights’431. Accordingly, the laws and policies that an 
actor has that relate to participation and accountability must not contain or comprise 
‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms (emphasis 
added).’432 
Both these general points also apply with regards to the laws and policies relating to the 
specific human rights discussed below. 
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In relation to the human right to participation in decision-making specifically433, the 
actor’s compliance requirements are that there are laws and policies in place that respect 
and protect the enjoyment of this right434. These could range from procedural rules such 
as the notice and comments provisions in administrative law435 to whether the actor has 
laws or policies relating to the participation with regards to specific programs. For 
example, the court in the Awas Tingni case required this in its judgement, making 
reference to state programs that allow for the participation of indigenous people in all 
stages of the project concerned, including the monitoring and evaluation stage436. 
 
Access to information is a key determinant of the ability of an individual to 
participate in decision-making or to hold duty-holders accountable 437 . As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, an individual’s right to seek and receive information protects their 
access to information. In relation to this right, the compliance requirement is whether the 
state or non-state actor has in place a legal and policy framework that protects this right 
for example with freedom of information laws or through organisational policies on 
information disclosure438. The measure of compliance would be whether the request for 
information was reasonable439  in the circumstances and whether the information was 
available to the actor at the time such that it could be provided to the individual 
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requesting it440 and whether the information was in fact supplied. What constitutes a 
reasonable request would be determined by the requirements for informed participation441 
and the relevance of the information sought for the purposes of seeking accountability. 
However, there are issues to consider in terms of who decides as to the fulfilment of these 
criteria. In addition, the criteria for compliance must also account for whether the 
individual rights-holder has the resources available for making the request for 
information in the first place. Finally, any restrictions on the availability of information 
should not be at the cost of the substance of the rights of the individual to participate in 
decision-making on matters affecting their interests or to seek accountability from the 
actors concerned. 
 
As the ability to organise, assemble and meet are important for both the exercise of 
the right to participation in decision-making442 and the ability to hold decision-makers to 
account, the CF also identifies compliance requirements such as that there are laws and 
policies to protect the freedoms of association and assembly. For example, it would be a 
compliance requirement not to unreasonably meetings or memberships of NGOs. Any 
such restrictions would have to be assessed to determine if they are reasonable within the 
context of the international human rights framework. Other relevant compliance 
requirements would be measures to facilitate the freedom to organise such as the 
presence of laws that allow for the registration of NGOs. In any case, restrictions on the 
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freedom to organise or of assembly must not be such as to deprive the individual of the 
substance of their rights in relation to participation and accountability. 
 
Finally, in order to respect or protect the rights-holder’s participation in decision-
making and ability to hold decision-makers accountable, the actor has to provide avenues 
for rights-holders to seek remedy or redress if any rights-holder’s interests protected by 
the international human rights framework have been adversely affected. Accordingly it 
would be a compliance requirement that the laws and policies enacted by the actor 
concerned provide for mechanisms for redress and that adequate remedies are provided 
for443. Thus the features of an actor’s operations to assess are whether they provide the 
individual with internal institutional remedies, a right to a legal remedy, the accessibility 
of tribunals and their impartiality and procedural fairness444. 
 
The availability of legal aid must also be considered445. The issue of legal aid is one 
of the availability of resources so the consideration of context does operate here446. The 
rules as to standing may be assessed to determine if they are so restrictive as to deny the 
individual concerned of a right of remedy. Likewise, the remedies provided must be 
assessed to determine if they are adequate or effective in repairing the harm caused by the 
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actor’s violations of the individual’s human rights447. This may necessitate the provision 
for interim measures in order to avoid continuing violations448. 
 
The ability of the actor to provide such measures may in many cases depend on the 
availability of mechanisms for monitoring how such measures operate in practice. The 
issue of mechanisms at the implementation level are covered in the next two sections but 
it is important to point out that the application of the CF will necessitate interaction 
among the considerations at various levels of the CF and also within the same level. One 
of the useful aspects of the CF may be the way it shows how the different aspects 
interrelate so that optimal human rights protection may be attained. 
 
5.3.1.2. Mechanisms relating to participation in decision-making and accountability 
In addition to laws and policies, there is also a requirement for mechanisms that 
facilitate participation and accountability. These mechanisms in effect allow for the 
operationalisation of the laws and policies discussed in the previous section. It is thus 
necessary to assess if the actor has the relevant mechanisms in place. The mechanisms 
must be impartial, independent, fair, equitable, open and transparent 449  and include 
ombudsperson offices, complaints processes, peer review processes, mechanisms for 
NGO participation and consultation policies, among others. 450  The mechanisms 
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themselves may vary depending on factors such as the type and nature of the forum, and 
the nature and phase of the decision-making process451. It is necessary to assess laws and 
policies distinctly from their associated mechanisms because the failure to realise the 
relevant human rights may lie in the mechanisms employed rather than the law or policy. 
 
Again, as in the case of assessing laws and policies discussed earlier, any limitation 
imposed by the mechanisms on the ability of individuals to participate in decisions 
affecting their interests or to hold actors to account must be assessed to determine if there 
is a reasonable and objective justification for it452. This point is related to the issue of the 
individual’s right-holder’s right to determine the modality of the participation or 
accountability mechanism. Thus all the mechanisms mentioned earlier may exhibit some 
limitation in their operations. It is not the case that by failing to accede to the 
requirements of an individual or group of individuals that they specifically participate in 
the decision-making process, the actor is in violation of the human rights requirements 
relating to participation and accountability 453 . Rather such cases will have to be 
determined in terms of the justifications for the limitations and their effect in terms of the 
interests of the wider community. Factors that could be taken into account is how 
seriously the interest of the individual or group seeking to take part might be affected by 
the decision taken and how representative of their interests any accredited body to the 
decision-making process is. 
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5.3.1.3. Monitoring, capacity building and knowledge 
In addition to the actor’s laws, policies and mechanisms, other compliance requirements 
at the implementation level are the actor’s internal monitoring mechanisms and measures 
relating to its capacity to comply with its human rights obligations or commitments. 
 
The general principle that an actor undertake its human rights obligations and 
commitments in good faith and effectively454  implies that the actor puts in place a 
strategy for monitoring policy implementation and a schedule for assessment.  If such a 
strategy does exist, it ought to be assessed to see if it relates to individual laws and 
policies, and if it takes into account issues at the implementation, application and 
effectiveness stages of the CF, and whether the assessment includes measurable 
benchmarks and targets455 . The actor also needs to have in place a mechanism for 
investigating allegations of human rights violations as a failure to carry out an 
investigation may itself be a violation of the actor’s human rights obligations456 . In 
relation to such a strategy, the CF would assess if the actor has an internal review 
mechanism in relation to its human rights requirements and how well-resourced and 
effective such mechanisms might be. 
 
In order for such compliance systems to fulfil their objectives, it is necessary for the 
staffs and officials concerned to have an adequate understanding of the human rights 
                                                 
454
 Alastair Mowbray, above n.34, CESCR, General Comment 1. 
455
 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 5, paras.1, 45-47. 
456
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31. 
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provisions and norms to be complied with.  The availability of human rights education is 
thus a key consideration.  Human rights awareness is also necessary to inform capacity 
building within the duty-holder institution when such compliance reviews identify gaps 
in human rights protection457. The CF would assess the actor’s operational structure in 
relation to both these aspects. 
 
5.3.2. Application 
The compliance requirements at the application level of the CF concern whether the 
implementation activities undertaken at the implementation level are applied as intended. 
Accordingly, the compliance requirements elements identified at the application level 
provide information regarding the manner in which institutional arrangements for 
realising human rights are functioning in practice. One of the actor’s compliance 
requirements at the application level is to monitor its progress towards defined policy 
objectives 458 ; in this case the objective of ensuring the human rights aspects of 
participation and accountability in relation to institutional activity with regard to the 
decision-making process459.  For assuring and maintaining the actor’s compliance, the 
application level is key. If the actor’s implementing activities do not work as they are 
designed to, it is unlikely the actor will be in compliance with the relevant human rights 
norms. And as noted in the earlier chapters, one factor that CF takes into account is the 
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 RBA Guideline. 
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 Paul Hunt, Interim Report, para.26. 
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 Using process indicators inherently recognises that achieving desired objectives or human rights 
benchmarks usually requires time, as embodied in the concept of progressive realisation of rights. This 
should not detract from immediate legal obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights standards. 
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actor’s context and how this relates to its compliance requirements, including at the 
application level. 
 
There are three compliance requirement elements at the application level. First, as 
mentioned, whether the implementing activities that have been put in place function as 
intended. For example, the Human Rights Committee requires that states report not only 
measures that protect against discrimination in law but also whether ‘there remain any 
problems of discrimination in fact, which may be practised either by public authorities, 
by the community, or by private persons or bodies’460. Second, there is a need to assess 
the behaviour of rights-holders to the measures taken by the actor. Is that behaviour one 
that indicates that the measures have successfully addressed the interests of the 
individuals? For example, in its General Comments, the Human Rights Committee notes 
that  
State reports should also describe factors which impede citizens from exercising the right to vote 
and the positive measures which have been adopted to overcome these factors.461 
Accordingly, one of the compliance requirements at the application level is to identify 
situations when the exercise of a right is being impeded and this requires an assessment 
of the practice or behaviour of the rights-holder. Only when the impediment is identified 
can the factors responsible for the impediment be identified, following which remedial 
                                                 
460
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18, para.9. This also applies to remedies prescribed to 
remedy human rights violations. In General Comment 31, para.20, the Committee notes 
‘Even when the legal systems of States parties are formally endowed with the appropriate remedy, 
violations of Covenant rights still take place. This is presumably attributable to the failure of the 
remedies to function effectively in practice. Accordingly, States parties are requested to provide 
information on the obstacles to the effectiveness of existing remedies in their periodic reports.’ 
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 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25, para.13. 
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measures can be prescribed. Third, it is necessary to assess whether the measures for 
compliance undertaken by the actor affect the social environment and ecosystems of the 
individuals concerned as this may affect the realisation and enjoyment of the human 
rights relating to participation and accountability as well as other human rights. 
 
The aspects of the CF relating to the application level discussed below relate to the 
obligation or commitment on the part of the actor, for example the state as duty-holder, to 
monitor the human rights situation ‘with respect to each [human right] on a regular basis 
[so that the state is aware] of the extent to which the various rights are, or are not, being 
enjoyed by all individuals within its territory or under its jurisdiction’462. They in turn 
relate to the broader obligation to ensure that measures taken to realise human rights are 
effective 463 . In relation to non-state actors the CF’s application level compliance 
requirements are concerned with similar issues as those for states as adapted to the 
operations of the non-state actor in terms of the manner in which those operations affect 
the enjoyment of individuals affected by those operations. 
 
It has been noted for instance by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights that undertaking such monitoring can be costly and time-consuming and that 
international assistance can be sought for doing so464 . In principle, non-state actors, 
through state parties, may also seek such assistance because either the time spent on such 
                                                 
462
 CESCR, General Comment 1, para.3.  
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monitoring impedes its effectiveness or the actor lacks sufficient experience with 
monitoring human rights-related issues. 
 
5.3.2.1. Assessing how laws, policies and mechanisms function in practice 
In assessing the how the laws, policies and mechanisms relating to the human rights 
aspects of participation and accountability function in practice, the realisation or the 
enjoyment of the human rights in question ought to be framed around the rights-holders’ 
expectations.  Accordingly, it is necessary to investigate if the institutional arrangements 
designed for realising human rights are functioning as intended with regard to the rights-
holder’s entitlement to the enjoyment of the subject matter of each right in terms of its 
availability, accessibility, quality, acceptability and adaptability as discussed in Chapter 
3. To take the example of discrimination, it will be necessary to ascertain if local 
government agencies or subsidiaries of private sector non-state actors are carrying out 
their activities in discriminatory fashion in violation of state laws against discrimination. 
Though this may be difficult to do in practice, it may be a mitigating factor for the actor 
concerned if the issue of liability arises. It may also facilitate remedial action if the issue 
is already the subject of an internal assessment as opposed to the situation where the issue 
was never considered in which case a response from the actor concerned will likely take 
longer, compromising the right to a remedy465. 
 
The CSF also assesses the actor’s own compliance strategy and systems. These 
systems ought to be assessed in terms of their performance and their output in terms of 
                                                 
465
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, para. 15, ‘…A failure by a State Party to investigate 
allegations of violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of 
an ongoing violation is an essential element of the right to an effective remedy.’ 
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the reports to the relevant monitoring bodies, for example the Human Rights Committee, 
and their effectiveness in terms of the ability of such systems to improve the duty-
holder’s compliance record. 
 
5.3.2.2. Assessing rights-holders’ practice 
The CSF requires an assessment of whether rights-holders are making use of measures 
and mechanisms created for participation in decision-making or for the purposes of 
accountability. For instance, although a duty-holder may have provided the appropriate 
institutional arrangements whereby rights-holders can participate in decision-making or 
hold actors accountable, the individuals concerned might not use the mechanisms. If the 
mechanisms are working as intended, it is possible that rights-holders may choose not to 
participate or to hold the actor to account466. However, there must be a monitoring of the 
situation to ascertain that this is indeed the reason why the rights-holders have not used 
the mechanisms. An important issue of practice that has to be monitored is whether all 
stakeholders regardless of gender, age and socioeconomic status use mechanisms for 
participation and accountability equally. For instance, poorer individuals may settle 
disputes without recourse to the courts because the access to the judiciary is time-
consuming and beyond their means. Finally, such an assessment is required to ascertain 
the actor’s level of compliance with its obligation to respect human rights. Thus this 
aspect of the CSF would assess if there have been positive measures adopted by the actor 
that interfere with rights-holders taking part in decision-making or in making use of 
accountability mechanisms. 
                                                 
466
 The decline of voter participation in general elections in some countries is an example of rights-holders 
electing not to exercise their rights under ICCPR, Article 25. 
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5.3.2.3. Assessing the environmental effect of compliance with the human rights 
concerned 
The possible impact that participation and accountability processes might have on living 
and work environments and ecosystems must be assessed. 
 
Enabling environment 
The implementation of laws and policies on participation and accountability may result in 
changes to living, work and physical activity environments that make these environments 
less or more conducive to participation and accountability.  For example, as a result of 
laws and policies on participation and accountability, the legal environment may have 
changed to become a more supportive or restrictive environment for activities related to 
participation and accountability as assessed by stakeholders.  In a seminar on the ‘Legal 
Dimensions of the Enabling Environment for Civic Engagement’, developing country 
and international NGOs, legal experts and practitioners, World Bank staff participated to 
examine the World Bank-commissioned Handbook on Good Practices on Laws Relating 
to NGOs.  The participants cautioned that stipulations as to definitions of NGOs, 
taxation, funding, licensing provisions and liabilities of NGO officials could lead to 
restrictions on the activities of NGOs467 . The effects of such provisions have to be 
assessed in case the legal framework created for the operation of NGOs within a country 
actually creates a more restrictive environment for NGO operations. 
 
Ecosystems effects 
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Activity related to participation and accountability may have ecosystem effects or other 
operating environment effects that may have an impact on the lives of people that could 
be an impediment on the enjoyment of human rights by the people concerned. These 
ecosystem effects ought to be assessed to ensure that participation and accountability 
effects do not have a deleterious effect on the enjoyment of other human rights. For 
instance, the operation of participatory mechanisms may lead to the delay in planning 
approval for the development of infrastructure and amenities that affects the well-being 
of other community members. Such a situation would have to be identified to ensure that 
a proper balance is achieved between the rights of those wishing to participate in the 
planning process to prevent the development and those who wish the development to 
proceed. Where the balance finally rests might be subjectively determined but it is 
important that effects of the operation of the participatory mechanism, as in the example, 
are identified and transparently assessed in trying to achieve that balance. 
 
5.3.3. Effectiveness 
Outcome measures can be used to assess progress over time towards achieving 
defined human rights targets or benchmarks. While process level assessment is concerned 
with evaluating the effort in terms of the level and manner of implementation and 
utilisation of laws, policies and mechanisms, outcome assessments are concerned with 
evaluating the results of law and policy implementation and utilisation468 .  Thus in 
relation to a policy with the objective to increase overall participation of disadvantaged 
groups in policy-implementation for example, the outcome measure is the overall level of 
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 Katarina Tomaševski, ‘Indicators’ in Asbjorn Eide, Catarina Krause, Allan Rosas (eds.), Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter Katarina Tomaševski, Indicators), p.542. 
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participation of disadvantaged groups in policy-implementation.  The outcome 
assessment in terms of participation and accountability in the decision-making process 
includes the extent to which human rights norms underlying participation and 
accountability are realised as well as an evaluation of the impact of increased 
participation and accountability on the realisation of other human rights, such as the right 
to education and the right to health. 
 
Assessing outcomes involves several complexities. The range of actors and factors 
that potentially influence human rights and socio-political outcomes make it difficult to 
determine the extent to which those outcomes are directly attributable to any specific 
actor, policy or process. Additionally, some outcomes may be evident immediately while 
others could take much longer to develop. Finding appropriate methods to assess 
outcomes can be difficult and assessment may involve considerable time and resources. 
Thus there are debates about how far assessment can meaningfully evaluate outcomes. 
There are also discussions on who is responsible, or who is the relevant duty-holder, for 
ensuring longer-term outcome assessments given that policy and programme cycles e.g. 
in international organisations, usually occur in relatively short-term cycles, but outcomes 
could take much longer to develop and may occur totally unrelated to any particular 
programme or policy cycle. 
 
The human rights position is clear; policies and policy activities cannot be considered 
as ends in and of themselves, but should lead to the full realisation of human rights. It is 
therefore essential to monitor outcomes.  As duty-holders have the obligation to realise 
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human rights, they implicitly have a duty to monitor the outcome of steps taken to realise 
rights.  Furthermore, a systematic approach to assessing outcomes is an important way to 
understand how and to what extent realising human rights actually affects certain 
outcomes. This in turn can inform future policy strategies and programme investments to 
more effectively and efficiently realise human rights benchmarks and targets.  Conversely 
if adverse effects are apparent due to the misapplication or interpretation of human rights 
norms, the norms themselves may need to be reinterpreted. 
 
Given the interdependent nature of human rights, it is imperative that realising the 
human rights related to participation and accountability must support the realisation of 
other human rights. Thus realising the human rights concerned with participation and 
accountability could have impacts on economic and social rights469 and therefore this 
linkage also needs to be closely monitored.  Examples of linked effects could include 
impacts of participation on economic development, where trade union and civil society 
movements have sometimes been seen as a hindrance to such development. Impacts 
could also be assessed in terms of full and productive employment, where productivity 
may decrease in terms of workdays lost or increase as a result of satisfaction and 
motivation of being involved in decision-making processes. For instance, the impact of 
participation on social rights is increasingly being recognised. For example, empirical 
analysis indicate an association between the level of participation in public affairs and 
health and social capital outcomes where communities with lower level of participation 
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 Specific indicators relating to these other human rights have been produced.  For example see Katarina 
Tomaševski, Annual report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, submitted pursuant to 
Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/29, E/CN.4/2002/60. 
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had lower levels of health outcomes 470 .  While this positive association indicates a 
relationship between the realisation of the right to participate and the realisation of the 
right to health, the relationship is not a simple one and will depend on contextual factors 
and thus needs to be carefully monitored as it could have negative effects as well. 
Assessment of negative effects of participation could include considerations of whether 
inequitable exposure to social or political risks result from participation in the conduct of 
public affairs or seeking accountability. 
 
5.3.4. Benchmarks and targets 
As noted earlier targets are goals the actor seeks to achieve and benchmarks are markers 
on the way o achieving those goals. In relation to the human right to participation, 
possible targets might be the number of people attending meetings to update people about 
development projects. Of interest would be the proportion of those attending who are 
women or who belong to a minority group. The target might be to get 50% of attendees 
from minority groups. And the target may be time dependent in that it may be to 50% of 
attendees from minority groups within two years. 
 
Appropriate benchmarks could be set in terms of seeing the representation of 
minorities at such meetings to increase in a progression of 10% every six months for 
example. The examples of benchmarks and targets are obviously very extensive. But the 
key thing is that they be designed to be fair and reasonable and that the targets not be set 
too low for otherwise the progress made would be too slow. 
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5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter offered an example of the CF being used to identify compliance 
requirements in relation to particular human rights. The human rights were first specified 
and particular examples of compliance requirements in relation to them were described 
moving up through the levels of the CF from implementation to effectiveness. In the next 
chapter, these requirements are considered in relation to a World Bank project in 
Mumbai, India. 
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Chapter 6 A simple illustration of the Compliance Strategy 
and Framework in relation to a World Bank development 
project 
 
In Chapter 5, the Compliance Framework (CF) portion of the Compliance Strategy and 
Framework (CSF) was used to work out the compliance requirements in relation to the 
human rights associated with the human rights-based approach to development principles 
of participation and accountability. This chapter develops that use of the CSF further by 
seeking to identify the compliance requirements in relation to the same set of human 
rights but in relation to a development project where such issues may arise in actual 
cases. The development project is a World Bank project in Mumbai, India and is called 
the Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP). 
 
 The treatment here is basic in the sense that the various categories and levels of 
the CSF have been explained fully in Chapters 1 through 4 of this thesis so what will be 
done here is to simply identify the categories and make the relevant observations in 
connection to them. It is hoped this way, the CSF and the CF will be stripped bare to 
show their parts clearly. 
 
Background to the project 
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The World Bank’s preparation of the MUTP began in 1995471. To secure Bank financing 
the project had to be appraised by the Bank, which involved Bank staff working with the 
Government of India and the state Government of Maharashtra and their agencies to 
ensure the project would be viable and would be implemented to the Bank’s standards472. 
The MUTP gained approval from the Bank in 2002 with the objective of facilitating 
‘urban economic growth and improve quality of life by fostering the development of an 
efficient and sustainable urban transport system including effective institutions to meet 
the needs of the users in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR)’473. 
 
There are three parts to the MUTP, two infrastructure components and one 
concerning the resettlement and rehabilitation (‘resettlement component’) of people 
affected by the project. The infrastructure components concerned improvements to rail 
and road transport networks in Mumbai. These components were financed by an IBRD 
loan of US$463 million. The resettlement component involved the resettlement of around 
120,000 people; one of the largest such projects in an urban setting and was financed 
largely by an IDA credit of about USD 79.0 million474. At conception the resettlement 
component was planned as a separate project but it was merged with the transport 
components into a single project, the MUTP, in 1999475. 
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Elements of the CSF 
Compliance Topic: 
The compliance topic are the human rights associated with the principles of participation 
and accountability under the human rights-based approach to development. This is the 
same topic as in Chapter 5 but the difference here of course is that it is being examined in 
relation to a specific actor, the World Bank. 
 
Actor’s characteristics: 
(a) Normative characteristics: 
The various normative frameworks governing the World Bank’s conduct in this instance 
are the following: 
 
International law 
The World Bank is a subject of international law and so its conduct is governed by 
international law. Under this normative heading the views as to World Bank’s human 
rights obligations are either that as a matter of customary law and of the fundamental 
norms of international law or peremptory norms (jus cogens), the Bank has an obligation 
to respect human rights476  or more expansively to respect, protect and fulfill human 
rights.477 This is a controversial area in which there is no authoritative determination. 
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 Sigrun Skogly, The Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
Cavendish, 2001. 
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Additionally, international law is the applicable law governing the loan and credit 
agreements between the World Bank and the Indian government and the municipal 
government of Mumbai. 
 
The national law of India 
The national law of India governs the MUTP. India has ratified the ICCPR without 
reservations in relation to the articles associated with participation and accountability. Its 
national laws were not discerned to be a factor interfering with the human rights at issue. 
In fact India’s freedom of information law actually helped the people affected by the 
MUTP to get relevant information. 
 
The Bank’s Articles of Agreement 
The World Bank has challenged arguments that human rights considerations matter for its 
operations on the basis that concern for such considerations falls outside its mandate as 
defined by its Articles of Agreement478. However, as discussed below, the evolving scope 
of the Bank’s development work now encompasses human rights issues, strengthening 
the claim and expectation that such issues, including its human rights compliance are 
taken into account in the Bank’s operations. 
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 The Articles of Agreement are the World Bank’s ‘constitution’. See Articles of Agreement of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 22 July 1944, 2 UNTS 134, as amended, 606 
UNTS 294 (the IBRD Articles). The Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association, 
26 January 1960, 439 UNTS 249 (the IDA Articles) are also relevant and in the material terms similar to 
the IBRD articles. Financing for World Bank projects is provided both by the IBRD and the IDA so the 
respective Articles govern the issue of whether human rights considerations should be taken into account 
by the Bank. 
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The Bank has challenged assertions that it has to take human rights issues into 
account in its operations on the basis that doing so would involve basing its decision-
making on political considerations, which is prohibited under the Articles. The relevant 
provisions of the Articles are479: 
Article III, Section 5(b): The Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any 
loan are used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to 
considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other non-economic 
influences or considerations. 
Article IV, Section 10: The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any 
member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or 
members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these 
considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article 1. 
Thus the position of the Bank has been to ascribe a limitation on its ability to consider 
human rights issues in connection with its operations480. In other words, the Bank would 
be governed by the rule that its operations must give effect to human rights but for this 
limitation. 
 
However, as the Bank came under pressure to make human rights guarantees 
conditions of its loans481 and itself started to appreciate the human rights dimensions of 
its development work, it continued to develop its understanding of how the human rights 
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 The limitation applies in particular to issues concerning civil and political rights. See for instance, the 
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situation in a country would be a political factor that could be counted in its loan risk 
assessment. As articulated in a 1995 legal opinion of the Bank’s General Counsel, the 
Bank adopted the position that it could take into account ‘an extensive violation of 
political rights which takes pervasive proportions’. Such a factor could be relevant to its 
loan decision-making where ‘the violation had significant economic effects, or if it led to 
the breach of international obligations relevant to the Bank, such as those created under 
binding decisions of the UN Security Council.’482 This was the point arising from Article 
103 of the UN Charter discussed earlier in section 2.2.1. 
 
On this interpretation of its Articles, the Bank would be able to withhold or 
suspend loans 483  from governments that are involved in large-scale human rights 
violations. Thus human rights consideration can play a role in the Bank’s decision-
making. However, that role is not limited to loan decision-making at the country level; it 
can also be relevant at the local, project level. While country level human rights 
considerations were said to matter to the Bank in terms of their macroeconomic effects, 
the local level considerations are instrumentally concerned with their effect on the 
operational success of the project. In the same 1995 legal opinion, the Bank’s General 
Counsel posited the following scenario in which the Bank may legitimately promote 
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 World Bank, Prohibition of Political Activities in the Bank’s Work, Legal opinion of the General 
Counsel, 11 July 1995 (SecM95-707, July 12, 1995), in Ibrahim Shihata, World Bank Legal Papers, 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2000, p. 235. 
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‘However, in egregious situations, where extensive violations of human rights reach pervasive proportions, 
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individual political rights in the interest of a project’s needs and withhold funding if such 
rights were not protected484: 
The Bank, benefiting from its experience in development finance, seeks participation of affected 
people in the design and implementation of many types of projects it finances, and requires 
consultation with local communities and local NGOs in the preparation of the ‘environment 
assessment’ of projects with significant impact on the environment. Such participation and 
consultation, to be useful at all, require a reasonable measure of free expression and assembly. The 
Bank would, in my view, be acting within proper limits if it asked that this freedom be insured 
when needed for the above purposes. Its denial of lending for a given project in the absence of this 
requirement where it applies cannot be reasonably described as an illegitimate interference in the 
political affairs of the country concerned, just because the rights to free expression and assembly 
in general are normally listed among political rights. 
 
The Bank’s own operational policies 
The Bank’s staff are required to comply with its own operational policies in connection 
with the Bank’s projects. A number of Bank operational policies applied to the MUTP 
including OD4.30 the operational policy on involuntary resettlement. None of the 
operational policies interfered with the human rights at issue.  
 
The practice of involuntary resettlement relates to the relocation of people, in 
some cases entire communities, to make way for the development of infrastructure or 
resources. OD 4.30’s objective is ‘to ensure that the population displaced by a project 
receives benefits from it’, that the displaced people are ‘assisted in their efforts to 
improve their former living standards, income earning capacity, and production levels, or 
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at least to restore them’ and that resettlers ‘should be integrated socially and 
economically into host communities so that adverse impacts on host communities are 
minimized’485.  
 
Although OD 4.30 does not refer to the implications of resettlement for the 
enjoyment and realisation of the human rights of the people being resettled and of the 
host communities where the resettled people are moved to, there is clearly a human rights 
dimension to resettlement. If the stated objectives of the policy are realised, the affect on 
the enjoyment of certain human rights such as those concerning housing, health, 
education, the family and work may be minimised. Conversely, if the policy objectives of 
OD 4.30 are not realised the enjoyment of those rights may be negatively affected. Even 
if the policy objectives are realised, the resettlement process itself involves matters 
pertaining to the exercise of human rights such as the right to participate in public affairs 
and in decision-making affecting the rights-holder’s interests, the right to freedom from 
discrimination and to freedoms of expression and assembly as well as the right of access 
to remedies486. 
 
The process of involuntary resettlement is theoretically meant to allow the people 
affected to participate in decision-making regarding the resettlement programme487. In 
addition, the contractual and administrative framework under which involuntary 
resettlement takes place also theoretically means there are procedures available for 
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holding the actors involved488 accountable to the people who have to move. The extent to 
which involuntary resettlement programmes are participatory or accountable will likely 
vary from project to project and any claims as to lack of participation or accountability 
are likely to be contested. However, the presence of features of participation and 
accountability in such programmes make it potentially appropriate to apply the CF from 
Chapter 5 with regards to the human rights relating to participation and accountability to 
such cases. 
 
The Bank’s understanding that the realization of human rights is relevant to its mandate 
The relevance of human rights considerations to the Bank’s mandate was noted in a 2006 
legal opinion of the Bank’s General Counsel489 that stated: 
development is no longer confined to economic development narrowly defined, but encompasses 
broad areas of human development, social development, education, governance and institutions, as 
well as issues such as inclusion and cohesion, participation, accountability and equity. … Many of 
these areas relate directly to the realisation of human rights, in being either preconditions for such 
realisation, or the subjects of human rights themselves. Indeed, human rights and development 
share important conceptual and practical affinities and are fundamentally linked with one another 
The manner in which the Bank’s purposes and mission are now understood makes consideration 
of human rights essential. Human rights relate substantively to many of the activities of the World 
Bank. They are deeply interconnected with the purposes outlined in Article 1 [of the Bank’s 
Articles], in large measure because they are directly relevant to the Bank’s mission of poverty 
alleviation. 
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The Counsel went on to note that the Bank’s role is not that of an enforcer of human 
rights obligations but instead that it understands its role to be ‘one of supportive 
cooperation with its members in the realisation of human rights’ or of facilitating ‘the 
realisation of human rights in partnership with its members’. 490  Subsequently a 
programme called the Nordic Trust Fund was launched to train and inform ‘Bank staff on 
how human rights relate to the Bank’s core work and mission of promoting economic 
growth and poverty reduction’.491 
 
On the basis of these developments, it is possible to posit that the Bank has an 
informal policy of respecting human rights or not undermining the human rights of the 
people affected by its projects. And for the purposes of the showing how the CF might be 
applied, such a normative position would be sufficient as it indicates human rights 
considerations are being taken account of within the Bank. There is no incongruity 
between the statements of World Bank officials, the fact that a human rights awareness 
programme has been launched at the Bank, and the proposition that the Bank would be 
interested to learn what its human rights compliance requirements would be in relation to 
its projects from a ‘do no harm’ perspective. The compliance requirements are 
accordingly thought through on that basis using the CF. For the reasons given, it is 
suggested this would be a valid and legitimate use of the CSF. 
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(b) Operational characteristics: 
Once the World Bank approves a project loan, implementation of the project is the 
responsibility of the borrower, while the Bank supervises the borrower’s 
implementation 492 . In the case of the MUTP, the resettlement component 493  was 
implemented by ‘the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) 
on behalf of the Government of Maharashtra (GoM) and the Borrower, [the Government 
of India] (GoI). MMRDA is the coordinating agency and is responsible for implementing 
the resettlement and rehabilitation component on behalf of all the implementing 
agencies.’494 
 
While MMRDA has overall responsibility for implementing the resettlement aspect 
of the project495, individual segments of the resettlement work has been contracted out to 
local NGOs with the Bank’s approval 496 . The involvement of NGOs in planning, 
implementing and monitoring resettlement projects is provided for in OD 4.30 497 . 
However, the appointment of such contractors, almost inevitable in large projects, adds a 
further layer of administration and potential complexity in the translation of the Bank’s 
policies into practice. The effect can be to weaken the Bank’s control over the project and 
its operation. This does not mean however, a diminution of the Bank’s accountability for 
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the conduct of the project. As discussed below, the Inspection Panel established by the 
Bank to ensure project compliance with Bank policies takes the Bank’s project 
management staff to task for policy non-compliance. It is the job of the Bank’s 
management to then get the borrower’s implementing agencies in line so as to ensure 
policy compliance. The Inspection Panel investigation will produce its recommendations 
that add a further layer of compliance requirements for the Bank’s project management 
team to work with the borrower to satisfy. The assumption here is that the Bank’s 
management gets full cooperation from the borrower’s implementing agencies and its 
contractors. That is probably not a realistic assumption given the complexity of such 
projects, indicating a further limit on the control the Bank has over the project. 
 
The NGOs appointed were headed by the Society for the Promotion of Area 
Resources Centre (SPARC) and the National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF), which 
had experience with some of the slum-dweller communities affected by the project, 
particularly those living along Mumbai’s railway tracks498. As Bank supervision missions 
were to learn, both MMRDA and the NGOs lacked sufficient capacity to implement the 
resettlement component499. The large scale of the project was one issue but so was the 
lack of relevant expertise on the part of MMRDA and the NGOs. In fact, one reason that 
MMRDA contracted out the work to the NGOs was that it lacked the capacity for doing 
it. The lack of capacity also related to a particular feature of the MUTP, which was that it 
affected two different groups of people, slum-dwellers affected by the railway component 
of the project and slum-dwellers and middle-income shopkeepers affected by the road 
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component of the project. The NGOs only had experience working with the former 
group500. 
 
The Bank’s accountability body, the Inspection Panel, criticised the Bank’s 
management over the lack of capacity of the MMRDA and the NGOs since that 
incapacity caused problems in implementing the resettlement component and so affected 
the rights and interests of the people being resettled. In the case of the MUTP, there were 
institutional failings on the part of the Bank, in particular the decision in 1999 to merge 
the resettlement component with the transport components that resulted in responsibility 
for the resettlement being given to MMRDA instead of the government of Maharashtra’s 
Urban Development Department that had been identified by the Bank team preparing the 
project as better suited for the task501. It is possible that in some other cases, issues of 
incapacity may arise despite the Bank’s best efforts in exercising its control over the 
project to ensure appropriate agencies undertake the required tasks. The exercise of due 
diligence by the Bank in such situations should then mean that the responsibility for the 
lack of human rights realisation or protection should fall to the borrower as the lack of 
capacity could not be attributed to the Bank’s exercise of control over the project. 
 
So in operational terms, it is relevant to note that the Bank exerts more control over 
the project before it commences. The project is implemented by the borrower country and 
once it gets underway, exerting control over the project is more complicated. But while 
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the borrower country implements the project, the Bank’s staff supervise it and in that way 
are able to exert some say over the project.  
 
Applicable Norms 
The applicable norm thus would be that in relation to the MUTP, the Bank would not 
operate in a manner that would undermine the enjoyment of human rights by the people 
affected by the project. 
 
Elements of the CSF 
The applicable human rights norm and the specific human rights authoritatively identified 
and interpreted 
As mentioned in earlier discussions of the CF, this category essentially overlaps with the 
previous one ‘Applicable norms’ and provides the basis for identifying the compliance 
requirements using the CF. Here in addition to the norm ‘not to undermine the enjoyment 
of human rights’, the specific human rights are identified and their content specified. This 
was done in Section 5.2. of Chapter 5. In terms of authoritatively interpreting and 
identifying these human rights, reliance would be placed on the human rights treaty 
bodies’ interpretation of the rights and on the United Nations’ agencies understanding 
and explication of the human rights-based approach to development and its principles of 
participation and accountability. For instance, a World Bank publication relates to that 
approach and the two principles as follows: 
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A human rights-based approach is a conceptual framework for the process of human 
development that is normatively based on international human rights standards and 
operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights. It seeks to analyse 
inequalities which lie at the heart of development problems and redress discriminatory 
practices and unjust distributions of power that impede development progress. Mere 
charity is not enough from a human rights perspective. Under a human rights-based 
approach, the plans, policies and processes of development are anchored in a system of 
rights and corresponding obligations established under international law. This helps to 
promote sustainability of development work, empowering people themselves— 
especially the most marginalized— to participate in policy formulation and accountable 
those who have a duty to act.502 
 
and 
The concept of a human rights– based approach is therefore broadly identified according 
to five basic principles: 
• An anchoring of development efforts in human rights norms and standards and 
obligations 
• A perspective that emphasizes analytical as well as operational approaches 
• A perspective that focuses on participation and empowerment of rights-holders and 
on accountability of duty-bearers 
• A focus on marginalized groups and on legal instruments that are especially relevant 
to them 
• Assumptions about the centrality of inequality and discrimination as constraints on 
development progress503 (emphasis added) 
 
Baseline and context 
The World Bank undertakes environmental and social development analysis of the 
communities in the vicinities of its projects. With regards to involuntary resettlement 
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Operational Policy OD 4.30 provides for the affected people to be restored to conditions 
similar to the ones they had to leave. So the environmental and social development 
analysis done by the Bank, and which was done for the MUTP as well, allows the Bank’s 
staff to determine that the affected people are able to enjoy similar conditions in the place 
they were moved to. 
 
 From a human rights perspective, the ideal baseline analysis would be to 
determine the level of human rights enjoyment prior to any intervention. Only that way 
will it be possible to tell at the end of the intervention whether human rights enjoyment 
was affected, and if so whether the effect was positive or negative. Such an overt 
assessment was not done by the Bank in the MUTP case and would be unlikely to be 
carried out in any case as it would be seen as too overt a human rights-related activity. 
But proxy indications can be obtained such as the level of literacy and level of gender 
equality in the affected population. Such information would help in the design of policies 
and mechanisms to help ensure that the rights associated with participation and 
accountability could be enjoyed in relation to the activities of the MUTP project. 
 
Implementation 
Starting at the implementation level of the CF, the human rights compliance requirement 
is for the Bank to take measures with the aim of not undermining the human rights of 
concern. The measures relate to the laws, policies and mechanisms concerning the MUTP 
and the associated institutional capacities of both the Bank and the project’s 
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implementing agencies, namely MMRDA, the state government’s implementing agency. 
and its affiliates. The measures to be taken by the Bank are at two levels; the Bank’s own 
policies, mechanisms and capacities and by the Bank working with the borrower and its 
implementing agency, the MMRDA, concerning their laws, policies, mechanisms and 
capacities. An example of the specific requirements identified using the CF is first 
provided in relation to the laws and policies governing the MUTP. 
 
Laws and policies 
The Bank would be required to have a policy that gives effect to the human rights of the 
people being resettled by the MUTP to participate in its resettlement process. As 
mentioned, OD 4.30 prima facie does so by providing for the participation of the people 
being resettled in the planning, implementation and monitoring of the resettlement 
process. The key requirement however is for the Bank to work with the MMRDA to 
ensure that this aspect of OD 4.30 is effectively translated to MUTP’s resettlement 
policy. Until OD 4.30 is translated to the MUTP resettlement policy, it has no effect on 
the resettled people’s human right to participate in the resettlement process. Translating 
OD 4.30 into the MUTP resettlement policy would be done under the various provisions 
of OD 4.30 that provide for the review of the borrower’s laws and policies and for 
working with the borrower to produce a resettlement policy. For instance, the MMRDA’s 
resettlement policy did in fact make provision for active community participation in both 
the development and implementation of the details of the resettlement program504. 
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The MMRDA policy states that the mode of participation would be ‘by 
establishing links with community based organisations’, which raises questions about 
how ‘active’ the participation might actually be. As it turned out, some of the people 
being resettled felt they were not allowed to participate in the planning or the 
implementation of the resettlement plan, lodging a complaint with the Bank’s Inspection 
Panel alleging that their rights to participation and consultation had been denied505. The 
manner in which participation policies operate in practice is the subject of the CF’s 
application level. However, since the mode of participation is through local organisations, 
the issue of the capacity of those organisations to adequately provide for the participation 
of the people concerned, is the subject of another compliance requirement at the 
structural level, that concerning ‘institutional capacity’. 
 
In the case of the MUTP, the Bank’s policies were applicable and in working with 
the Borrower, in particular the Government of Maharashtra, the Bank was able to ensure 
that the appropriate policies were in the resettlement policy with regards to provisions for 
participation, information disclosure and grievance mechanisms. The resettlement policy 
was adopted in 1999, three years before the MUTP loan and credit were approved. It 
takes into account gender discrimination and provides for appropriate measures if 
indigenous people are affected but does not make provision for any other vulnerable or 
marginalised group. 
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Giving effect to the right to participation will involve more than just the provision 
of a policy for doing so. The Bank should be concerned that the borrower also has the 
laws and policies in place that would support the enjoyment of the human rights related 
to participation and accountability. In case such rights will be interfered with the Bank 
should be concerned that the Borrower has the laws and policies that would minimise 
such disruption. As the Bank’s General Counsel noted, participation issues also involve 
the protection of the freedoms of expression and assembly, so the Bank would also have 
to work with the borrower to ensure that those protections are part of the law. The Bank 
should also be concerned with the level of protection of the freedom of expression and 
assembly on their own, as these freedoms would be important for the proper functioning 
of the project506. The Bank would also be concerned to assess that all the relevant laws 
and policies provide for the enjoyment and protection of the human rights concerned 
without discrimination. 
 
However, there is no record that the Bank made any assessment of the adequacy 
of protection of the freedoms of expression and assembly under Indian law and it is noted 
that the requirement for assessing the availability and extent of such protection is not part 
of any Bank operational policy. 
 
There is also a requirement for those laws and policies to provide for the equal 
access of all resettled people507 and also, where necessary, to be adaptable to the needs of 
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the rights-holders. The Bank’s policy on involuntary resettlement for instance provides 
for particular attention to ensure that vulnerable groups are adequately represented in 
participatory mechanisms508. This list is not exclusive and so would allow the Bank to 
influence the borrower’s policy to include other groups as the project’s characteristics 
may require. The critical issue of course is whether having gained representation in such 
mechanisms, members of vulnerable groups can effectively take part or make their voices 
heard. Ensuring that the views of vulnerable groups are actually taken into account is a 
matter of seeing how this policy is implemented in a particular case and so is an issue 
covered at the application level.  
 
The Bank of course has had experience of many projects all over the world that 
involved population resettlement. This raises the question of the extent to which the Bank 
is able to transfer lessons learnt between projects where those lessons enhance 
participation and accountability levels of the people affected by these projects. But the 
requirement of adaptability is a difficult one for the Bank to deal with. The Bank is 
conscious that the adequacy requirement might be used by states as a way to water down 
the resettlement policy requirements of their implementing agencies. While the Bank 
would seek to ensure the same resettlement policies are adopted in all its projects, even if 
from the perspective of utility if doing so simplifies the project’s preparation and 
supervision, variation of local conditions, in particular capabilities of state implementing 
agencies would make that impossible. A comparison of the resettlement policies for the 
various Bank projects will show a variation in the policies around the mean provided by 
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the relevant Bank policy, OD 4.30 for instance. Not all of the variation will be due to 
different project conditions. There is also likely to be variation as a result of learning 
within the Bank, institutional failure by the Bank, and staff turnover within the Bank to 
name a few reasons. However the variation also represents an assertion of control by the 
borrowing state over the project that is a reality of all Bank-financed projects. Perhaps 
one can acknowledge that and try to work around it. 
 
Mechanisms 
The Bank also needs to ensure that the appropriate mechanisms are instituted in order that 
the relevant laws and policies may give effect to the human rights relating to participation 
and accountability. These include the mechanisms that the Bank can institute on its own 
accord because they fall within the Bank’s direct responsibility as well as the 
mechanisms that the Bank can influence the borrower to institute under the loan or credit 
agreement. With regards to its projects, the Bank would have in place a mechanism that 
operates as a review body for project decision-making that people affected by the project 
can participate in. It would also be required to institute an accountability mechanism that 
allows people to seek redress if their rights are or have been threatened. In order for both 
types of mechanisms to function as needed, the Bank also has to provide people with all 
relevant information concerning the issue the mechanism is required to deal with. In the 
case of the MUTP for example, the people affected by the project were able to avail 
themselves of the Bank’s Inspection Panel process and seek redress for some of their 
complaints. 
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In the case of the borrower, the user of the CF would identify that the Bank would 
have to work with the borrower to ensure that appropriate mechanisms are in place to 
ensure the enjoyment, realisation and protection of the human rights related to 
participation and accountability are not undermined. Specifically, there would be required 
mechanisms for participation by the project affected people in various stages of the 
resettlement process from planning to implementation. To facilitate both the participation 
of individuals in such mechanisms and in accountability mechanisms, there should be 
mechanisms for the disclosure of information. There would also be required mechanisms 
for accountability should members of the resettlement population take issue with any 
aspect of the resettlement process. This could include a situation in which the individual’s 
enjoyment of human rights is being interfered with. Such mechanisms ought to be 
accessible and their procedures made known through the dissemination of information. 
 
In the case of the MUTP, the accountability mechanisms provided were the first 
and second tier grievance mechanisms. These mechanisms would have to be accessible, 
adaptable, adequate, available 509  and impartial, whichever of these attributes were 
applicable. In the event, the MUTP’s grievance mechanisms lacked these attributes in 
that they were found by the Inspection Panel to be inaccessible, inadequate, effectively 
unavailable because the resettled people were not adequately informed about them, and 
not impartial. The details of these shortcomings are discussed in relation to the 
application level as they came to light when the mechanisms were put in practice. 
However, it is worth noting here that the Inspection Panel’s findings led to an 
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acknowledgement by the Bank that aspects of the grievance mechanisms would be 
changed. The changes in effect would bring the mechanisms in line with the attributes of 
accessibility, adequacy and availability; the issue of impartiality was dealt with by 
replacing the MMRDA and NGO staff sitting on the grievance mechanisms with 
independent officials. Thus the human rights attributes are relevant to the Bank’s project 
requirements and the Bank may have been able to avoid an Inspection Panel investigation 
by ensuring the grievance mechanisms did have those attributes. It is also worth noting 
that the Inspection Panel’s findings plus the Bank’s practice in acknowledging the 
validity of those findings has the effect of replicating the human rights compliance 
requirement of ensuring the Bank’s operational policy-related mechanisms have those 
attributes. In other words, in using the CF, the user would want to ensure that the 
grievance mechanisms under OD 4.30 did not have the deficiencies pointed out by the 
Panel. 
 
Institutional environment, culture and capacity 
The user concerned with human rights compliance must also give consideration to issues 
of institutional environment, culture and capacity for both the Bank and the borrower and 
its implementing agencies. This includes consideration of the human rights culture and 
capacity of both sets of actors. The CF would be used to identify the relevant institutional 
capacities for the purpose or from the perspective of human rights compliance. 
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For the Bank, the human rights compliance requirement would be to ensure its 
own institutional capacity to establish appropriate implementation of the components of 
its resettlement projects that are relevant to the human rights relating to participation and 
accountability. These, as mentioned previously, are three-fold: measures related to 
participation, information disclosure and accountability. In the MUTP case, this was not 
done because the Bank authorised a merger of the resettlement component of the project 
with the transport components. The merger violated the Bank’s own practice and its 
operational policy. As a result, the Bank was unable to secure the appropriate 
implementation of the measures related to participation, information disclosure and 
accountability510. 
 
In addition to the above, the Bank has to ensure it has adequate supervision 
capacity to supervise and monitor the borrower and its implementing agency. Finally, the 
Bank has to provide human rights training for its staff. Without such training, the Bank’s 
staff may have difficulty assessing the human rights requirements needed for the 
purposes of the participation and accountability components of its projects511. 
 
The CF would also be used to identify the need to ensure that the borrower’s 
implementing agency has the capacity to implement and to supervise those components 
of the resettlement project that are relevant to the human rights relating to participation 
and accountability. Lastly, the CF would be used to identify the need to understand the 
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level of human rights protection provided by the borrower concerning the human rights 
related to participation and accountability and the level of human rights awareness among 
the staff of the borrower’s implementing agency. 
 
Application 
As noted in earlier discussions of the CF, at the application level, there is a requirement 
to ensure that the steps taken by the actor to respect and give effect to human rights 
actually work in practice as they were designed to. Thus in the MUTP case, the Bank 
would be required to determine that the people having to be resettled are in fact making 
use of the mechanisms concerning participation and accountability that were designed for 
the project at the implementation level. Finally, the Bank is required to ensure that the 
steps taken at the implementation level and put into practice do not adversely affect the 
enjoyment or realisation of other human rights, either of the resettled individuals or of 
other individuals in the community. Together with that, the Bank is also required to 
determine if the steps taken adversely affect its institutional capacity to continue applying 
them in practice.  
 
Application of laws, policies and mechanisms 
In case actions at the implementation level are not being applied as designed, there is a 
requirement to rectify the matter, which may involve actions at the application or 
implementation levels. At the application level, if the implementation measures are not 
being carried out as designed there is a requirement to rectify that with the borrower and 
its implementing agencies. However, if they are not being carried out as designed 
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because of the way they have been designed, there is a requirement to return to the 
implementation level and rectify the problem with the borrower and its implementing 
agencies as to the design of the law/policy. Existing procedures concerning OD 4.30 
allow the Bank to do this in two ways; through the MMRDA’s own monitoring and 
reporting as well as through the Bank’s own supervision of the MMRDA and its 
affiliates. 
 
The application of the MUTP’s grievance mechanisms in practice illustrates this 
aspect of the CF. So too does the next example concerning the monitoring of rights-
holders’ practice. Although these mechanisms were designed as part of MMRDA’s 
resettlement policy and approved by the Bank, the Inspection Panel’s investigation 
‘revealed a lack of common understanding of how the mechanism works and what its 
major duties are’ among MMRDA’s staff 512 . The lack of ‘clear responsibilities, 
procedures and rules’513 concerning the MUTP’s grievance mechanisms contributed to 
their lack of accessibility and effectiveness as well as the lack of timeliness of the 
response of the mechanisms to people’s complaints 514 . The lack of clear rules and 
procedures is an implementation level issue, since it concerns the design of the 
mechanism. However, the problem was revealed at the application level when the issue 
of how the mechanisms worked in practice was examined. Thus the human rights 
compliance requirement would be to monitor how the mechanisms are working in 
practice, and if they are found to be working improperly due to implementation level 
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issues, to make the necessary correction to the mechanisms at the implementation level, if 
that is where the problem is, as in this case. 
 
Rights-holders’ practice 
There is a requirement to identify what the practice of the rights-holders is concerning the 
measures, the policies and mechanisms, adopted to give effect to their human rights 
relating to participation and accountability. If the practise is not what is intended, that is 
the rights-holders are not participating in the participation and accountability mechanisms 
that may be an indication that the laws/policies for participation and accountability are 
not properly designed or that the mechanisms to implement those laws/policies are not 
properly designed. In that case, the CF would direct the user back to the implementation 
level, or perhaps to another category at the application level, to make the necessary 
adjustments to the law/policy or to the mechanism. 
 
In the case of the MUTP’s grievance mechanisms, the Inspection Panel found that 
a number of rights-holders were not making use of the grievance mechanisms. The reason 
was found to be that they had not been adequately informed about the mechanisms515 and 
that the rights-holders felt that the mechanisms were not independent. The two grievance 
committees were manned by MMRDA and SPARC staff and since many of the 
grievances referred to alleged malpractice by MMRDA or SPARC staff, there was a lack 
of recourse to those mechanisms by the people affected by the project516. 
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In the case of the MUTP, the mechanism used by the NGOs to engender 
participation by the people affected by the project was ineffective. It would be necessary 
to identify this so that the situation might be remedied and a proper mechanism used to 
ensure those rights were not undermined. 
 
The associated effects 
Here the requirement of the Bank would be to ensure that the laws/policies/mechanisms 
adopted in relation to the human rights related to participation and accountability do not 
undermine the enjoyment, realisation and protection of other human rights. Specifically 
the requirement would involve the Bank’s assessing if the laws/policies/mechanisms 
adopted in relation to the human rights relating to participation and accountability have 
undermined the enjoyment, realisation and protection of other human rights of those 
affected by the project in terms of the resettlement and those affected by the project 
because the project affected their (living and working) environment. This is the 
requirement arising from the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights. If there 
are such effects, then the follow-up requirement would be to make the determination that 
the effective restriction of the other human rights was reasonable in the circumstances. 
However, if there are such effects, but they are not reasonable in the circumstances, to 
make the necessary rectifications either to the design of the laws/policies/mechanisms or 
the manner in which they are being implemented. 
 
In identifying the Bank’s compliance requirements in relation to the applicable 
human rights norm relating to the human rights relating to participation and 
accountability, the key focus is at the application level.  This is the case for all actors with 
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human rights obligations or commitment, but is particularly pertinent in the case of the 
Bank as the Bank operates in various contexts throughout the globe.  The context-
specificity of human rights compliance is therefore especially relevant to actors with 
global operations.  The different contexts in which the Bank operates creates variation in 
performance of project requirements as provided by the Bank’s operational policies.  
How to take into account of such variation in assessing human rights compliance is a key 
question.  It will require that the use of any compliance strategy be dynamic and flexible.  
In addition, as the Bank has different capabilities in different countries, it should be 
recognised that one thing that the identification of human rights compliance requirements 
in the case of the World Bank must do more than in the case of other actors is to highlight 
the different capabilities so that steps may be identified that can be taken to compensate 
for those differing capabilities. 
 
Effectiveness 
The effectiveness level concerns whether the actions taken in connection with the 
requirements of the Bank to ensure that the human rights associated with participation 
and responsibility in relation to the MUTP were not undermined. Since compliance is the 
factual matching of the actor’s behaviour with the norm concerned, this level of the CF is 
concerned to determine whether the MUTP operations were conducted in a manner that 
did not undermine the enjoyment of the human rights of the people affected by the 
project, particularly those rights concerning participation and accountability. From a 
human rights perspective however, the effectiveness of measures taken to respect human 
rights, or not to undermine human rights, is not determined only with regard to the human 
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right or rights of those being resettled but also with regard to the human rights of others 
affected by the project whether directly, for instance the host communities, and those of 
the broader community in which the resettlement operations are being conducted. 
 
Level of realisation of rights related to participation and accountability 
The requirement for the Bank would be to determine whether the MUTP gave effect to 
the human rights related to participation and accountability of the people being resettled.  
The requirement is to take the measures undertaken to see to it that the MUTP did not 
undermine the human rights of concern and determine whether they were effective. If 
they are found to be ineffective then remedial steps can be taken at the implementation 
and application levels. Further if the effectiveness level shows that the measures taken 
did not prevent the undermining of the human rights of concern: 
1. Redress might be made to those who rights were not given effect to (the consequence 
of non-compliance), and 
2. The measures may be rectified if the project is long-term and ongoing (also the 
consequence of non-compliance but also a means of ensuring compliance) 
3. The lessons learnt may help prevent such rights not being given effect to in future 
projects (the consequence of non-compliance). 
 
Level of realisation of other human rights 
The requirement would be to assess if the laws/policies/mechanisms adopted in relation 
to the human rights relating to participation and accountability have undermined the 
enjoyment, realisation and protection of other human rights of those people affected by 
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the project in terms of the resettlement and those affected by the project because the 
project affected their (living and working) environment. 
 
Targets and benchmarks 
These were not addressed by the Bank in the MUTP context. And arguably, the length of 
Bank projects may not be such as to make it sensible to establish any other targets than to 
aim for the goal of zero negative impact on human rights enjoyment over the course of 
the project. Benchmarks in such a case would be required to be designed as warning 
indicators so the Bank could be alerted if a situation involving the restriction of human 
rights enjoyment is developing. So for example, there could be a benchmark in terms of 
the expected occupancy or use levels of grievance mechanisms in relation to a project. 
Then if the expected level is seriously undermet, the Bank could seek to determine if 
there is a problem to do with an interference to people’s enjoyment of their rights to 
access remedies. 
 
In conclusion, this simple illustration of the use of the CSF and the CF extends the 
example of the CF’s use that was undertaken in Chapter 5. It is an example in broad strokes 
aimed only at providing some idea of the use of the CSF in practice. Clearly, the compliance 
situation is a very complex one as all real world situations would be. For instance, there are 
dealing between the World Bank and different levels of government in India. There will be 
rotations of staff both from the World Bank side and from the side of the implementing 
agency in Mumbai. The circumstances, in other words, against which the compliance 
requirements would have to be identified would be subject to quite a degree of change. Still, 
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it is suggested that those are some of the reasons that can make the CSF and CF useful 
templates for use by actors concerned with issues of compliance – either their own 
compliance or the compliance of others. In a situation of substantial nuance and complexity, 
having a simple to understand template can be useful in helping all the people involved 
focus on a few key things. And it can be useful for structuring otherwise chaotic situations. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to identify, describe and examine requirements for compliance 
with norms of international law, and in so doing to suggest a strategy and framework as a 
solution for the identification of such requirements for use in specific cases. 
 
 The motivation to address this issue arose from the observation that in certain 
instances, and for various reasons, there was uncertainty over what an actor was supposed 
to do to comply with a norm of international law. The idea of an actor’s compliance 
requirements as a systematic approach to helping an actor determine what to do to 
achieve compliance was a proposed solution. 
 
 Next, the idea of compliance requirements with norms of international law was 
explained by analogy with the idea of the course of conduct and actor was obliged to 
undertake in order to comply with an obligation of result under international law. And 
this led to the conception of the compliance requirements as being defined by the actor’s 
course of conduct given the compliance topic the actor had to address plus considerations 
regarding compliance derived from compliance theories and considerations arising from 
the concept of compliance itself. 
 
 These considerations involved a focus on the sustainability of an actor’s 
compliance especially where its compliance was an ongoing process and was a matter of 
degree. In addition, the compliance process was conceptualised in terms of three stages or 
levels: Implementation, Application and Effectiveness. Other considerations included 
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taking account of the actor’s context and characteristics and the importance of clearly 
identifying the norm in relation to which compliance was expected. 
 
 At the end of the investigation of compliance theories, the concept of compliance 
and the idea of the actor’s course of conduct, the conception of compliance requirements 
was that compliance requirements orchestrated an actor’s course of conduct in complying 
with a norm of international law. By organising the elements of compliance requirements 
that were identified or conceptualised into a framework, a strategy for achieving 
compliance and a framework for identifying compliance requirements to orchestrate an 
actor’s course of conduct was produced. The whole strategy was represented by the 
Compliance Strategy and Framework (CSF) and the framework identifying the actor’s 
compliance requirements was the Compliance Framework (CF). 
 
 The description, application and use of the CSF and the CF in identifying an 
actor’s compliance requirements was provided as well as a simple illustration in relation 
to a collection of human rights.  
 
 It is submitted that the CSF and CF will help actors identify their compliance 
requirements with norms of international law. One helpful feature of the CSF and CF is 
that they are universal templates that can be used in relation to both state and non-state 
actors and in relation to both legally binding and non-legally binding norms. In this way 
it provides a template for the exchange of learning between various categories of actor in 
relation to what works when seeking to comply with international norms. 
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 The idea of compliance requirements itself is useful as it focuses attention on the 
reality of compliance with international law norms, namely that compliance is not a 
binary affair but a process of negotiation, iteration, and trial and error. And that the main 
issue in dealing with international law and with international norms is to change an 
actor’s behaviour so that it complies with the international norm. 
 
 The CSF and CF can facilitate that transformation of behaviour because they are 
objective frameworks that operate in a transparent manner. Accordingly there is an 
element of fairness and legitimacy to the CSF and CF that will, it is hoped, facilitate 
compliance with international norms by those using them. 
 
7.1. Possible uses of the CSF 
In Chapter 1, the potential uses of the CSF were highlighted. Here some of those uses are 
re-emphasised and others are highlighted in light of the theoretical basis for the CSF that 
was unfolded in this thesis and of some of the practical considerations identified along 
the way. 
1. The CSF can facilitate the transposition of international law norms from one actor, 
most likely a state, to other actors, such as non-state actors. This ‘use’ applies to the 
CSF as a whole not just the CF. 
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2. The CSF, with its emphasis on taking account of causality, that is the link between 
the norm and the conduct conforming to the norm, can help the empirical study of 
compliance and compliance phenomenon.  
 
3. The CSF can help in the analysis of how norms are interpreted and applied in 
particular instances.  
 
4. The CSF allows the user to identify gaps in the law 
 
5. The CSF allows the user to identify, contemplate and decide on the trade-offs in 
balancing competing interests and facilitates making that trade-off transparently. 
 
6. The CSF facilitates the development of international law through structuring the 
practice of actors in terms of the CSF elements. 
 
7. The CSF allows for questions of justice to be incorporated into international law. 
Users making trade-offs will have to address issues of justice. Similar issues will 
have to be addressed in closing gaps in the law revealed using the CSF. In this way, 
issues of justice can be worked into the development of international law. 
 
8. The CSF facilitates compliance by allowing actors to map their operational activities 
onto the CSF template, or conversely allows actors to see where and how the CSF 
relates to their existing operations. Then the actors can easily see what changes might 
be need to improve their compliance. 
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9. The CSF facilitates: 
a. Better coordination between actors. 
b. Better analysis of a compliance situation. 
c. Learning among actors if they share a single, simple template. 
d. The conceptualisation of the normative requirements of non-binding norms and 
soft law norms where authoritative interpretation is not on hand. 
 
• The CSF can be used as part of an actor’s risk management and risk mitigation 
strategy. 
 
7.2. Further steps 
The following developments could be further steps building on the idea of compliance 
requirements with norms of international law and the CSF and the CF: 
1. To see if the idea of compliance requirements can make a contribution to compliance 
theories. 
2. To apply the idea of compliance requirements, the CSF and the CF to other areas of 
international law such as environmental law and international investment law. 
3. To see whether the idea of compliance requirements, which in this thesis, tried to deal 
with the fragmentation of international law can creditably address issues of norm 
conflict involving a broad range of international law areas. 
4. In relation to the last point, an immediate further step could be to review the CSF and 
CF to ensure any kinks are worked out and then to apply it to the case of the conflict 
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between human rights norms and international investment protection norms. This 
issue was mentioned in Chapters 1 and 4 of this thesis and a full treatment of the 
issues involved together with the application of the CSF and CF could be undertaken. 
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